Showing posts with label Cambodia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cambodia. Show all posts

On April 4

On this day in ...
... 1976 (35 years ago today), the man who'd been a "virtual prisoner" since the Khmer Rouge takeover the previous year, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was forced to resign his position as Cambodia's head of state. Within days Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan (right) would be named "Chairman of the State Presidium," and his colleague, Pol Pot, Prime Minister. As IntLawGrrls have posted in our Khmer Rouge accountability series, Pol Pot is dead, but Khieu Samphan awaits trial before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. (photo credit)

(Prior April 4 posts are
here, here, here, and here.)

Beyond the ECCC

One of the hopes, if not justifications, for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia is that the tribunal will promote the rule of law in Cambodia by modeling concepts of procedural due process and equality before the law. But these ideas are spreading through the country slowly, if at all. Just beyond the court’s perimeter are two particularly disturbing examples of the vacuum of accountability that exists in Cambodia today. Driven by hunger for development and economic growth, the government has turned a blind eye to land grabs and trafficking of young girls, essentially legalizing these abusive practices.
LICADHO, a well-respected Cambodian NGO, reports from a survey of half of the country’s provinces that approximately 250,000 Cambodians were evicted between 2005 and 2009. Last year alone, the NGO helped nearly 50,000 people facing land grabbing. Another reputable NGO, Adhoc, says that over 12,000 families were victims of land grabs last year. Focusing on the capital, Phnom Penh, another NGO estimates that around ten percent of the population has faced eviction since the turn of the century.
In just the past month, over 20,000 people have been evicted from their homes and businesses on or around Boeung Kak Lake in central Phnom Penh. Homeowners report that they were given no warning before armed construction workers began pumping thousands of gallons of sand and water into their homes. A new residential, commercial, and entertainment complex is to be built on the site of the former lake. Ironically, many of the residents of this neighborhood were displaced once before, by the Khmer Rouge.
Surya Subedi, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cambodia, agrees that “[l]and grabbing by the rich and powerful is a major problem in Cambodia today.” Indeed, when I last visited Cambodia, in 2007, Cambodian pop music featured songs about the land grabbing phenomenon, demonstrating its prevalence and importance to the population. In contrast, the Director-General of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce says that, “[w]hen land belongs to the government, they can do what they like with it . . .[S]ome people are just trying to hold back our country’s development with their protests.”
After a World Bank inquiry finding a denial of due process in the adjudication of land claims in the Boeung Kak Lake case, the government gave residents a week to decide whether they would accept $8,500 compensation in exchange for the destruction of their homes. Local activists who wish to keep their homes say that international pressure is the only solution, as the government is in collusion with the development corporations.
Financial interests run deep in Cambodia’s trafficking problems as well. A recent investigation by Cambodian NGOs found that recruiting companies have solicited over 20,000 Cambodians, including girls as young as thirteen, to work in Malaysian households.
The government is alleged to be complicit in this business on several levels. Commune level officials have reportedly falsified birth certificates so that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can issue passports with false birthdates for girls under twenty-one years of age. Last September, Adhoc issued a report on severe cases of abuse at “training” facilities for domestic workers in Phnom Penh, including forced imprisonment, beatings, and even rape and torture. When one woman incurred injuries attempting to escape from such a facility, local police interrogated and chastised the neighbors who assisted her.
MP Mu Sochua, former Minister for Women’s Affairs, says that the government is protecting these recruiting companies because of financial interests in them. In addition to this corruption, Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia Division, notes that international efforts to train Cambodian officials about trafficking have had little success. In other words, the rule of law is still a distant aspiration, and it’s not clear what role the ECCC has played in bringing it home to Cambodians.


(photo credit to Aratxa Cedillo)

The memory cascade in Cambodia

When I first began working in Cambodia almost fifteen years ago, I was shocked to learn that the history of the Khmer Rouge was not taught in the schools (prior post). The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) began pushing in 1999 to change this situation, publishing a high school textbook on the Khmer Rouge regime in 2007, the year after the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) began operating. The DC-Cam has subsequently held numerous teacher trainings to educate teachers in methods of presenting this history to their students.
Earlier this month, just two weeks after the indictments were filed in Case 002 at the ECCC, Indra Devi High School in Phnom Penh unveiled new anti-genocide slogans on their library building. The signs, pictured at left, say "Talking about experiences during the Khmer Rouge regime is to promote reconciliation and to educate children about forgiveness and tolerance," and "Learning about the history of Democratic Kampuchea is to prevent genocide."
Through these signs, the DC-Cam aims to raise awareness among teachers and students about genocide and genocide prevention, a task that is particularly important given that 70 percent of Cambodians were born after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. By early next year, every high school in the country will display similar slogans.
The timing of these successful efforts to memorialize the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and the creation and operation of the ECCC are not coincidental. The ECCC has arguably served as a catalyst for this memory cascade, creating political space for non-governmental organizations to pursue creative transitional justice efforts. Other efforts have been more closely tied to the ECCC, such as the DC-Cam's Living Documents project through which victims of the Khmer Rouge visit to the tribunal to watch a trial and then facilitate public discussions about the proceedings in their home village.
But all of the numerous memory projects that have proliferated in recent years owe a debt to the tribunal. Though the ECCC's role in formal accountability has been limited to the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime, the tribunal has played a crucial role in enabling a much broader range of activities, all of which will work in tandem to ensure that mass crimes are never again committed on Cambodian soil.

