Showing posts with label genocide. Show all posts
Showing posts with label genocide. Show all posts

On February 25

On this day in ...
... 1956 (55 years ago today), in an address that the BBC called "sensational," former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was reviled "as a brutal despot" by his successor, Nikita Khrushchev (right). The latter told an assembly of the Communist Party of the "regime of 'suspicion, fear, and terror' built up under the former dictator," who'd ruled from 1924 till his death in 1953. (photo credit) Khrushchev said his goal was to bring to an end what he called "the 'Stalin cult' that has held Soviet citizens in its thrall for 30 years." Americans and Britons would learn of the "Secret Speech" the following month, but it would not be published in Russia until 1988. It's estimated that during Stalin's rule "20 million died in labor camps, forced collectivization, famine and executions."

(Prior February 25 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Genocide and crimes against humanity in the national systems of Latin America

(Many thanks to IntLawGirls for inviting me to present my latest article in in this guest post)

As opposed to the other so-called core crimes under international law, genocide is one of the few to be codified in the national judicial systems of most Latin American states long before the adoption of the Rome Statute system. Indeed, the codification process took place from the 1970s onwards and, in some instances, even before. As I discuss in my latest article, "An Overview of the Crime of Genocide in Latin American Jurisdictions", 10 International Criminal Law Review 441 (2010), this history generated disparities between the international and the national definitions.
In general terms, the dolus specialis -- the requisite "intent to destroy, in whole or in part," as stated in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) -- is inherent to all national provisions on genocide analyzed in my article.
The deviations from the international definition thus revolve around the actus reus, understood as encompassing two other aspects of the Genocide Convention definition:
►The modalities of commission, encompassing, in Article III, genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide; and
► The protected groups included in Article II, namely, "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."
Deviations from the Genocide Convention definition found in Latin American codes present a common feature: the enlargement of the scope of the protected groups, by including the political group and other, even more general groups.
Such a disparate outcome may be attributed, in my view, to the several decades of confrontation, in many cases amounting to non-international armed conflicts, that were experienced in various countries in Latin America. (In Colombia, the armed conflict, although reduced, is still ongoing.) Such conflicts generally involved a state policy of systematic attack against civilian populations, and in many instances against political groups. By the same token, the so-called "doctrine of national security" that served as a justification for the emergence of repressive regimes in the 1970s was politically motivated and targeted.
Jurisprudence in this area is incomplete.
Notwithstanding the fact that the most relevant Latin American deviations from the international definition refer to the protected groups, jurisprudence has not shed much light either on the underlying rationale or justification for such a deviation or on the scope of interpretation of the deviation. In this connection, my article pays particular attention to constitutional challenges that have been lodged against some of the elements incorporated in the Colombian and Bolivian provisions on genocide. Also receiving attention is a conviction for genocide rendered by the Bolivian Supreme Court (above).
In my view, understanding the status of other international offences is critical to understanding the status of genocide as it is codified in Latin America.
Crimes against humanity were generally unknown in national legislation. Arguably, this did not begin to change until the 2002. The entry into force that year of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (below right) paved the way for serious consideration of the proscription of crimes against humanity in national systems. This situation may explain why some Latin American countries adopted definitions of genocide that deviated from the international standard.
Also significant is the fact that conviction for genocide has historically provoked a strong moral condemnation.
The time is ripe to reflect on the reasons behind the intention to label a particular situation as genocide, given that the codification of the other core crimes has gained momentum.
Some consideration should be devoted to the national implementation of the Rome Statute.
In this vein, it is worth noting that the current trend on implementation in Latin America offers mixed signals as to whether states will opt:
► To maintain the enlarged scope of genocide, on the one hand; or,
► To avoid, on the other hand, perilous juxtapositions that may arise -- mainly with respect to crimes against humanity -- by creating clearer parameters between crimes.
Blending of Latin American history, of the customary aspects of crimes against humanity and its momentum of codification, and of societal perspectives towards the crime of genocide lead to a complex and challenging interaction.

On the Brink of Genocide?

On Wednesday, Youssoufou Bamba, the Ivory Coast's newly minted Ambassador to the United Nations, warned that his country was "on the brink of genocide." Bamba, who was appointed by Alassane Outtara, the internationally recognized victor in the country's recent elections, voiced concern over massive human rights violations in recent weeks. (The BBC offers an excellent summary of the post-election crisis here.)
Should Bamba's statement be taken at face value? The signs are certainly concerning. Last week, the UN deputy human rights commissioner reported the deaths of nearly 200 Outtara supporters in the post-election violence, as well as many cases of arrest, detention, and torture. This is just the tip of the iceberg, as the UN has been prevented from investigating many serious allegations of human rights abuses. In one example, the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire was blocked from investigating a possible mass execution site north of Abidjan.
Senior UN officials have expressed concern over "incitement to hatred and violence" through the national radio and television and some private newspapers. Bamba noted that some houses have been marked according to their residents' ethnic background, a claim echoed by UN officials. Gbagbo has told the UN to leave and his youth minister, Charles Blé Goudé, has warned ECOWAS not to intervene. In his chilling words:
'They should prepare themselves very well because we are thinking about totally liberating our country, and soon I will launch the final assault.'
The forced migration dimension of the story leaves little doubt about the gravity of the situation. On Tuesday, UNHCR reported that 19,000 Ivorians had fled to Liberia. The refugees, largely women and children, are primarily supporters of Outtara but also include some pro-Gbagbo; all sides fear the consequences of a civil war. Most come from western Ivory Coast, a region already known for lawlessness and severe sexual violence prior to the election. While UNHCR has provisions for just over 10,000 additional refugees, humanitarian needs may soon eclipse their capacity.
In the new year, the European Union will tighten sanctions against Gbagbo and his supporters. As indicated in Diane's post yesterday, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo has warned that "leaders who are planning violence will end up in the Hague," a call welcomed by Outtara, who has invited an ICC investigation. More to the point, ECOWAS has given Gbagbo a deadline of January 3 to step down or face forcible removal. One can only hope that these international efforts will be sufficient to pull the Ivory Coast back from the brink.

