Showing posts with label crimes against humanity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crimes against humanity. Show all posts

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)


'[I]f you want to confine your energies to big fish, you need larger holes. Otherwise, you'll spend all your time picking out the sardines, minnows, and plastic bottles. One of the greatest challenges of international criminal justice is the selection of cases. Resources must be focused using the concept of 'those who bear the greatest responsibility' or something similar.


-- Our colleague William A. Schabas, Professor of Human Rights Law, and Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland-Galway, in "Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes," published in a Leiden Journal of International Law forum on the policy element included in the ICC definition of crimes against humanity. At issue, to be precise, is Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, which requires that the requisite anti-civilian attack occur "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack." Schabas' concluding essay constitutes a biting smackdown of proposals to relax the requirement.



Breaking News from the ICC

The ICC recently released three important decisions in the last two days:

1. The first two are decisions by Pre-Trial Chamber II, by a majority, to issue summons to the six Kenyan suspects (about which we've blogged before) to appear before the ICC on April 4, 2011:

  • William Samoei Ruto (Ruto),
  • Henry Kiprono Kosgey (Kosgey),
  • Joshua Arap Sang (Sang),
  • Francis Kirimi Muthaura (Muthaura),
  • Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Kenyatta) and
  • Mohammed Hussein Ali (Ali).

The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (the Odinga defendants) can be prosecute for specified crimes against humanity (murder, forcible transfer and persecution). (The Chamber rejected efforts to prosecute the three for torture). The cases against Ruto and Kosgey will proceed under a theory of indirect co-perpetration (i.e., committing crimes through another person(s)) in accordance with article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. The case against Sang, by contrast, will proceed under a theory of complicity rather than co-perpetration, because the PTC determined that no reasonable grounds existed to believe that Sang's contribution to the commission of the crimes was essential.

Maintaining almost perfect symmetry, the PTC determined Muthaura and Kenyatta (the Kibaki defendants) will be prosecuted as co-perpetrators of the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts. Likewise, the case against Ali will proceed under a theory of complicity based on the finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Ali otherwise contributed to the commission of the crimes in accordance with article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.

Unsurprisingly (see prior post), Judge Hans-Peter Kaul dissented (opinion as yet unavailable), arguing that the Prosecutor had failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes were committed pursuant to or in furtherance of the policy of an organization as required by the definition of crimes against humanity in the ICC Statute.

2. In the Darfur situation, PTC I confirmed charges against two rebel leaders (Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus) based upon alleged attacks on the compound of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan on the evening of September 29, 2007. The two will be prosecuted for the war crimes of:

•violence to life and attempted violence to life;
•intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units and vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission; and
•pillaging.

Stay tuned...

ATS Case Involving Abuse By Church Officials Survives Motion to Dismiss

An Alien Tort Statute (ATS) case pending in the Central District of California survived this week a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was filed on behalf of a Mexican national, proceeding anonymously, against Cardinal Roger Mahony, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Mexican national Cardinal Norberto Rivera, Mexican national Father Nicholas Aguilar Rivera (left, the alleged direct perpetrator), and the Diocese of Tehuacan in Mexico. Plaintiff's lawyers specialize in cases redressing the abuse of minors. The plaintiff's allegations stem from abuse suffered when he was twelve-years old at the hands of Father Aguilar and the subsequent conspiracy among the defendants to conceal and cover-up the abuse in order to protect Father Aguilar and the Church. The complaint contains ten causes of action, including:
  • rape & other sexual abuse,
  • crimes against humanity,
  • torture,
  • cruel, inhuman, & degrading treatment,
  • civil conspiracy,
  • intentional infliction of emotional distress,
  • negligence and
  • failure to warn.
In addition to the abuse of the plaintiff, it alleges other instances of abuse in the relevant dioceses, including some that led to the criminal prosecution of Father Aguilar (see this timeline of events). Evidence invoked in the opinion suggest that Church officials were aware of Father Aguilar's history of abuse and yet did nothing to prevent his access to children in either diocese.