Teeing Up ECCC Case 002

The Co-Investigating Judges of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) recently filed the Closing Order for Case 002 indicting four defendants for international crimes allegedly committed during the Khmer Rouge era (1975-1979). The four defendants in question, who have been in pre-trial detention since 2007, are the surviving members of the Khmer Rouge Central Committee and/or Standing Committee:
► Ieng Sary (former Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs) (left),
► Khieu Samphan (former Chair of the State Presidium) (below right),
► Nuon Chea (former Chair of the People’s Representative Assembly and the Khmer Rouge’s chief ideologue) (below left), and
► Ieng Thirith (former Minister of Social Affairs and Ieng Sary’s wife) (below right).
As a result of the Closing Order, which officially ends the formal investigation by the Co-Investigating Judges, the four defendants will be tried for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, genocide, and offenses under the 1956 Cambodia Criminal Code. In light of the enormity of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge, the Co-Prosecutors in their 2007 Introductory Submission asked the Co-Investigating Judges (“CIJs”) to focus their investigation on specific crimes in specific sectors, including:

  • the multiple displacements of the population;
  • the establishment of abusive cooperatives and worksites;
  • the “re-education” of “bad elements” and the elimination of "enemies” in security centers and execution sites;
  • crimes against particular minorities in Cambodia (including Cham Muslims, those of Vietnamese descent, Buddhist adherents, and individuals affiliated with prior regimes);
  • and the “regulation of marriage,” which concerns forcible marriage and sexual relations as discussed here.
The overarching theory of the cases is that the Khmer Rouge used these criminal means to implement its revolutionary project. The Closing Order notes:

Whilst the existence of an ideological project cannot, as such, be considered to be a legal element of crimes against humanity, the implementation of the plan adopted, by criminal means in the case in point by the [Khmer Rouge] authorities demonstrates the widespread and systematic character of the attack.
As we've seen in a number of such cases, the CIJs invoke crimes against humanity as an umbrella charge to cover a range of abuses. The murder and extermination charges stem from purges of Khmer Rouge enemies (such as members of the prior regime) and killings committed at security centers and execution sites. Starting in 1977, the killing of members of the Vietnamese and Cham communities reached a scale so as to qualify as extermination as well as genocide. In addition, the CIJs imply that the charged persons could be convicted for extermination for the high numbers of deaths resulting from the large-scale population movements as well as the conditions of life in the security centers.
Enslavement, imprisonment and torture charges stem mainly from abuses at worksites, cooperatives, and security centers. At these sites, Khmer Rouge staff exercised

total control and all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over the persons placed there . . . .
The infringements on freedom in the worksites and cooperatives also deemed to constitute imprisonment. Deportation charges concern persons of Vietnamese descent forced to leave Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge came to power.
Evolving patterns of persecution on political grounds (against intellectuals, individuals associated with the prior regime), religious grounds (against members of the Cham community and adherents to Buddhism), and racial grounds (against people of Vietnamese descent) involved grave violations of fundamental rights recognized under customary or conventional international law. The charge alleging the commission of other inhumane acts through attacks on human dignity encompasses everything from deprivations of food, shelter, medical care, sanitation etc. during the population movements to the condition of life at worksites. The rape charges stem from the arrangement of forced marriages, which are also charged as other inhumane acts.
The Co-Investigating Judges have already determined the admissibility of over two thousand Civil Party applications (of over four thousand filed). Other applications were rejected primarily because the Civil Parties did not allege acts falling within the situations under investigation, and a number of these are under appeal. The Civil Parties whose applications were deemed admissible include forty-one victims based in the United States who are represented by the Center for Justice & Accountability, a human rights law firm based in San Francisco, led by IntLawGrrl guest/alumna Pamela Merchant, which has heretofore focused on Alien Tort Statute/Torture Victim Protection Act litigation.
There is no question that these defendants were high-level figures within the Khmer Rouge, responsible for launching a radical and ultimately disastrous revolutionary program. Case 002 will determine the extent to which they can be held responsible for the crimes committed in connection with implementing this project throughout the country given that mid-level cadre may have had considerably discretion in to how to best advance the revolution.
To date, all these defendants have either denied their knowledge of or involvement in abuses by their subordinates or laid responsibility at the feet of their dead compatriots, Pol Pot (“Brother Number One”) (right) or Ta Mok (head of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea) (above left).

Stay tuned!

For a longer discussion of the Closing Order, see my ASIL Insight.

Forced Marriage and the Khmer Rouge

Not without controversy, gender-based violence and sexual violence did not feature prominently in the first trial to go forward before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) against Kaing Guek Eav, a.k.a. Duch, the head of S-21 prison. Indeed, the Civil Parties in their closing arguments (see coverage here) decried the fact that the Co-Prosecutors did not place more emphasis on this aspect of violence at S-21 prison in their Introductory Submission to the Co-Investigating Judges.

By contrast, gender-based violence is proving to be more central in Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge regime leaders, such as Ieng Sary (left). In particular, the Co-Investigating Judges have recently issued their Closing Order indicting the four defendants for sexual violence—viz., the crimes against humanity of rape and other inhumane acts—among other crimes. Most of these allegations stem from the Khmer Rouge’s regulation of marriage, though, rather than from more traditional forms of sexual violence so endemic to situations of armed conflict or repression.

These allegations can be traced to civil party applications in Case 002 that alleged the occurrence of forced marriage and forced sexual relations. On the basis of these applications, the Co-Prosecutors asked the Co-Investigating Judges to expand their initial investigation to explore these allegations. (See here for this procedural history). Over a defense objection, the Co-Investigating Judges complied. Charges based on sexual violence are now contained in the Closing Order, which ends the pre-trial investigation against the four defendants and tees the case up for trial in January 2011. See prior posts on this involvement of the civil parties in shaping the charges before the ECCC here.