On September 2

On this day in ...
... 1998, was issued the 1st judgment of conviction for genocide against a defendant who stood trial before an international tribunal. Convicted in the Trial Chamber judgment in Prosecutor v. Akayesu was the former bourgmestre, or mayor, of a Rwanda community afflicted by massacres and other atrocities in 1994. As I've written here and here, the judgment was a landmark for many reasons, among them: its ruling that "sexual violence" is a crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (above left); and its teleological interpretation of the protected-groups element of the proscription codified in Article II of the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and included verbatim in Article 2 of the ICTR Statute. (photo credit)

(Prior September 2 posts are here, here, and here.)

Gender Crimes and Canada's Genocide Prosecutions

(Delighted to welcome guest Heather Goodman, who contributes this post in tandem with IntLawGrrl Valerie Oosterveld)

On Friday, Jacques Mungwarere, an Ontario resident who immigrated several years after the 1994 genocide in his native Rwanda, appeared in a Canadian court in connection with 4 counts, arising out of events in the Kibuye region, levied against him in June: 2 charges of genocide (intentional murder and causing serious bodily or mental harm to Tutsis); and 2 charges of crimes against humanity (intentional murder and sexual violence). Mungwarere, who appeared before the Ontario Superior Court in Ottawa (logo at left), is the 2d person to be charged under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. Passed in 2000, the Act permits the national prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. (The website of the Canadian Centre for International Justice provides more details on the case.)
The first person to have been charged is Désiré Munyaneza (below right), a Rwandan who had been living in Toronto before his arrest on October 19, 2005. (photo credit) Authorities charged him, under the 2000 Canadian Act, with 7 seven counts stemming from events in the Butare region of Rwanda: 2 counts of genocide (intentional murder and causing serious bodily or mental harm to Tutsis); 2 counts of crimes against humanity (intentional murder and sexual violence); and 3 counts of war crimes (intentional murder, sexual violence and pillaging).
Munyaneza’s trial officially began on March 27, 2007, in Montreal, though it had been preceded by a rogatory commission in Kigali, Rwanda, during which Justice André Denis of Quebec Superior Court heard the first 14 prosecution witnesses -- witnesses unable to travel to Canada. At trial proceedings in Montreal, the prosecution called an additional 16 prosecution witnesses, for a total of 30. The accused called 36 witnesses in total. A dozen were heard by the court in Montreal; the remainder, by rogatory commission: 3 in Paris, 7 in Kigali, and 14 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
On May 22, 2009, as then posted, Justice Denis issued a judgment of conviction on all counts. That same year, on October 29, Munyaneza was sentenced to life in prison, with no chance of parole for 25 years. His case is currently on appeal.
The Munyaneza judgment is important for the overall development of Canadian law under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. More specifically, we believe that it is also significant as an example of a gender-sensitive domestic universal jurisdiction prosecution.
Throughout the Munyaneza judgment, countless examples of gender-based crimes are evident:
► For example, expert witness Dr. Rony Zachariah told the court about his pregnant colleague, a Hutu woman. She was killed because her husband was Tutsi, and therefore, “the child she was carrying … would be Tutsi” (para. 456).
► Several witnesses recounted a difference in treatment between male and female victims. Witness C-19 stated that “Minister Pauline gave instructions to kill the men and rape the women,” and that Munyaneza was particularly zealous in following these instructions, making the men undress before taking them away to be killed (para. 687). Witnesses C-16, C-17, and C-24 observed that the men were taken away and never seen again, while the women were raped (paras. 636, 655 and 834). Witnesses C-15, C-19 and C-23 recalled the treatment of Tutsi women as though they were property (paras. 620, 689 and 801). Witness C-22 stated that members of the Interahamwe militia “raped a girl on the prefecture grounds in front of everyone” (para. 768). Witness C-15 stated that about ten men raped her, and that “they wanted to see whether Tutsi women were better than others” (para. 617).
► Witnesses also recited instances of sexual captivity. Witness C-15, who was 17 years old in 1994, recounts how she and two other Tutsi girls were kept in sexual captivity for three days, where they were repeatedly raped (paras. 615, 619). Witness C-20 observed that women would be taken away by soldiers and the Interahamwe to be raped, and some did not return for two days (para. 704). Witness C-23 provided similar testimony, stressing that Interahamwe especially liked to take away very young girls for an evening or for days, and that Munyaneza took part in this violence (para. 800).
A militia member took witness C-21 to the house of Munyaneza’s father, Isaac Munyagasheke. Witness C-21 testified that Munyagasheke paid 20,000 Rwandan francs for her life, and she stayed at his house until the RPF took the city. She also told the court that, while at the house, she was raped five times by Munyaneza, who was armed and threatened to hand her over to the Interahamwe, who would kill her. C-21 felt unable to leave because she had nowhere safe to go (paras. 727-741). At one point, Munyaneza told C-21 that “he had kept her alive to show what a beautiful Tutsi was like, since she was the last” (para. 736).
In his May 22 judgment, Justice Denis defined the prohibited genocidal act of causing serious bodily or mental harm to include “rape, sexual violence, mutilation and interrogation accompanied by blows or threats” as well as “[s]ubjecting a person to intense fear, terror, intimidation or threats” (paras. 88-89). He relied in particular on the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Akayesu in the course of defining the term “sexual violence” as any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive (para. 95). Denis provided examples of such sexual violence: forcing a person to undress in public; sexual penetration; rape; and sexual molestation (para. 96). He adopted the same approach with regard to the crimes against humanity and war crimes counts (paras. 121 and 142). When considering the war crimes charges, Denis also held that an act of sexual violence is part of “inhumane acts”, “outrages upon personal dignity”, and “serious bodily or mental harm” as regards the victim (para. 141).
In an article entitled "Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act on Trial: An Analysis of the Munyaneza Case", published this year in the Journal of International Criminal Justice, Professor Fannie Lafontaine (left), of the Faculty of Law at the University of Laval in Quebec, noted that Justice Denis' judgment did not define the term “rape”, despite the fact that his factual findings often referred to rape. In Canadian law, the crime of rape was replaced by the broader term “sexual assault” in 1983. As Lafontaine points out, since the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act defines Canadian law by reference to international criminal law, and since international criminal law does recognize the specific crime of rape, the crime of rape is again part of Canadian law, at least for the purposes of this statute. She argued that Justice Denis should therefore have defined the term “rape”.
For us, LaFontaine’s observation raises the very interesting question of how the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act should address such differences between international criminal law and Canadian criminal law -- especially differences that, many would argue, put Canadian law in a more progressive stance than international criminal law.