In the opinion denying defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (under FRCP 12(b)(1)), the Court determined that plaintiff had adequately pled a federal cause of action and thus had the right to proceed in federal court. In so ruling, the Court determined that the plaintiff's claims were not insubstantial, implausible, frivolous, or devoid of merit, which would allow it to dismiss the case at this preliminary stage in the absence of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (under FRCP 12(b)(6)). The Court also ruled that the complaint was not barred by the 10-year statute of limitation, because the ATS is subject to equitable tolling. The infamous Erie case reared its head here as the Court cited California laws tolling cases involving a child plaintiff until the child turns 18 and laws tolling cases filed by victims of sexual abuse until the child turns 26. The Court determined that the case was timely under either theory. In addition, the Court ruled that plaintiff was not required to exhaust local remedies prior to filing suit here.

Most importantly for students of international law, the Court also ruled that plaintiff's international law claims were actionable under the Alien Tort Statute as violations of customary international law. In particular, it noted that rape, sexual abuse, and private torture can violate international law when they rise to the level of crimes against humanity. In so ruling, the Court cited prior ATS jurisprudence, human rights treaties including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 7 of the ICC Statute (defining crimes against humanity). The Court confirmed that supplemental jurisdiction exists over the California state law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Based on the arguments made in the instant motion, we can expect future motions to dismiss arguing that
  • As a corporation, the Archdiocese cannot be sued under the ATS,

  • The plaintiff has failed to allege facts that if true would entitle him to relief for the causes of action alleged.
The crimes against humanity claim is no doubt the most worrisome claim for the Church and the most vulnerable claim for the plaintiff. It will require the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. Given the increasing number of cases involving abuse and cover-up within the Church worldwide, the plaintiff may be able to meet this threshold. In addition, maintaining the crimes against humanity claim will entitle the plaintiff to broad pattern-and-practice discovery. The relevant federal rules of civil procedure allow discovery on any matter that is relevant to the party's claims; for good cause shown, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. This broad scope is limited, however, by evidentiary privileges, such as that between priest and penitent as set forth in California law.

This website contains information and a searchable database on priests accused of abuse (list of names above). Stay Tuned!

Genocide and crimes against humanity in the national systems of Latin America

(Many thanks to IntLawGirls for inviting me to present my latest article in in this guest post)

As opposed to the other so-called core crimes under international law, genocide is one of the few to be codified in the national judicial systems of most Latin American states long before the adoption of the Rome Statute system. Indeed, the codification process took place from the 1970s onwards and, in some instances, even before. As I discuss in my latest article, "An Overview of the Crime of Genocide in Latin American Jurisdictions", 10 International Criminal Law Review 441 (2010), this history generated disparities between the international and the national definitions.
In general terms, the dolus specialis -- the requisite "intent to destroy, in whole or in part," as stated in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) -- is inherent to all national provisions on genocide analyzed in my article.
The deviations from the international definition thus revolve around the actus reus, understood as encompassing two other aspects of the Genocide Convention definition:
►The modalities of commission, encompassing, in Article III, genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide; and
► The protected groups included in Article II, namely, "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."
Deviations from the Genocide Convention definition found in Latin American codes present a common feature: the enlargement of the scope of the protected groups, by including the political group and other, even more general groups.
Such a disparate outcome may be attributed, in my view, to the several decades of confrontation, in many cases amounting to non-international armed conflicts, that were experienced in various countries in Latin America. (In Colombia, the armed conflict, although reduced, is still ongoing.) Such conflicts generally involved a state policy of systematic attack against civilian populations, and in many instances against political groups. By the same token, the so-called "doctrine of national security" that served as a justification for the emergence of repressive regimes in the 1970s was politically motivated and targeted.
Jurisprudence in this area is incomplete.
Notwithstanding the fact that the most relevant Latin American deviations from the international definition refer to the protected groups, jurisprudence has not shed much light either on the underlying rationale or justification for such a deviation or on the scope of interpretation of the deviation. In this connection, my article pays particular attention to constitutional challenges that have been lodged against some of the elements incorporated in the Colombian and Bolivian provisions on genocide. Also receiving attention is a conviction for genocide rendered by the Bolivian Supreme Court (above).
In my view, understanding the status of other international offences is critical to understanding the status of genocide as it is codified in Latin America.
Crimes against humanity were generally unknown in national legislation. Arguably, this did not begin to change until the 2002. The entry into force that year of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (below right) paved the way for serious consideration of the proscription of crimes against humanity in national systems. This situation may explain why some Latin American countries adopted definitions of genocide that deviated from the international standard.
Also significant is the fact that conviction for genocide has historically provoked a strong moral condemnation.
The time is ripe to reflect on the reasons behind the intention to label a particular situation as genocide, given that the codification of the other core crimes has gained momentum.
Some consideration should be devoted to the national implementation of the Rome Statute.
In this vein, it is worth noting that the current trend on implementation in Latin America offers mixed signals as to whether states will opt:
► To maintain the enlarged scope of genocide, on the one hand; or,
► To avoid, on the other hand, perilous juxtapositions that may arise -- mainly with respect to crimes against humanity -- by creating clearer parameters between crimes.
Blending of Latin American history, of the customary aspects of crimes against humanity and its momentum of codification, and of societal perspectives towards the crime of genocide lead to a complex and challenging interaction.

