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The Co-Prosecutors have appealed the Closing Order, arguing inter alia that Duch should also have been indicted for his participation in crimes pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise (JCE). The ECCC Law does not specifically mention the availability of JCE as a form of commission, but the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the landmark Tadić decision treated JCE as a prosecutable form of “commission,” even though its Statute is also silent as to this form of responsibility and excludes conspiracy except with respect to the crime of genocide (in keeping with Article III of the Genocide Convention).
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JCE is traditionally conceived of as encompassing three overlapping forms.
► The first (“basic”) mode provides for liability where an individual intentionally acts collectively with others to commit international crimes pursuant to a common plan.
► The second (“systemic”) form provides for liability for individuals who contribute to the maintenance or essential functions of a criminal institution or system, such as a concentration or detention camp.
► The third, and most controversial form, provides for extended liability, not only for crimes intentionally committed pursuant to the common design, but also for crimes that were the natural and foreseeable consequence of implementing the common design.
The theory with this latter form is that participants in the JCE willingly took the risk of the commission of additional non-intentional but foreseeable crimes.
Most relevant to S-21, of course, is the second JCE form. Under this form, Duch could be held liable not only for crimes he personally committed or ordered, but also for crimes that were
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It is not clear how many crimes might escape prosecution in the absence of JCE allegations in the indictment.
► As chairman of S-21, Duch can be held responsible for any crimes committed by his subordinates when he knew, or should have known, about such crimes and failed to take adequate steps to prevent or punish them.
► He can also be held directly liable for ordering or planning crimes, or for otherwise aiding or abetting them through the knowing or intentional provision of substantial assistance to the direct perpetrator.
The only crimes that seem to fall through the cracks without JCE liability are crimes committed by non-subordinates (individuals over whom Duch did not exercise effective command or control), crimes of which he was not aware and could not have reasonably been aware, or crimes that he did not order, plan, or substantially assist.
The third, extended, form of JCE could also be utilized to hold Duch responsibility for crimes (such as rape and other forms of sexual violence) that he did not order, did not intend to be committed, or did not know had been committed, but were nonetheless foreseeable given the abject conditions of detention prevailing at S-21.
Given the volumes of direct evidence against Duch, including his own partial confessions and admissions as detailed in the Closing Order, he is unlikely to escape responsibility entirely. Nonetheless, the Co-Prosecutors are no doubt looking to the future to ensure that JCE liability is available for other defendants in the dock who were likely very far from the commission of crimes, but nonetheless could be alleged to have participated in, indeed launched, a vast JCE to establish a utopian agrarian state, through violence where necessary, and to rid Cambodia of enemies of the revolution.