Guest Blogger: Rebecca Young

It's IntLawGrrls' great pleasure to welcome Rebecca Young (left) as today's guest blogger.
Rebecca is currently an Associate Legal Adviser within the Presidency of the International Criminal Court. She has previously interned with South Africa’s Legal Resources Centre.
She completed her Honours Bachelor of Laws at the University of Adelaide in 2006, and was awarded the RBS Scots-Australian Council Postgraduate Council Scholarship to complete her Masters of International Law at the University of Edinburgh in 2009. At Edinburgh she was awarded both the T.B. Smith Prize for the most distinguished LL.M. Scholar and the W.A. Wilson Prize for the best dissertation in international law.
In her guest post below, Rebecca outlines her article, just published in the International Criminal Law Review, on victim groups and genocide (It's an issue on which IntLawGrrl Beth Van Schaack's also written, here, as well as yours truly, here.) Rebecca's work in international criminal law and international human rights law also has appeared in the Australian International Law Journal and the Edinburgh Student Law Review.
Rebecca reports that her passion for international law was inspired by her participation, while still an undergraduate, in the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, about which another onetime participant, IntLawGrrl Kathleen A. Doty, also has posted.

Heartfelt welcome!

Identification of genocide victim groups

(I am very grateful to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute this guest post, which is based on my article “How Do We Know Them When We See Them? The Subjective Evolution in the Identification of Victim Groups for the Purpose of Genocide,” 10 International Criminal Law Review 1 (2010))

Any reference to “victim groups” pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment the Crime of Genocide likely causes an instinctive turn toward the perennially popular question of which types of groups should be included within the definition of genocide. An equally fundamental, but often overlooked, question is how such victim groups are identified. Is identification based on objective indicators of the group’s existence, or is it based on subjective perceptions of both the group itself and those around it?
The 2005 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
to the United Nations Secretary-General
, by a U.N. panel led by Antonio Cassese, former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, reflects what has become a conventional legal wisdom: that identification of victim groups for the purpose of genocide has evolved to such extent that it may now be based on entirely subjective evidence. At the heart of this position one usually finds the jurisprudence of the ICTY and its counterpart, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, with the latter often identified as the “birth place” of the subjective identification of victims groups.
Close examination of this jurisprudence reveals, however, significant discord between the principles espoused and the actual forms of evidence used to identify victims in a given case. Despite strong statements that a victim group may be identified based on either self-perception or the perception of perpetrators, almost no case before the ad hoc tribunals has identified a victim group using subjective evidence alone. Before the ICTR, all cases have relied on a combination of objective factors, such as evidence of the Rwandan legal and administrative system, with subjective factors, such as the self-identification of persons appearing before the tribunal.
Where, then, is the subjective evolution referred to in the Darfur Report?
It lies in the fact that the evidence that the ad hoc tribunals have labelled as objective -- for example, a legal system dividing persons into the categories of Hutu and Tutsi -- has an underlying subjective essence. The Darfur Report describes this process as follows:

[T]he process of formation of a perception and self-perception of another group as distinct (on ethnic, national, religious or racial grounds) … may begin as a subjective view, as a way of regarding the others as making up a different and opposed group, it gradually hardens and crystallizes into a real and factual opposition … from subjective becomes objective.
This notion is key to understanding the purported subjective evolution referred to in the Darfur Report. The evolution is not in the method of identification itself, but in the manner in which one understands the process of identification. Those factors -- which lawyers and the ad hoc tribunals have been quick to regard as objective (such as legal and administrative mechanisms) -- may be more properly understood as part of ongoing subjective processes of group identification. Indeed, they have long been so regarded in the field of sociology.
The first foray of the International Criminal Court into the crime of genocide in the case against Sudan's incumbent President, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, neatly demonstrates the relevance of these issues. Although the issue arises only obliquely, that case demonstrates that the victim group itself may be different depending on how it is identified:
► The majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber I, in its March 4, 2009, decision on the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest, sought to rely on objective factors related to language, custom, and land to identify the victim group. In so doing, it identified three separate victim groups – the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.
► But in her dissenting opinion, Judge Anita Ušacka focused instead on the existence of a group which, in the societal context of the counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur, is regarded simply as a group of “African tribes”. By focusing more on subjective perceptions, Judge Ušacka identified a different victim group than did her judicial colleagues. (As IntLawGrrl Beth Van Schaack posted, this past February the ICC Appeals Chamber endorsed Judge Ušacka's approach, and thus reversed the 2009 ruling of the pretrial panel. A 2d warrant to arrest Bashir on genocide was issued last Monday.)
The identification of the victim group of genocide, in short, depends on where and how one is looking in the first place.
The underlying theme is that both subjective and objective evidence of group identification is permissible, and that there is no need to “disguise” as objective those factors ultimately having subjective foundations.


(credit for photo of camp for displaced Darfuris (c) UNICEF/NYHQ2006-0559/Shehzad Noorani)

Breaking News: Genocide Charges Against Al-Bashir

As we've blogged before (see here, here, here, here, here, and here, among others) the question of whether the violence in Darfur rises to the level of genocide has been an issue of some dispute. Today, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued a second warrant of arrest against Omar Al-Bashir, the newly re-elected President of Sudan. The issuance of the warrant is based on a finding (per Art. 58) that "there are reasonable grounds to believe" he is responsible for genocide against protected ethnic groups.
The particular manifestations of genocide charged are:
  • genocide by killing members of the group,
  • genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and
  • genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction.

The first arrest warrant covering war crimes and crimes against humanity (issued in March 2009) remains extant.
As you may recall, the Pre-Trial Chamber originally rejected the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest in respect of the crime of genocide. In July 2009, the Prosecutor appealed this decision. The Appeals Chamber in Feburary 2010 reversed and remanded, finding that the Pre-Trial Chamber had applied the wrong standard of proof. The new arrest warrant is the result of a reconsideration of all the evidence under the appropriate burden of proof. It concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Al-Bashir acted with specific intent to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups. (Photo, left, from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, which has excellent facts and figures on the crisis in Darfur here).
The Registrar will now prepare and submit a supplementary request for cooperation to the Sudanese authorities, all State Parties, and the Security Council, which originally referred the situation to the Court in March 2005.
At the moment, four cases are being heard in the Darfur situation:
  • The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”);
  • The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir;
  • The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and
  • The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus.

Crimes Against Humanity: Enduring normative debates and doctrinal ambiguities

(Delighted to welcome back alumna Margaret deGuzman, who contributes this guest post on Crimes Against Humanity, her forthcoming book chapter)