Update from the ECCC

The Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia today confirmed and partially amended the Closing Order (analogous to an indictment) against the four regime leaders in custody and destined to become Case 002 before the ECCC. The four remain in provisional detention.

The accused filed appeals filed against the Co-Investigating Judges' Closing Order. Most of the grounds of appeal were dismissed, but the Pre-Trial Chamber did apparently require a specification as to the existence of a link between the underlying crimes against humanity and an armed conflict, confirming that the so-called war nexus (about which we've blogged before) remained an element of crimes against humanity in the Khmer Rouge period. In addition, the PTC ruled that rape per se was not an enumerated crime against humanity at this time, but it was an "inhumane act" and so remained prosecutable under that moniker.


A written opinion is expected soon. Stay tuned...

Different sort of punto final

'No hablo de guerra sucia, prefiero hablar de guerra justa.'
that is,

'I do not speak of dirty war, I prefer to speak of just war.'

Thus spake defiant former Argentine dictator Jorge Videla (above), before a national court. Many of his 28 codefendants -- all members of the brutal military regime that ruled in the 1970s and 1980s --delivered similarly unrepentant speeches.
But the court in Córdoba had the final word, imposing sentences of life in prison for crimes against humanity. (credit for EFE photo) Yesterday's relegation of once-powerful men to una cárcel común ("a common prison") was the latest in a string of national prosecutions in Argentina; IntLawGrrls' prior posts on this accountability process are available here.