As the Co-Investigating Judges’ Closing Order details, intimate relationships outside of marriage were contrary to the collectivist approach of the Khmer Rouge and considered a vestige of the ancient bourgeois regime. The party’s moral code cautioned against taking “liberties with women” and actions “detrimental to women,” and those suspected of immoral behavior were categorized as “bad elements” worthy of purge, reeducation, or even death. The Co-Investigating Judges noted that although rape was nonetheless committed in security centers and cooperatives, there was also evidence in the record of rapes being reported and punished. Based on these facts, the Co-Investigating Judges determined that

the official [Khmer Rouge] policy regarding rape was to prevent its occurrence and to punish the perpetrators. Despite the fact that this policy did not manage to prevent rape, it cannot be considered that rape was one of the crimes used by the [Khmer Rouge] leaders to implement the common purpose. ¶1429.
As such, the current defendants will not be charged with these types of rape.

Rape appears in the Closing Order in other forms, however. In all sectors of the country, the Khmer Rouge forced couples to marry—sometimes in group ceremonies involving 20-60 couples—to ensure that such unions adhered to official policy and advanced the revolution. For example, only individuals of the same status or standing in terms of party membership could be married. ¶847. Even former monks who had been forcibly disrobed as part of the Khmer Rouge’s effort to eradicate Buddhism from society were not exempt from this policy. ¶842. The Khmer Rouge also adopted a distinctly pronatalist policy with a goal of increasing the population to 20 million within 10-15 years. Bizarrely, many families were also split up as husbands and wives were assigned to different collectives only to be brought back together when the party so dictated, including in some cases for procreation.

Orders regulating marriage apparently came from the highest echelons of the Khmer Rouge, although particular marriages were arranged by local administrative authorities. Army superiors would also choose women from villages for their subordinates, sometimes at random by matching potential mates through drawing numbers from the proverbial hat. ¶848. In these “weddings,” traditional ceremonies were banned; instead, couples vowed to accept each other and work to achieve the objectives of the revolution. Testimony in the record revealed that couples did not dare to resist for fear of punishment at a labor or work camp, reeducation, or even execution. ¶845. Witnesses testified that some individuals committed suicide rather than be subjected to such marriages. Women who refused to have intercourse with their new husbands were also subject to punishment, including imprisonment or beatings. ¶ 858. One witness claimed that most couples were satisfied with the match, although those who were not were given ominous-sounding “imagination counseling.” Some relationships were apparently monitored by militia to ensure proper consummation. The Co-Investigating Judges concluded that the

specificity of this process and the evidence that it was applied in different locations demonstrates the existence of a common purpose formulated at the highest level of the [Khmer Rouge] regime. ¶1446.

The Co-Investigating Judges—You Bunleng (Cambodia, above right) and Marcel Lemonde (France, above left)—determined that these forced marriages are chargeable as the crimes against humanity of rape and other inhumane acts. Interestingly, the description of these forced marriages is gender neutral, although it does speak of a “perpetrator committing a physical invasion of a sexual nature against a victim in coercive circumstances in which the consent of the victim is absent.” ¶1431. This implies that one member of the couple is the direct perpetrator and one the victim. In total, 644 civil parties (out of almost 2000) were declared admissible as victims of the policy of the regulation of marriage.

The photograph above shows the wedding of Nun Huy a.k.a. Huy Sre (left) and Prok Khoeun a.k.a. Prak Samuth (right). Huy was born in 1951 and served as head of the Khmer Rouge re-education center at Prey Sar, also known as Office S-24. Prey Sar was part of the central internal security complex, which also included Tuol Sleng Prison (S-21) and the Killing Fields at Choeung Ek. One prison document, dated 23 July 1977, reports the killing of 18 prisoners at S-24 and bears a note saying "also killed 160 children today for a total of 178 enemies killed." Source: Documentation Center of Cambodia, Document No. D1175 and K08273.

Duch gets 35 (- 5) years




So says the presiding judge of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in Khmer, in this 10-minute video clip of today's verdict against Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), about whose trial we've blogged here. The 67-year-old Duch, stoic during the reading of the verdict, was convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, and torture, and sentenced to "35 years in prison -- with five years taken off that sentence for time served."
Said Documentation Center of Cambodia Director Youk Chhang (right) of Duch's fate:
'It's clear that he will never be a free man again.'

ECCC Update

We've blogged before on the remarkable denouement of the trial of Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) (below right) wherein the defendant all but changed his plea in the final moments of the trial, eviscerating the careful defense that had been constructed for him by his brilliant Co-Defense Counsel, François Roux, and driving a final wedge between his foreign and Cambodian co-counsel (left). The latter, Kar Savuth, had himself also surprised everyone in attendance with an impassioned closing argument on behalf of his client; he attacked the prosecutor's case on both substantive and jurisdictional grounds, and asked for an acquittal on all counts in the Closing Order.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, it was announced Friday that Duch has officially asked to withdraw Roux as his Co-Defense Counsel. Defendants are allowed to change their counsel only under "exceptional circumstances."
The Defense Support Section of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia issued an administrative decision allowing for the withdrawal on the grounds that:
    1. There is no reason to doubt that Mr Kaing’s loss of confidence is genuine;
    2. There is no reason to believe that the Request is aimed at obstructing the proceedings;
    3. The withdrawal of Maitre Roux at this stage will not unduly delay the proceedings;
    4. The loss of confidence amounts to exceptional circumstances.
Savuth will represent Duch at the reading of the verdict on the 26th of this month. Roux, meanwhile, has taken the position as chief defense counsel for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
In other news from the ECCC, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon recently announced that he would appoint a U.N. Special Expert on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to monitor the tribunal and endeavor to prevent political interference. The scuttle is that the position will be taken up by Clint Williamson (left), former U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, starting very soon.