In the summer of 1997 I was a law student intern in the Legal Advisor’s Office of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia at The Hague (left). When I walked in the door I was told that my assignment was to try to figure out the mens rea of crimes against humanity.
I was shocked. Surely someone who had spent more than a semester studying criminal law had already worked out the elements of crimes against humanity?
I spent a fascinating summer digging through cases decided under the Nuremberg Charter and under Control Council Law No. 10, as well as anything else I could get my hands on that might provide some insight into the mental element of crimes against humanity. (In those days, international criminal law sources were not as readily available as they are now.)
In the end I wrote an article that argued, as much on policy grounds as on precedent, that the mens rea should involve knowledge of the connection between the individual’s inhumane act and the broader attack against a civilian population. I like to think that my work influenced the adoption of the knowledge standard in the Appeals Chamber's July 15, 1999, Judgement in Tadić, but who knows?
I have remained fascinated with crimes against humanity ever since. One of the things that most intrigues me is that although this category of crimes is supposed to represent, along with genocide, the worst of the worst that people can do to each other, there is still lots of uncertainty about the elements and the theoretical underpinning of the legal prohibition.
The persistent uncertainties surrounding crimes against humanity are due in part to their historical origins. After World War II, the Allies wanted to prosecute the Nazis for crimes committed within German territory, conduct that was not covered by the laws of war. They found purchase for the new crime in the Martens Clause, part of the preamble of the Hague (IV) Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Invoking natural law protections for any lacunae in the laws of war, the Martens Clause provides that persons not otherwise covered in the 1907 Convention
remain under the protection and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
From those cryptic words, a new category of international crimes was born, without any diplomatic negotiations, drafting committees, or treaty ratifications.
This unusual history is only partly to blame for the persistent uncertainties that surround crimes against humanity, however. Figuring out what is meant by “crimes against humanity” has simply proven tricky for many smart people over the years. The International Law Commission debated the matter for decades, diplomats pondered the elements when they drafted the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, and the international community spent years trying to work out a definition for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Nonetheless, the ICC definition, in some ways the culmination of all these efforts, remains controversial in a number of important respects. Furthermore, the normative justification for crimes against humanity continues to engage deep thinkers, as illustrated by a number of recent treatments by such scholars as David Luban, Larry May, and Richard Vernon.
I explore some of the persistent normative debates and doctrinal ambiguities that surround crimes against humanity in my contribution to the forthcoming The Routledge Handbook on International Criminal Law, edited by our colleagues, William A. Schabas and IntLawGrrl guest/alumna Nadia Bernaz. My chapter first provides an overview of the evolution of the definition of crimes against humanity, before surveying the competing normative visions of this category of crimes. A number of justifications have been advanced for international jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, including that they:
► Threaten international peace and security;
► Are particularly grave and thus shock the conscience of humanity;
► Involve actions of states or state-like organizations that would otherwise go unpunished; and
► Target groups rather than isolated individuals.
I conclude that ultimately none of these approaches provides a clear and complete rationale for categorizing certain inhumane acts as crimes against humanity.
I then explore the doctrinal debates that necessarily result from the lack of clear philosophical underpinnings for these crimes:
► What constitutes a widespread or systematic attack?
► Is a policy required and, if so, what kind?
► What defines a “civilian population”?
► What connection is required between the individual inhumane act and the broader attack?
Last year, a group of experts on crimes against humanity gathered in St. Louis at the invitation of Washington University Law Professor Leila Nadya Sadat, an IntLawGrrls guest/alumna, to consider a Convention on Crimes Against Humanity. Initially, there was much discussion of how to “improve” the definition for inclusion in the Convention. Ultimately, however, the organizers decided it would be unwise to create a new definition that would compete with that included in the Rome Statute and simply adopted the latter’s definition. Perhaps the debates about crimes against humanity will now subside, and the Rome Statute’s definition as interpreted by the court will gain general acceptance.
In the meantime, I’ll continue to be intrigued.

Write On! Untold war crime trial stories

(Write On! is an occasional item about notable calls for papers.) From our Opinio Juris colleague Kevin Jon Heller, news that papers are being sought for what promises to be a fascinating event:
The conference, entitled Untold Stories: Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials, will be held October 15-16, 2010, at the University of Melbourne Law School in Australia. Sponsoring the conference is the law school's Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law (logo below left). Organizers are Kevin, who's a Senior Lecturer at the law school, along with Dr. Gerry Simpson, Centre Director and a law professor both at Melbourne and the London School of Economics; Dr. Tim McCormack, Melbourne law professor and the Centre's Foundation Director, whom the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has named its Special Adviser on International Humanitarian Law; and Dr. Jennifer Balint (right), an expert on genocide and state crime at Melbourne's School of Social and Political Sciences. Confirmed speakers for this effort to examine less well-known aspects of war crimes trials, with an eye to publication of a conference volume, include our colleagues Mark Drumbl (Washington & Lee) and Larry May (Vanderbilt).
Organizers explain:
As international criminal law matures, there has been a return to history. Intriguing research agendas have focused on the origins of international criminal law in the repression of piracy or slave-trading and on the institutional innovations found at Versailles and The Hague. Meanwhile, familiar landmarks are being revisited in order to clarify ongoing doctrinal debates (aggression at Nuremberg, conspiracy at Tokyo, and so on). Alongside all of this is increased interest in less familiar war crimes trials, both international and domestic.
The idea behind this symposium is to uncover and explore some of the less well-known – perhaps even obscure – war crimes trials. As an example, Kevin Heller, one of the organizers, will be presenting a paper on the twelve Nuremberg Military Tribunals held under Control Council Law No. 10. There will also likely be papers on the war crimes trials held in Bangladesh after the secession, on the recent genocide trial in Ethiopia, and on the post-war trials under Australian jurisdiction in the Far East.
An abstract of 300 to 500 words, plus a short CV, should be submitted no later than the deadline of May 30, 2010, to Professor Simpson c/o Centre Administrator Cathy Hutton at c.hutton@unimelb.edu.au. Questions should be directed to Kevin at kheller@unimelb.edu.au.