Breaking News: ICC Kenya Indictments Announced

As expected, Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo today requested under Article 58 that the International Criminal Court issue summons to appear to six Kenyans in connection with his proprio motu investigation into post-election violence in Kenya. We've blogged about this and other issues involving transitional justice in Kenya here, here, here, and here. The six individuals to be prosecuted in two cases are:
1. William Samoei Ruto (left) who is the suspended Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology and a member of Parliament for Eldoret, one of the places hardest hit by the violence. He was a supporter of Raila Odinga, Kenya's Prime Minister.
2. Henry Kiprono Kosgey is the Minister of Industrialization and a MP for Tinderet Constituency. He is former chair of the orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Odinga's party.
3. Joshua Arap Sang (right) is currently Head of Operations of and a commentator on a Kenyan radio station. He was accused of inciting violence after the elections.
The highly-redacted Article 58 Applications for the Odinga supporters is available here.
4. Francis Kirimi Muthaura (below right, addressing Kofi Annan) is Head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet and Chairman of the National Security Advisory Committee and a Kibaki supporter. He is accused of authorizing the police to use excessive force against ODM supporters.
5. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta is currently the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Chair of the KANU party. He is the son of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first president.
6. Mohamed Hussein Ali is Chief Executive of the Postal Corporation of Kenya and was Commissioner of the Kenya Police in the post-election period.
The equally-redacted Article 58 Application for the Party of National Unity supporters is available here. The crimes against humanity to be charged include murder, torture, persecution, and deportation.
The full Press Release is here and a video of the press conference is here. All suspects have apparently been on television stating they would cooperate with the ICC, although many of have publicly discredited the investigation.
In response to the Applications, President Obama issued the following statement:
Today, as the International Criminal Court announces the names of six suspects alleged to have participated in the post-election violence that threatened to tear Kenya apart three years ago, I encourage all Kenyans take a moment to reflect on the tremendous progress their country has made since those dark days. Together, you have been working to reconcile your communities, to reform your institutions to better serve the public good, and to put your country on a path to lasting peace and prosperity. Kenya is turning a page in its history, moving away from impunity and divisionism toward an era of accountability and equal opportunity. The path ahead is not easy, but I believe that the Kenyan people have the courage and resolve to reject those who would drag the country back into the past and rob Kenyans of the singular opportunity that is before them to realize the country's vast potential.

In pursuit of these goals, I urge all of Kenya's leaders, and the people whom they serve, to cooperate fully with the ICC investigation and remain focused on implementation of the reform agenda and the future of your nation. Those found responsible will be held accountable for their crimes as individuals. No community should be singled out for shame or held collectively responsible. Let the accused carry their own burdens - and let us keep in mind that under the ICC process they are innocent until proven guilty. As you move forward, Kenyans can count on the United States as a friend and partner.

Hear, hear.

On October 21

On this day in ...
... 1999, the highest court in France rejected an appeal by a Frenchman convicted of crimes against humanity committed during World War II. The court ruling that the convicted man, Maurice Papon, had forfeited the right to appeal upon taking flight to Switzerland earlier in the month. Papon had been sentenced to 10 years in prison in April 1998. Within weeks of the ruling on this day, Papon would be back in custody in France. As posted, the former Vichy official (left) died in 2007 at age 96. (photo credit)

(Prior October 21 posts are here, here, and here.)

No Alien Tort Liability for Corporations?

A serious, perhaps, mortal blow has been dealt to the Alien Tort Statute by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The ATS creates federal jurisdiction over