Review of Cultural Heritage

(IntLawGrrls is pleased to welcome back Jennifer Kreder, who contributes this guest post stemming from her work on issues related to cultural property)

The American Society of International Law Interest Group on Cultural Heritage & Arts, for which, as posted, I am a co-founder and serve as co-chair, has released the very first issue of the Cultural Heritage & Arts Review. In it you'll find a rich variety of articles, among them "High Seas Shipwreck Pits Treasure Hunters Against a Sovereign Nation: The Black Swan Case," by attorney Kimberly Alderman (right), "The UK’s Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act of 2009," by University of Derby Lecturer Charlotte Woodhead (left), "Should Cultural Heritage Be on the Judicial Auction Block?" by attorney Laina Lopez (below right), a Co-Vice Chair of our Interest Group, and "Heritage Watch Acts to Protect Cambodian Cultural Heritage," by Terressa Davis, an Executive Consultant to the Association for Research into Crimes against Art and a Review editor.
To access these and the many other articles in this 1st edition, click here to open the Review in Acrobat Reader, go to the Table of Contents page, click on "View" in the toolbar, then "Navigation Panels" in the 1st popup box, "Bookmarks" in the 2d.
A limited high-quality print edition will be available soon. Please contact yours truly at krederj1@nku.edu if you'd like to place an order.
Our Interest Group's March panel discussion on Cultural Heritage and the Arts Interest Group: Wrestling the Dead Hand of History: Perspectives on a Proposed State Department Commission on Nazi Looted Art, which I previewed in an earlier post, was a great success (as I detail in another Review article). If you missed it, it's available on tape by searching for the panel title here.
We are recruiting for editors and writers for the Review's next issue, to be published in the Fall. Please contact me if you're interested in contributing.
To join ASIL and our new Interest Group, click here.

Prosecuting Journalists?

While some may view Obama's stance on administration leaks as aggressively hard-line, his approach of prosecuting officials responsible for disclosure of confidential information is relatively tame compared to the approach proposed at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia last week. The Cambodia Daily reports that, at a private meeting, international Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley warned that journalists who disclose confidential information from the ECCC risk criminal prosecution. That's right -- not court staff, but journalists could face prison time for publishing confidential information from the court. In addition, Cayley threatened contempt of court charges against journalists responsible for publishing confidential court documents. While there's no doubt that the problem of confidentiality is a serious one for the ECCC, with names of witnesses exposed on the Internet and prosecution allegations leaked to reporters, the prosecution of journalists seems both ineffective and contrary to the underlying purpose of the court -- to bring the rule of law and democracy to Cambodia.
Cayley's threat appears to rest on quite broad language in the ECCC's rules authorizing the court to sanction "any person who discloses confidential information in violation of an order of the Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers." While punishing court officials and employees who reveal confidential information might in some cases be necessary to prevent leaks from the inside, the prosecution of journalists will neither stop these leaks nor serve the public interest.
The dangers of authorizing such prosecutions are described well by Thierry Cruvellier, a French journalist who faced contempt proceedings at the hands of the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda after he revealed that a key prosecution witness was suspected of participating in the genocide. In his words,
In democratic societies, journalists breach confidentiality measures and defy court orders when they believe the public interest outweighs the need for secrecy. And it is the job of journalists to find out information that some parties in a trial want kept secret.
Yet prosecutors at the ICTR and now the ECCC seem to overlook both the crucial role of the Fourth Estate in a democracy and the central function of internationalized criminal courts in modeling democratic principles in countries struggling to transition to democracy. One can only hope that they remember these core democratic values at the ECCC, and soon.

A Hybrid Mess in Cambodia

A flurry of competing press announcements in Cambodia has left this IntLawGrrl scratching her head and wondering about the viability of the hybrid tribunal model.
► This past Monday, June 7, according to the Cambodia Daily, Lars Olsen, the UN Legal Affairs spokesperson for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, announced that investigations had begun on five new suspects whose prosecutions the government has opposed.
► According to Olsen, last Friday, June 4, the Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge You Bunleng and the International Co-Investigating Judge Marcel Lemonde issued letters rogatory asking the police to collect evidence to be used in cases 003 and 004. This investigation will bring the total number of Khmer Rouge suspects before the ECCC to ten.
Despite a 2009 survey by the Documentation Center of Cambodia finding that nearly 60 percent of Cambodians favor these expanded investigations, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has repeatedly stated that the tribunal should not prosecute more than five suspects. Sen, himself a former Khmer Rouge cadre, claims that further investigations risk rupturing the peace agreement reached in the 1990s and could even cause a new civil war. Cambodian Co-Prosecutor Chea Leng has hewed the party line, also opposing additional prosecutions; Robert Petit, the International Co-Prosecutor, pushed the cases through despite opposition from Leng and Cambodian pretrial judges. In particular, Petit claimed that arguments about national stability were inconsistent with the ECCC's mandate of accountability, and were not properly before the court.
And here's where it starts to get complicated:
► Late Tuesday night (June 8), Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge You Bunleng (pictured left) issued a press statement disassociating himself from the Cambodia Daily news report of his participation in these additional investigations. Apparently the press release referred questions only to the ECCC's Cambodian spokespeople and avoided any mention of the UN spokespeople. Indeed, on Tuesday evening, UN legal affairs spokesperson Olsen denied any knowledge of Bunleng's press statement.
► In an effort to quell negative rumors, the Co-Investigating Judges issued a press release Wednesday morning (June 9). The release includes internal communications between the judges over the timing of these new investigations, and thus provides fascinating insight into the inner workings of the ECCC.
In a memo dated June 2, International Co-Investigating Judge Lemonde (pictured right) sent an ultimatum to his Cambodian counterpart, Bunleng, expressing concern that since investigations in case 002 had been completed, the investigators were being paid to do nothing. Lemonde noted that the investigators stood ready to undertake investigative missions in the new cases, and that he had sent the letters rogatory to Bunleng for his signature three weeks earlier. Describing these signatures as an "extremely simple" task, Lemonde gave Bunleng until noon on June 4 either to complete them or to face the negative consequences of an official report of the judges' disagreement on whether to proceed.
Bunleng responded with a memo on Tuesday June 8, noting that he had spent some time reflecting on the issues raised by cases 003 and 004, including general principles of justice, the principles used to establish the ECCC, the actual context of Cambodian society, and the impact of these efforts on case 002, which was moving forward smoothly. This assessment led him to the conclusion that the time was ripe to move forward on the new cases, and he signed the letters rogatory accordingly. But, Bunleng noted, after "closer and deeper" consideration of the question, he decided that it was not the right time to move forward on the new investigation. Moreover, he suggested that the closing of the files of case 002 will take some time, and that the new investigations should not take place until that task is completed. Bunleng included with his memo the letters rogatory signed by Lemonde but with Bunleng's signature crossed out.
The fracture that began with Petit's decision to prosecute has created a gaping canyon right down the center of the ECCC, with the internationals lining up on one side and the Cambodians on the other.
While both sides present compelling arguments, the fear remains that Hun Sen's thumb on the scale reflects self-interested politics rather than advocacy of national interests. That worry is compounded by the results of the preference survey described above.
In any case, the ostensibly hybrid court's failure to reach consensus on these important decisions does not bode well for its effectiveness as a mechanism of justice. Future experiments in hybridity, and in international criminal law more generally, must confront and address opposing viewpoints and potential political spoilers within the structure of new accountability mechanisms. If they do not, they may face similarly damaging schisms.