Human rights' new DOJ home

Brand-new in D.C.:
The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, established within the U.S. Department of Justice yesterday.
HRSP, as it's to be known, is intended to combat human rights violations and to endeavor to bring war criminals to account. Its approval by Congress last week culminated plans 1st announced by U.S. Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer during testimony last October 6 before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law.
This new section within the Criminal Division was formed through the merger of 2 existing DOJ units:
1st, the Domestic Security Section, which since 2002 has concentrated on international human rights violations, offenses brought under the under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and related statutes, and and complex immigration and border crimes. The section worked alongside federal prosecutors in the Southern District of Florida in a case about which we've posted: the 1st-ever conviction, secured in 2008 against Boston-born Chuckie Taylor (below) (image credit), son of Liberia's ex-President, under the United States' extraterritorial torture statute.
2d, the Office of Special Investigations, formed in 1979 to investigate and prosecute Nazi-era crimes. In 2004 OSI's mandate was expanded to citizenship revocation proceedings against perpetrators of genocide, official torture, and extrajudicial killing in other contexts. Among its notable cases is that of Ukraine-born John Demjanjuk (bottom) (photo credit), now on trial in Munich after having been stripped of U.S. citizenship and sent to Germany.
Leading HRSP is Teresa L. McHenry. Most recently chief of the Domestic Security Section, McHenry, also has served as head of DOJ's Alien Smuggling Task Force, as a trial attorney in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia, and as a prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, Eli M. Rosenbaum becomes the Director of Human Rights Enforcement Strategy and Policy. Since 1995, he's led the Office of Special Investigations; before that, he was a corporate litigation associate with Simpson Thacher in Manhattan and general counsel of the World Jewish Congress.
Looking forward to good works from this new section.

ICC Appeals Chamber & the Bashir warrant

(Many thanks to IntLawGrrls for inviting me to contribute this guest post)

The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court recently ruled against Pre-Trial Chamber I's March 2009 decision granting granting an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (below left) only on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, but not for genocide charges. (photo credit) (Prior IntLawGrrls post) The Appeals Chamber's ruling has alternately been:
► Hailed as a momentous development in the ICC’s attempts to pursue Bashir; and
► Dismissed as a meaningless procedural move that could have been accomplished without an appeal—and without the seven months it took the five-member panel to reach a decision.
As I explain in my ASIL Insight on the decision, perhaps it is neither one. But it is important nonetheless.
The Appeals Chamber’s decision centered on the proper interpretation of Article 58(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to grant the Prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant if

[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Appeals Chamber held that by requiring that genocidal intent be the only reasonable inference available from the evidence, rather than only one of the reasonable inferences available, the Pre-Trial Chamber had constructed too rigorous a standard for determining what constitutes “reasonable grounds to believe.”
The Appeals Chamber, however, left it at that, and it did not define a standard for evaluating whether “reasonable grounds to believe” exist; that determination is left up to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Nor did the Appeals Chamber use its power under the ICC’s Rules of Procedure to decide on its own to issue the warrant for Bashir on the genocide charges. That, too, is up to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Given the divergence of views about whether the violence in Darfur—which according to UN officials has caused some 300,000 deaths and forced more than 2.7 million people from their homes—constitutes genocide, a decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue the warrant on genocide charges is not a sure thing. And with Bashir still in power—Bashir recently received the official nomination of his party to run again for the presidency in Sudan’s April elections—the Appeals Chamber’s decision looks even less like a development of much import in the fight for accountability in Darfur.
Perhaps that is a fair assessment of the decision.
But even if it results in the ICC eventually holding a sitting head of state criminally responsible for genocide, the Appeals Chamber’s decision is also significant, right now, for what it tells us about international criminal law and about the internal dynamics of the Court:
► As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber corrected an error in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard, an error which, had the Prosecutor chosen not to appeal, would have impacted future cases dealing not only with genocide charges, but also with any other crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction.
► Moreover, beyond this important advance in interpretation and application of the Rome Statute, the decision provides a fascinating glimpse into the Appeals Chamber’s vision of its own powers relative to the Pre-Trial Chamber, and of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s powers relative to the Office of the Prosecutor. In finding error in the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, but reserving for that body for the ultimate determination about the standard for issuance of a warrant and the grounds for the warrant itself, the Appeals Chamber is protecting the Pre-Trial Chamber’s role as the gatekeeper for investigations, as the check on the Office of the Prosecutor, while at the same time it is preventing the Pre-Trial Chamber from too strictly performing these necessary functions.
In short, the Appeals Chamber has defined for itself a limited role in interlocutory appeals—a role that holds great power despite its limits.

Breaking News: Al Bashir Can Be Prosecuted for Genocide

As we've blogged in the past (see, e.g., here, here, & here) the question of genocide in Darfur remained an open one. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC recently ruled that the Pre-Trial Chamber had erred in a prior ruling when it failed to confirm the genocide counts proposed by the Prosecution against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir (right).
The new ruling is premised on the burden of proof at the arrest warrant stage. The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) had essentially demanded proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Al Bashir's genocidal intent when it required proof that
the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn [from the evidence presented] is the existence of reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the [Government of Sudan's] dolus specialis/specific intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups.