any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
In its opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., however, the Second Circuit dramatically narrowed the scope of the ATS by ruling that it did not apply to "juridical persons," meaning corporations.
Since the groundbreaking judgment in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala (2d Cir. 1980), which was brought by my dearly-missed colleague Rhonda Copelon and the Center for Constitutional Rights, the ATS has offered victims of human rights abuses the prospect of access to U.S. courts.
In Kiobel, the oil company defendants stood accused of aiding and abetting the Nigerian government's campaign of human rights abuses in the Niger Delta, Nigeria's oil-producing region. The litany of human rights violations at issue in the case included allegations of torture, arbitrary detention, and crimes against humanity. Unfortunately, these allegations can no longer be heard in U.S.courts. The Second Circuit ruled on September 17th that corporations cannot be sued under the Alien Tort Statute because they are “juridical” entities rather than natural persons. Should this ruling be adopted throughout the U.S. court system, it would gut the scope of the ATS, making it very likely that corporations participating in human rights abuses will escape any accountability for their conduct.
The Niger Delta is home to 31 million people. (map credit) Since oil exploration began some 50 years ago, the region has suffered an Exxon Valdez-sized oil spill every year. As you can imagine, these spills have devastated the local population. In 2009 Amnesty International reported that the oil industry in the Niger Delta of Nigeria
has brought impoverishment, conflict, human rights abuses and despair to the majority of the people in the oil-producing areas.
Local populations have failed to benefit from the wealth generated by oil production, even as they suffer its environmental consequences. Before being despoiled by oil pollution, the Niger Delta was one of the most important wetlands in the world. BP's oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (see previous Intlawgrrl posts here, here and here) focused public attention, albeit briefly, on the ongoing environmental devastation in the Niger Delta. (You can hear an interview I did with WBEZ Chicago Public Radio’s Worldview Program on this topic here.)
Just last year, Shell Oil settled an ATS case alleging the company’s complicity in the hanging deaths of nine Ogoni activists, including the world-renown poet Ken Siro Wiwa. Cases alleging similar human rights abuses in oil production have been brought against Talisman Energy for its activities in the Sudan, Unocal for its activities in Burma, and Chevron for its activities in Ecuador. (News on that last suit here.)
Second Circuit Judge José A. Cabranes interpreted international law precedents extremely narrowly in order to concluded that, throughout history,
the principle of individual liability for violations of international law has been limited to natural persons—not ‘juridical' persons such as corporations.
This despite the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly applies to "every individual and every organ of society." Over the objections of Judge Pierre N. Leval, Judge Cabranes, joined by Judge Dennis Jacobs concluded that that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over ATS claims brought against corporate entities.
Given that oil production often takes place in countries without robust judicial systems, this cramped ruling virtually assures that victims will have no avenue of redress.
The United States consumes a quarter of the world’s oil—10% of which comes from Nigeria. That makes the United States the largest purchaser of oil produced in the Niger Delta. Our participation as end-consumers makes us unwitting collaborators to abuse in Nigeria and around the world. We surely have an interest in giving victims of these human rights abuses a forum in which to seek justice.

4th Chautauqua Declaration

As a cosponsor of the 4th International Humanitarian Law Dialogs, just concluded at the Chautauqua Institution in upstate New York, IntLawGrrls is proud to reproduce in full the 4th Chautauqua Declaration signed yesterday by a host of prosecutors from present and past international criminal courts and tribunals, depicted above. They are: top row left to right, Andrew T. Cayley of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Serge Brammertz of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Fatou Bensouda of the International Criminal Court, James Johnson of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and Bongani Majola of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and bottom row left to right, Robert Petit of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, David M. Crane of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Benjamin B. Ferencz and H.W. William Caming of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg, and Richard J. Goldstone of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. (Seated next to Goldstone is Stephen J. Rapp, a former prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Now the U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, he did not sign.)
Here's the Declaration:

In the spirit of humanity and peace the assembled current and former international prosecutors and their representatives here at the Chautauqua Institution ...
Recognizing the continuing need for justice and the rule of law as the foundation to international security, and cognizant of the legacy of all those who preceded us at Nuremberg and elsewhere:
Recognize the tenth anniversary of the Robert H. Jackson Center and its important mandate to preserve, promote, and advance the legacy of Justice Robert Jackson through education, exhibits, and events, which emphasize the current relevance of Jackson’s ideas on individual freedom and justice;
Honor the life of our colleague and friend Whitney R. Harris, a prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg who passed away this year; commend his drive and force in ensuring that the spirit of Nuremberg continued; and note the awarding posthumously to Whitney Harris the first annual Joshua Heintz Humanitarian Award for distinguished service to mankind;
Applaud the efforts of the states parties to the Rome Statute, and other delegations in Kampala this year in their willingness to openly take stock in the progress of international criminal law in general and the concrete recommendations to ensure justice for victims of international crimes; and for reaching consensus on a definition of the crime of aggression and for their determination to press for appropriate mechanisms for its enforcement and prosecution;
Noting that after thirty years of impunity the first judgment has been rendered in respect of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia;
Reflecting upon the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide at Srebrenica and the continuing need for the accountability of those responsible;
Expressing concern at the continuing plight of civilians caught up in armed conflict and particularly for those crimes committed against women and children;
Now do call upon the international community to:
Keep the spirit of the Nuremberg Principles alive by:
Ensuring the enforcement of the laws of armed conflict and in particular those relating to the protection of civilians;
Calling upon parties in armed conflict to respect international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls;
Ensuring that gender crimes are investigated and prosecuted appropriately;
States refraining from the use or threat of armed force and settling their disputes by peaceful means and in accordance with the United Nations Charter and international law;
Supporting and adequately funding the tribunals and courts in their work to maintain the rule of law at both the international and domestic level;
Implementing their obligations under international law in the sharing of information, investigating, prosecuting or transferring to an appropriate judicial body those who violate international criminal law to ensure accountability of all persons, including sitting heads of state;
Considering the adoption of a Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity; ...