Joint Criminal Enterprise & the ECCC

We've blogged before about whether the still-controversial doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE), in its three manifestations, can be charged before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). As we've discussed, the same question was posed in the Duch case, although the Court determined that the issue was not properly raised at the investigative stage, so the defendant could not be charged under this theory of liability.
In Case 002, involving regime leaders such as Ieng Sary (left, former Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Khieu Samphan (right, former head of state), the issue has emerged again. Defendant's legal challenge to the doctrine turned on the issues of legality and retroactivity:
Did the doctrine exist in customary international law during the Khmer Rouge era (1975-79)?
The Pre-Trial Chamber (in red at left) comprising President Prak Kimsan, Ney Thol, and Pen Pichsaly (all from Cambodia, surnames listed first), along with Judges Rowan Downing (Australia) and Catherine Marchi-Uhel (France), has now ruled on the issue. The decision arose out of the defendants' appeals of the order of the Co-Investigating Judges confirming that the JCE doctrine was properly pleaded by the Co-Prosecutors, that the JCE doctrine existed in customary international law at the applicable time, and that it may be charged before the ECCC.
In its opinion, the Pre-Trial Chamber sustained most of the order of the Co-Investigating Judges; however, it split the proverbial baby in terms of the three forms of JCE by rejecting the most expansive form of the doctrine.
By way of background, JCE is traditionally conceived of as encompassing three overlapping forms.
►The first (“basic”) mode provides for liability where an individual intentionally acts collectively with others to commit international crimes pursuant to a common plan.
► The second (“systemic”) form provides for liability for individuals who contribute to the maintenance or essential functions of a criminal institution or system, such as a concentration or detention camp.
► The third, and most controversial form, provides for extended liability, not only for crimes intentionally committed pursuant to the common design, but also for crimes that were the natural and foreseeable consequence of implementing the common design.
The Pre-Trial Chamber noted that the objective elements of all three forms are the same:
  • the existence of a common plan to commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the ECCC,
  • a plurality of persons, and
  • the contribution (surpassing some threshold) by the defendant to the execution of the common plan (para. 38).
By contrast, the mens rea of each form differs:

  • JCE I requires proof of a shared intent to further the enterprise.
  • JCE II, as a subset of JCE I, adds the requirement that the defendant be aware of the system of ill-treatment.
  • JCE III finds analogies in the Pinkerton doctrine by allowing members of the JCE to be found guilty of extraneous crimes where the defendants foresaw, and willingly took the risk, that such crimes may occur (para. 39).
In reviewing the reasoning and sources of law relied upon by the Co-Investigating Judges, the Pre-Trial Chamer confirmed that post-World War II case law, early work by the International Law Commission on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace & Security of Mankind, and national case law on the common purpose and co-perpetration doctrines all establish that a notion of JCE I and II liability would have been sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to the defendants in 1975.
By contrast, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the sources reviewed by the Co-Investigating Judges (and the other ad hoc tribunals to consider the issue) do not provide sufficient evidence of consistent state practice or opinio juris with respect to JCE III at the times relevant to Case 002 (para. 77). The two international instruments relied upon by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case to establish the provenance of JCE III — the Terrorist Bombing Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court — were not yet in existence during the Khmer Rouge era. To the extent there were relevant WWII-era cases, such as the Borkum Island or Essen Lynching cases, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that those case lacked a reasoned judgment clearly showing the basis of liability relied upon. In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the argument that most, if not all, countries had adopted some notion of extended common purpose doctrine holding someone liable for unintended but foreseeable crimes outside of the common plan (paras. 86-87). Indeed, Cambodian law itself would not have given noted to the defendants that they might be liable for such crimes.
This ruling has the potential to limit the extent to which the regime leaders can be charged with much of the harm that befell the Cambodian populace during the Khmer Rouge era. While thousands of individuals were detained, tortured and executed in this period, many more died of starvation and overwork due to the radical collectivist and agrarian policies adopted by the Khmer Rouge leadership. Whether it can be shown that the defendants intended these deaths depends on the strength of the Co-Prosecutors' evidence.
Stay tuned...


(In other news from the ECCC, the judgment in the Duch trial will be released July 26, 2010.)