In so holding, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the lone dissent on the PTC, Judge Anita Ušacka of Latvia (left), who argued that the Prosecution had met its burden at the arrest warrant stage.

In its ruling, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that
the evidentiary threshold of "reasonable grounds to believe" for the issuance of a warrant of arrest must be distinguished from the threshold required for the confirmation of charges ("substantial grounds to believe", article 61 (7) of the Statute) and the threshold for a conviction ("beyond reasonable doubt", article 66 (3) of the Statute).
The Pre-Trial Chamber has been directed to re-consider the scope of the arrest warrant pursuant to the appropriate standard of proof on remand. Stay tuned!

ICL Holiday Update

While most of us were opening presents and eating too much over the holidays, the wheels of international justice were turning. This post provides a sampling of some important events in international criminal law over the holiday season.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
The ECCC concluded its first trial: that of Duch (below right), the former head of Tuol Sleng detention center where upwards of 12,000 people were detained, tortured, and executed during the Khmer Rouge era. As will be discussed in subsequent posts, Duch’s Co-Counsel advanced two contradictory defenses:

  • that he should receive mitigation in sentencing for his de facto plea of guilty, remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and assistance to the prosecutors and
  • that he should be acquitted because he was not one of the most responsible for the Khmer Rouge crimes and was only following orders under duress.
The ECCC Statute contains no provisions for accepting a guilty plea, so the Court was left to design ad hoc trial procedures that for all intents and purposes resulted in a full trial. It remains to be seen what the judges will do with this bizarre state of affairs; a verdict is expected this spring.
In other ECCC news, the initial judicial investigation in Case 002, which involves Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan—the four regime leaders in custody, has concluded. The parties may request additional investigative action, and the Co-Prosecutors are entitled to make a Final Submission requesting particular charges. Once these proceedings have concluded, the Co-Investigating Judges will issue their Closing Order, which marks the end of the investigation and is analogous to an indictment. The target date is September 2010. For more details on the investigative stage, see here. The Co-Investigating Judges have already indicated that, pursuant to the Co-Prosecutors’ Introductory Submission, they are investigating the following crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity (including enforced disappearances and forced marriage), genocide, and national crimes. They also ruled that they will consider the liability of the accused according to the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (para. 21), but only in respect to international crimes (para. 22). Ieng Sary’s effort to have Co-Investigating Judge Marcel LeMonde disqualified on grounds of bias was rejected as unsubstantiated.
After receiving the go ahead from the Pre-Trial Chamber as discussed here, the Co-Prosecutors earlier submitted Introductory Submissions with respect to five additional suspects.

The International Criminal Court
The ICC's Assembly of State Parties concluded a meeting in The Hague at which time they finalized the agenda for the first Review Conference in June 2010. Summaries of the proceedings are available here. At the meeting, delegates forwarded several proposals for amendments to the Review Conference for its consideration. These are:
  1. A proposal by Liechtenstein (former Chair of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression) for the inclusion of a definition of the crime of aggression. For a discussion of the text of this amendment, see our prior series on the crime of aggression.
  2. A proposal by Belgium and other states to add several weapons crimes (including employing poison weapons, asphyxiating gases, and expanding bullets) to the provisions addressing non-international armed conflicts. (These acts are already prosecutable before the ICC when committed within an international armed conflict.)
The Dutch proposal to include a placeholder provision on terrorism (discussed here) was not adopted. Delegates indicated that they might revisit the issue once an omnibus definition of terrorism existed under international law.

Gender Justice at the ICC
At the recent ASP meeting, the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice -- at which 3 IntLawGrrls guest/alumnae, Brigid Inder, Kate Orlovsky, and Katrina Anderson (prior post) work -- presented its fifth quasi-annual Gender Report Card for 2009, The report revealed that the ICC has reached gender parity in professional staffing. (Indeed, 53% of judges are now female.) The report also recounts progress in adjudicating gender violence and protecting victims and witnesses in the situations under consideration by the Court and how the Trust Fund for Victims has managed its funds.