On August 24

On this day in ...
... 2004, reversing a decision by the intermediate court of appeals, the Supreme Court of Argentina ruled 5-3 that statutes of limitation do not apply to charges of crimes against humanity. The ruling in Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro s/ homicidio calificado y asociación ilícita y otros arose out of an appeal of a trial court's judgment convicting an agent of DINA, the secret police that operated in Argentine and Chile during the regime of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, with having committed homicide by use of explosives and for participation in a criminal association. Among the instruments that the Argentinian high court (above right) cited in its ruling were the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. (photo credit)

(Prior August 24 posts are here, here, and here.)

The torture ban & cultural relativism

At the XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law held here in Washington, D.C., last week (about which others have blogged here and here), I was asked to participate in a plenary session.
The session was entitled The Prohibition Against Torture and Cultural Relativism. Specifically, I was asked to speak about this issue from an international criminal law perspective, addressing in particular whether different notions of how to evaluate allegations of torture emerge in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Interestingly, I found that the way in which the tribunals dealt with this question had a gender dimension.
A summary of my thoughts follows.
Consistent with human rights law, torture under the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals consists of an act or omission giving rise to severe physical or mental pain or suffering. Notably, the tribunals have held that permanent injury is not a requirement for torture; moreover, evidence of the suffering need not even be visible after the commission of the crime.
Nevertheless, in some cases, the tribunals have highlighted that certain forms of torture have long-lasting effects on the victim, particularly in cases involving sexual violence.
In those cases, it appears that social and cultural context may be relevant to an assessment of whether the pain is severe enough to constitute torture. For instance, while the tribunals have recognized that rape qualifies as torture because it causes severe pain and suffering, both physical and psychological, an early judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia -- Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo (the Celibici Case) (1998)-- explicitly pointed out:
The psychological suffering of persons upon whom rape has been inflicted may be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions and can be particularly acute and long-lasting.
A later judgment, Prosecutor v. Limaj (2005), agreed with this finding, noting that
in certain circumstances the suffering can be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions [and that] the evaluation should[, therefore,] take into account the specific social, cultural and religious background of the victims when assessing the severity of the alleged conduct.
Curiously, this later judgment highlighted the fact that this finding was