On May 12

On this day in ...
... 1975 (35 years ago today), naval gunboats of Khmer Rouge-controlled Cambodia seized the American freighter Mayaguez and its 39 crew members. U.S. President Gerald R. Ford (left) called the capture "an 'act of piracy' and promised swift action to rescue the captured Americans." Two days later, he sent Marines to the island where the crew was being held and ordered the port bombed; Cambodia "was already in the process of releasing the crew of the Mayaguez and the ship," and 41 "Americans died, most of them in an accidental explosion during the attack." A later congressional inquiry criticized the administration for failing to exhaust diplomatic channels before using force; nevertheless, as indicated by the Time cover above, the rescue effort won popular support in the United States.


(Prior May 12 posts are here, here, and here)

Law & migration & mothers & children

What a treat to have moderated the opening session of Uprooted: The International Migration of Children, the symposium that 2 student journals here at the University of California, Davis, School of Law (Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall) -- our Journal of Juvenile Law and Policy and our Journal of International Law and Policy -- cosponsored on Friday. (prior post)
Titled "The International Context that Pushes Migration," the session provided a rich overview of the causes, conditions, and effects on families of transnational migration trends.
1st up was our colleague Chivy Sok (right), whose career in human rights advocacy includes current service as a member of the Steering Committee of the Ginetta Sagan Fund of Amnesty International USA, as well as prior human rights center leadership at Columbia University and the University of Iowa. Chivy told of her own childhood picking onions for hours in U.S. fields alongside others in her Cambodian refugee family. Chivy then placed her experience in context. More than 200 million children labor worldwide, she said. Three-quarters work in agriculture. Agricultural hazards -- injuries from equipment, harms from pesticides -- constitute a leading cause of death among children. Many of these children have no access to education, to health care, even to basic hygiene. Sok pointed to the Children’s Act for Responsible Employment, legislation that U.S. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-Calif.) introduced in Congress last fall, as a potential means to address these problems.
Following Chivy was Jayne E. Fleming (left), Pro Bono Counsel at Reed Smith in San Francisco and the subject of a recent profile in the National Law Journal. (photo credit) Jayne recounted the forces of migration through stories about clients who live and work at a garbage dump in Guatemala. Economic forces of course play a role, she said, adding:
Extreme poverty is absolutely a human rights violation.

Other forces of migration emerged during the session, among them: implementation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement; political violence and armed conflict; family disintegration; sexual exploitation or incest.
Yet another force was at the center of remarks by the session's 3d speaker, Dr. Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (right). Some women migrate not out of sheer desperation, she said, but out of desire to improve their family's economic and social mobility. Professor of American Studies and Sociology at Brown University, Rhacel told what she'd learned her ethnographic research on globalized domestic workers. She focused on how laws break up families, compelling mothers to leave their children behind when go abroad to work. Once there, mothers find themselves infantilized by law -- assigned the legal status not of an employee, but rather of a member of the employer's family. They must depend on employers to treat them well, and they discover, when employers do not, that national labor laws do not protect them. This vulnerable status prevails in countries that pride themselves on human rights records -- Rhacel named Denmark and Sweden in particular -- as well as in those that do not. One reason? A "maternalist ideology" by which "various states are in denial that mothers are leaving the home," and so fail to take measures to protect the migrant domestic workers who care for the home in their stead.
Kudos to these excellent speakers, to journal editors Eve Epstein and Monica Feltz and their staffs, and responsible for putting together this stimulating panel.

(Cross-posted at California-Davis Law Faculty Blog)

On December 14

On this day in ...

... 1955, by Resolution 109, the U.N. Security Council admitted 16 new member states to the United Nations. Simultaneously admitted were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon (today, Sri Lanka), Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. The vote was 8-0-3; abstaining were Belgium, China, and the United States.

(Prior December 14 posts are here and here.)

Cambodia Update

We've blogged before on the controversy at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia between the two Co-Prosecutors over whether to charge additional suspects with international crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge era (see here and here). Following a recent ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber, which failed to achieve a majority to block further investigations, the Acting International Co-Prosecutor, William Smith (right), has now filed with the Co-Investigating judges two new Introductory Submissions.
Introductory Submissions are confidential to protect the integrity of the investigation, the identity of the victims and witnesses, and the presumption of innocence of the suspects. The Internal Rules do, however, allow the Co-Prosecutors to provide the public with a short summary of their submissions. What we've learned is that the Co-Prosecutors have recommended the investigation and prosecution of five additional suspects for 40 distinct factual situations of murder, torture, unlawful detention, forced labour, and persecution. The Second Introductory Submission contains allegations that, if proved, would constitute crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code. The Third Submission contains genocide allegations, but no war crimes allegations. (See our prior post on finding genocide in Cambodia).
These new Submissions specifically reference the theory of joint criminal enterprise (JCE), no doubt in an effort to ensure that the Closing Order (indictment) includes this form of responsibility. As we've blogged before, the Duch Closing Order does not include JCE allegations; the investigation into Duch's criminal liability did not focus on potential JCE liability, because the Co-Prosecutors failed to specifically reference JCE liability in their Submission to the Co-Investigating Judges. An appeal by the Co-Prosecutors on this point failed.
The Acting International Co-Prosecutor has indicated that he has no plans to conduct any further preliminary investigations into additional suspects at the ECCC.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen (left) is not happy. He has consistently argued against any expansion of the ECCC's investigations beyond the five suspects already in custody on the ground that it would spark civil unrest. At a forum on the release of new census figures, Hun Sen is quoted as saying:
If you want a tribunal, but you don't want to consider peace and reconciliation and war breaks out again, killing 200,000 or 300,000 people, who will be responsible?

Hun Sen's repeated involvement in this issue has given rise to concerns among human rights groups that the executive branch is attempting to interfere with the work of the Extraordinary Chambers.