The Ad Hoc Tribunals
Upon an appeal by the Prosecutor, the ICTY Appeals Chamber quashed the Trial Chamber’s acquittal in Prosecutor v. Šljivančanin on one count and increased the sentence of for crimes committed against Croatian civilians at Vukovar Hospital. The ad hoc tribunals allow the Prosecutor to appeal an acquittal and achieve a conviction before the Appeals Chamber without further possibility of review. Šljivančanin (right) filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that he should be entitled to appeal the new conviction in keeping with international human rights principles. In response to Šljivančanin’s motion for reconsideration, the Appeals Chamber ruled that settled jurisprudence made clear that no additional appeal was allowed. Although this jurisprudence is indeed settled, it has remained contentious.
The right to appeal was not in the Charters of the Nuremberg or Tokyo Tribunals. Article 26 of the Nuremberg Charter, for example, held that:
The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any Defendant … shall be final and not subject to review.
By contrast, Article 17 of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal provided only that an appeal of sorts could be lodged with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur. Although the defendants exercised this right, MacArthur upheld the verdicts, prompting the unsuccessful habeas petitions to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The modern tribunals depart from this previous practice. Indeed, as discussed above, the rules of these tribunals provide that both the defence and the prosecution can appeal adverse judgments. A new verdict is not inevitable, however; it is possible that the Appeals Chamber will order a retrial. For example, Rule 117C of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that “in appropriate circumstances the Appeals Chamber may order that the accused be retried according to law.”
The right to appeal a criminal conviction is enshrined in many international human rights treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, provides at Article 14(5) that
Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
Article 2(2) of the more recent Seventh Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, however, strikes a balance between the right to an appeal and the demands of expedient and efficient justice by making allowances for situations in which an individual is convicted following an appeal against an acquittal. Protocol No. 7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. 117. To be sure, these human rights treaties are addressed to domestic criminal proceedings and, as such, are not directly applicable to the international tribunals. The ICTR, however, has noted that
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is part of general international law and is applied on that basis. Regional human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence developed thereunder, are persuasive authorities which may be of assistance in applying and interpreting the Tribunal’s applicable law. Thus, they are not binding of their own accord on the Tribunal. They are, however, authoritative as evidence of international custom.
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision, para. 40 (Nov. 3, 1999).
Some commentators and judges have argued that the Appeals Chambers should order a new trial after a Trial Chamber’s acquittal is impugned. In particular, this has become a recurring point of disagreement between Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy, at left) and his colleagues on the ICTY/R Appeals Chamber. In several cases, Judge Pocar strongly dissented in favour of remitting the case back to the Trial Chamber for further determination. See, e.g., Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment (26 May 2003) and Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment (20 May 2005).
In Galić, for example, Judge Pocar argued:
[T]he Appeals Chamber is bound to uphold an accused’s right of appeal enshrined in international law as reflected in Article 14 (5) of the [ICCPR]. Thus, * * * the Appeals Chamber’s intervention * * * to correct errors committed by a Trial Chamber must be interpreted so as to comply with the fundamental human rights principle that any conviction and/or sentence must be capable of review by a higher tribunal according to law. While Article 25(1) of our Statute affords the Prosecution the possibility of lodging an appeal that seeks an increase in sentence, this provision does not allow for an exception to the Appeals Chamber’s obligation to guarantee the fundamental right of appeal under Article 14 (5) of the ICCPR. As stated by the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR, although the applicable law in a jurisdiction may allow for a person to be convicted and sentenced by the higher court in that jurisdiction, “this
circumstance alone cannot impair the defendant’s right to review of his conviction and sentence by a higher court.

Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No IT-98-29-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar, para. 2 (Nov. 30, 2006).
In other developments, the trial of Vojislav Šešelj (right) re-commenced before the ICTY this month. The trial has been marred by disruptions from the defendant, including a hunger strike; concerns about witness intimidation; and a contempt conviction against Šešelj. In the past, Šešelj has indicated he does not intend to call any witnesses on his behalf.
The ICTR acquitted Father Hormisdas Nsengimana of genocide. Nsengimana had been accused of being involved in an attack on Tutsis and supervising roadblocks installed to identify and eliminate Tutsis.
On grounds of alibi, the ICTR also reversed the conviction of Protais Zigiranyirazo, who had been convicted of genocide and extermination pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise. (He has also been implicated in the murder of Dian Fossey in light of his financial interests in gorilla tourism, which Fossey opposed). Both defendants were ordered released.

Roundup of Even More ICL News
The International Criminal Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law -- for which IntLawGrrl Kelly Askin serves as C0-Chair, and yours truly as Secretary -- recently circulated its newsletter addressing other developments this year. The newsletter is available here.

French courts, international crimes

Le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (left), the criminal court in France's capital, soon may adjudicate charges of international offenses.
In a joint op-ed appearing in Le Monde, Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Justice Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie (below right) announced that in the 2010 courts bill the legislature will be asked to give to the Paris court competence to hear cases involving allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity. As quoted by Agence France-Presse, the 2 ministers wrote, in a reference to the complementarity principle at the heart of the International Criminal Court structure:
'Il ne s'agit pas de mettre en place la compétence universelle mais de faire valoir les principes du droit international au sein de juridictions nationales dans le respect du traité de Rome de 1998.'
That is:

'It's not a matter of establishing universal jurisdiction but rather of giving force to the international law principles applicable to national court systems by dint of the 1998 Rome Statute.'


(courtroom photo credit; Alliot-Marie photo credit)

On November 16

On this day in ...
... 1989 (20 years ago today), at the 25th session of its General Conference, UNESCO adopted the Seville Statement on Violence. (credit for image from 2003 UNESCO conference discussing Statement)Produced by a global consortium of scientists meeting in 1986 in Spain, the Statement refuted "a number of alleged biological findings that have been used, even by some in our disciplines, to justify violence and war." After declaration 5 such so-called findings "scientifically incorrect," the Statement concluded "that biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism," and ended with these words:

Just as 'wars begin in the minds of men', peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us.


(Prior November 16 posts are here and here.)
 
Bloggers Team