made specifically in the context of rape.
Perhaps this is not surprising, since harm from sexual violence is often long-lasting, in part because of the cultural and social norms prevalent in many of the victims’ communities.
Indeed, as commentators have noted, women and girls continue to suffer from the consequences of sexual violence long after a conflict or attack against the civilian population has ended, often because of the social and cultural values of the community to which the victim belongs. For instance,
the birth of children from rape [by a member of a group to which the victim does not belong] ... is likely to cause significant [and long-term] ... mental harm, especially in patriarchal societies where the ethnicity of the child is [considered to be] that of the father, thus the rapist.
(See the 2005 book by Professor Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer (left), Tilburg Law School, the Netherlands, entitled Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: the ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and ICTR.) Similarly, long-term consequences such as isolation and ostracism are particularly common in social, cultural , or religious communities which attach stigma to the victim rather than the perpetrator of rape; indeed, victims of rape in these communities are sometimes cast as “unmarriageable” or abandoned by their spouse and/or family members.
Interestingly, the idea that cultural conditions should be considered in the analysis of whether particular conduct rises to the level of torture does not seem to appear in the discussion of other types of acts alleged to constitute torture.
In fact, acts such as:
► being forced to watch severe mistreatment inflicted on a relative;
► falsely informing a victim that his parent has been killed; and
► forcing victims to collect the dead bodies of other members of their ethnic group
have all been recognized as amounting to torture by the ad hoc tribunals without recourse to an analysis of the victims’ cultural or social background.
Consistent with this, consideration of cultural or social conditions is absent from the elements of torture, as enumerated in the Elements of Crimes that the Assembly of States Parties adopted to assist the judges of the International Criminal Court in interpreting the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact, consideration of such factors is absent from the elements of all other crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, save one: the war crime, set forth in Article 8(b)(xxi) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, of commission of outrages upon personal dignity.
This crime requires that the
perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons [to a] degree ... generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity.
A footnote to the definition states that it “takes into account relevant aspects of the cultural background of the victim.”
It may, perhaps, be appropriate to consider the broader circumstances in which the accused’s conduct occurred – including the cultural background of the victim – when assessing whether that conduct “humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of” the victim, as what is considered to violate one’s dignity is often culturally dependent. Curiously, however, there is little discussion of victims’ cultural backgrounds in the jurisprudence of the ad hocs dealing with the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity. Indeed, while the tribunals have found, for instance, that:
► the use of detainees as human shields or trench-diggers;
► inappropriate conditions of confinement;
► performing subservient acts;
► being forced to relieve bodily functions in one’s clothing; or
► enduring the constant fear of being subjected to physical, mental or sexual violence
all qualify as outrages upon personal dignity, none of these findings were contingent upon an analysis of the victims’ social or cultural circumstances.
Thus, even in the context of assessing whether a person’s dignity has been violated – where the social, cultural or religious context may be relevant to understanding how a perpetrator’s conduct would be experienced by the victim as violating his or her dignity – a victim’s cultural heritage seems to have had little bearing on the tribunal’s analyses.
The tribunals’ lack of attention to cultural context may, perhaps, be explained by a shift in their jurisprudence with respect to how long the victim must have suffered as a result of the accused’s humiliating or degrading conduct – a factor that, as the ICTY indicated in its discussion of rape as torture, can be exacerbated by the social and cultural values of the community to which the victim belongs.
While an early case, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (1999), suggested that the humiliating or degrading treatment must have caused “lasting suffering” to the victim, the trial chamber decision in a later case, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. (2001), found:
So long as the humilitation or degradation is real and serious, the Trial Chamber can see no reason why it would also have to be "lasting" .... Obviously, if the humiliation and suffering caused is only fleeting in nature, it may be difficult to accept that it is real and serious. However this does not suggest that any sort of minimum temporal requirement of the effects of an outrage upon personal dignity is an element of the offence.
I would submit that this is probably the right approach, not only in the context of prosecuting sexual violence as an outrage upon personal dignity, but also when prosecuting it as the war crime or crime against humanity of torture.
Indeed, not all women who suffered sexual violence in conflict situations are permanently shamed, ostracized, or rejected by their communities. In fact, one commentator writing on wartime rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina notes that when one rape survivor was asked whether she felt shame or guilt because of what happened to her, she responded:
'The shame is theirs, not mine.'
(See Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a 2005 article by Karen L. Engle (right), Cecil D. Redford Professor in Law and Director of the Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for Human Rights and Justice at the University of Texas School of Law.)
Opening the door to consideration of social and cultural conditions in assessing whether conduct was severe or serious enough to warrant characterization as an outrage upon personal dignity or an act of torture may lead to overlooking conduct that might not result in long-lasting suffering but would otherwise qualify as humiliating or degrading, or even as an act of torture.
More significantly, it may tempt the court to evaluate the circumstances of a case by reference to the judges’ own social or cultural norms.
The Sentencing Judgement in Prosecutor v. Zelenović case illustrates this point. The judgment in that case was confined to sentencing, as the accused there pleaded guilty to torture and rape as crimes against humanity. Noting that
[t]he gravity of the offences is the primary consideration in imposing a sentence,
the trial chamber first emphasized that
torture by means of rape is a particularly grave form of torture.
It then went on to point out that what makes rape a particularly serious crimes is
[t]he violation of the moral and physical integrity of the victims.
Although the accused’s conduct no doubt caused physical, and perhaps psychological, harm to the victims, it is unclear what the Chamber meant by stating that the rape also violated the victims’ “moral integrity.” The point here is that the Chamber’s use of the term “moral” seems to imply a value judgment about the nature of sexual violence which the victims may or may not have shared.
Notably, the ICTY Appeals Chamber's 2002 decision in Kunarac took an arguably more objective approach in analyzing the question of whether rape amounts to torture. Rather than considering the victims’ social or cultural background in assessing whether the harm was severe enough to qualify as torture, the Appeals Chamber held:
Generally speaking, some acts establish per se the suffering of those upon whom they were inflicted. Rape is obviously such an act .... Sexual violence necessarily gives rise to severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, and in this way justifies its characterisation as an act of torture.
In light of the circumstances in which victims find themselves in these cases – that is, in the midst of an armed conflict or a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population – it is perhaps understandable that cultural conditions need not be considered when evaluating whether the harm suffered was serious or severe enough to qualify as torture. Indeed, as explained by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al. (2001):
In considering whether severe pain and suffering was also inflicted upon the other victims of sexual violence, the Trial Chamber takes into consideration the extraordinary vulnerability of the victims [in this context] and the fact that they were held imprisoned in a facility in which violence against detainees was the rule, not the exception. The detainees knew that Radic [the accused] held a position of authority in the camp, that he could roam the camp at will, and order their presence before him at any time. The women also knew or suspected that other women were being raped or otherwise subjected to sexual violence in the camp. The fear was pervasive and the threat was always real that they could be subjected to sexual violence at the whim of Radic. Under these circumstances, the Trial Chamber finds that threat of rape or other forms of sexual violence undoubtedly caused severe pain and suffering to [the witnesses] and thus, the elements of torture are also satisfied in relation to these survivors.
In sum, I think that in this context there is little room for a cultural relativism approach.