Vindication, but too late?

As we’ve blogged before, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were recently seized of a disagreement between the two Co-Prosecutors over whether to forward new Introductory Submissions to the Co-Investigating Judges for judicial investigation pursuant to Internal Rule 53. (Introductory Submissions are written submissions by the prosecutor to an investigating judge requesting an investigation into crimes and proposing charges). The International Co-Prosecutor — at the time, Canadian jurist Robert Petit (left) — sought to supplement the investigation of Case 002 (which concerns the four former Khmer Rouge principals in custody) and launch two new cases (Cases 003 and 004). The Cambodian Co-Prosecutor — Chea Leang (below right) — opposed any expansion of proceedings beyond the five suspects already in custody. Petit argued in his submissions that the only requirement to open an investigation was the determination that there were reasonable grounds for believing that additional crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC had been committed. By contrast, Leang argued that extra-legal factors — such as the limited nature of the ECCC’s mandate, the threat of instability, and resource constraints — counseled against any expansion of charges.

Anticipating just such a disagreement between Cambodian and international personnel, the ECCC’s constitutive documents provide that disagreements of this nature are to be resolved by the Pre-Trial Chamber — a mechanism that is unique to the ECCC and strains classic separation of powers principles. In this process, the burden of persuasion rested with the National Co-Prosecutor. A decision of four of the five judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber (composed of three Cambodian and two foreign jurists) would have been necessary to block the additional investigations from going forward.

After receiving a number of written submissions from the Co-Prosecutors (who both agreed that an oral hearing was unnecessary and undesirable), the Pre-Trial Chamber (below left) issued its ruling on August 18, 2009; that ruling was released yesterday. The Chamber was unable to reach a majority, and so the International Co-Prosecutor has a mandate to seek the supplemental and new investigations.

Revealing that the dissension within the Chamber was, predictably, along nationality lines, the three Cambodian judges and the two international judges issued separate opinions. The Cambodian judges argued that the International Co-Prosecutor’s supplemental investigation was unlawful because it was conducted unilaterally without the cooperation (or knowledge) of the National Co-Prosecutor. They also reasoned that the (mostly redacted) facts on which the International Co-Prosecutor premised the proposed additional investigations were already part of the investigation of Case 002, including allegations of forced marriage. Accordingly, in their opinion, no new Introductory Submissions were warranted.

The international judges, by contrast, argued that concerns about the illegality vel non of the International Co-Prosecutor’s investigation were untimely. They also noted that new proposed Introductory Submissions were required if the Co-Investigating Judges were to consider the new facts revealed and that the new submissions were structured differently in terms of their subject matter and foci than the first submissions. The decision is not subject to appeal (Article 7(4) of the Agreement establishing the ECCC).

The vindication comes too late for Petit, who has stepped down as International Co-Prosecutor citing family reasons. The appointment of Australian William Smith (right), formerly the Deputy Co-Prosecutor, as interim Co-Prosecutor took effect this past Monday.

It remains to be seen who else will be the subject of investigation, although at the time the disagreement was revealed, Petit did state that additional suspects would not threaten the Royal Government of Cambodia. The government may feel otherwise, as it was widely believed that governmental authorities had pressured Leang to resist the expansion of any investigation.
Stay tuned...

Genocide in Cambodia?

The Khmer Rouge seized power on April 17, 1975 (photo, left), marking “year zero” in what turned out to be a four-year campaign to create the “New Cambodia.” Upon the ouster of the American-backed Lon Nol (prior posts here and here), the Khmer Rouge launched a radical project of social reorganization drawing upon communist and Maoist thought to re-construct Cambodia on the backbone of an idealized vision of a rural proletariat. The draconian measures instituted by the regime in this quest included:
► the liquidation of the Lon Nol army and members of the former regime;
► the extermination of the elite and educated;
► a complete evacuation of the urban centers;
► the incineration of books, libraries, banks, places of worship, and university facilities;
► the criminalization of the usage of foreign languages;
► the abolition of money, private property, markets, wages, and salaries;
► the dissolution of families and the separation of children from their parents;
► the subjugation and execution of ethnic minorities;
► the prohibition of religious practice and education; and
► the systematic hunt for real and imagined political opponents.
By the time a Vietnamese invasion opened the killing fields for the world to see in 1979,

a greater proportion of the population [had] perished than in any other revolution during the twentieth century.

Karl D. Jackson, The Khmer Rouge in Context, in Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death 3, 3 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1989).
The roughly two million deaths during the Khmer Rouge era are largely considered by the general public -- within Cambodia and abroad -- to be genocide. (The photo at left depicts a map of mass graves). Indeed, Cambodia often bears the dubious distinction of being described as the first post-Holocaust genocide. The U.S. Congress described the Khmer Rouge era as follows:

The persecution of the Cambodian people under the Khmer Rouge rule, [during which time] the bulk of the Khmer people were subjected to life in an Asian Auschwitz, constituted one of the clearest examples of genocide in recent history.

United States Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §906. In 1994, Congress passed the Genocide Justice Act, which authorized the creation of a documentation center in Cambodia, later named the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) to develop the United States proposal for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of those accused of genocide in Cambodia.
The establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (right) to prosecute surviving members of the Khmer Rouge paves the way for the resolution of a lingering question in international criminal law:
► To what extent was genocide committed in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge?
A quick read of the 1948 Genocide Convention reveals that much of the violence committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia may not constitute genocide, primarily because the perpetrator group and the victim group appeared to share the same nationality, ethnicity, race, and religion. Instead, victims appear to have been targeted on the basis of what an objective assessment would describe as their membership in an undesirable political, social, or economic group. After great debate and compromise, the drafters of the Genocide Convention purposefully denied protection to political, social, economic, and other unenumerated groups. (Today's post below notes tension between the legal meaning of "genocide" and public response to the crisis in Darfur.) As a result, genocide is defined in Article II of the Genocide Convention, which entered into force in 1951, as

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Thus, if the ECCC were to be strictly faithful to this original intent, it might reject most charges of genocide that might be brought against the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders. (Charges involving attacks against religious or ethnic minorities in Cambodia would have a better chance of surviving).
Despite this apparently dispositive conclusion, arguments exist for finding genocide in Cambodia based upon modern jurisprudential developments emerging from international criminal tribunals and domestic genocide prosecutions.
► First, the original intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention to exclude protection to unenumerated groups is muted with respect to genocide prosecutions before modern international and hybrid tribunals. This is a function of the origins of these institutions, established treaty interpretation doctrine, and interpretive trends emerging from the various multilateral human rights institutions vis-à-vis their constitutive instruments. Collectively, these factors elevate text and treaty object and purpose as interpretive sources over idiosyncratic intentions of human rights treaty drafters.
► Second, contemporary courts engaged in genocide prosecutions have rejected definitions of the protected groups employed at the time of the Convention’s drafting that, by today’s intellectual sensibilities, appear outmoded and even offensive. Instead, modern tribunals have focused on the subjective characterization of these groups within the impacted society at large and -- most importantly -- within the minds of the perpetrators in the dock and the societies that they terrorized. In this regard, international criminal jurists have eschewed identifying an objective or scientific definition of what are inherently contested and contingent concepts. This approach highlights the centrality of the crime’s specific intent element to determining the existence of the crime of genocide.
To be sure, normative arguments can be made about the legitimacy of these jurisprudential trends. Nonetheless, they exist as influential precedent on which the ECCC can draw if it is confronted with the genocide question in the Khmer Rouge context. (To date, no genocide indictments have been issued). In this regard, the ECCC can start from the proposition that the groups listed in the treaty have no independent content; rather, their meaning is inherently contextual, contingent, and historical and should be treated as such. This invites the ECCC to identify the subjective understandings of those terms as they existed within the relevant communities at the time the Khmer Rouge acted, whether or not such conceptions were shared elsewhere or have any objective content or modern resonance. Most importantly, the ECCC must endeavor to understand the intentions of the Khmer Rouge in implementing the radical policies that they did and the identities they ascribed to the individuals they targeted for extermination. As Tufts Law Professor Hurst Hannum has written:
The radical transformation of Cambodia envisaged by the Khmer Rouge required the racial, social, ideological, and political purification of the Cambodian nation, through the sociological and physical liquidation of a variety of groups considered to be irremediably tainted by their association with the old social order or otherwise unsuited to the intended new order.
International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, 11 Hum. Rts. Q. 82, 85 (1989). This “purification” required the extermination or forced assimilation of all non-Khmer ethnic groups, including ethnic Vietnamese, Chinese, Cham, Thai, and indigenous hill communities. It also required the elimination of other individuals whose perceived social, economic, and political affiliations or histories rendered them inherently impure and subject to violent exclusion from the revolutionary program of nation-building. This included Khmer Rouge cadre denounced as spies or counter-revolutionary agents and individuals resident in the Eastern zones hiding “Vietnamese minds in Khmer bodies.”
In implementing this program, the Khmer Rouge were animated by an idealized vision of the “pure Khmer” as both the source and beneficiary of the revolution. This nationalistic vision, however, could not be based on true Khmer ethnicity alone.
► First, the Khmer Rouge considered many indicia of the Khmer tradition and identity to be retrograde, such as the deep attachment to Buddhism. These counter-revolutionary vestiges of a prior identity had to be excised from society.
► Second, many of the key members of the Standing Committee (such as Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Sao Phim and Khieu Samphon) were of Chinese descent. To accommodate different “objective” ethnicities within the new Cambodian polity, the Khmer Rouge revived the term “Kampuchea,” even officially calling their party the Party of Democratic Kampuchea. The term dates from the 9th century and a romanticized period of the Angkor dynasty, which flourished in South East Asia for 600 years with its capital at the world famous Angkor Wat (below).

In the radical egalitarianism of the Khmer Rouge, all those who were proper Kampucheans were equal; all those who were not were expendable and, indeed, subject to elimination. In this way, the Khmer Rouge invented an ideal type -- with national, ethnic, political, and religious dimensions -- against which all citizens were to be measured. Individuals who did not adhere to these multidimensional criteria were exempt from inclusion, dehumanized, and subject to elimination. (The photo at right is of Cheung Ek, one of the many killing fields around Cambodia).
A finding of genocide writ large in Cambodia is thus feasible through the application of the analysis developed in international and domestic genocide prosecutions. By the subjective approach, it is the Khmer Rouge’s belief system that matters. In the Khmer Rouge’s purification process, individuals from certain political, economic, and social strata were perceived as “imperfect” or “invalid” Khmer, incapable of re-education or assimilation. According to this view, these subsets of society were permanently stained by their prior affiliations and had to be purged lest they hinder the radical societal reformation envisioned by the Khmer Rouge.
An objective assessment of many of these target groups would categorize them as political, social, or economic groups. Viewing these groups through the lens of the Khmer Rouge cosmology, however, these prior social, economic or political affiliations were considered biologically determinative and thus irremediable--the equivalent of a racial, national, or ethnic group. As noted by Michigan Law Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon,

One of the enduring legacies of the Nazis was the notion that culture is genetic.
Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights, 17 Harv. Women’s L. J. 5, 13 (1994). These individuals were also identified via their exclusion from the majority national group, which fit the ideal type as measured by the Khmer Rouge leadership.
Assuming sufficient evidence exists of this cosmology, the ECCC could reach a finding of genocide writ large within Cambodia.


 
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