On July 29

On this day in ...
... 2003, the most notorious of those who led rebels during the 1990s civil war in Sierra Leone, 65-year-old Foday Sankoh, died in custody while awaiting trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (logo at right). On March 7 of the same year, that court had issued against the Revolutionary United Front leader an indictment on 17 counts of crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The indictment would be withdrawn on December 8, 2003.

(Prior July 29 posts are here, here, and here.)

Crimes Against Humanity: Enduring normative debates and doctrinal ambiguities

(Delighted to welcome back alumna Margaret deGuzman, who contributes this guest post on Crimes Against Humanity, her forthcoming book chapter)

In the summer of 1997 I was a law student intern in the Legal Advisor’s Office of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia at The Hague (left). When I walked in the door I was told that my assignment was to try to figure out the mens rea of crimes against humanity.
I was shocked. Surely someone who had spent more than a semester studying criminal law had already worked out the elements of crimes against humanity?
I spent a fascinating summer digging through cases decided under the Nuremberg Charter and under Control Council Law No. 10, as well as anything else I could get my hands on that might provide some insight into the mental element of crimes against humanity. (In those days, international criminal law sources were not as readily available as they are now.)
In the end I wrote an article that argued, as much on policy grounds as on precedent, that the mens rea should involve knowledge of the connection between the individual’s inhumane act and the broader attack against a civilian population. I like to think that my work influenced the adoption of the knowledge standard in the Appeals Chamber's July 15, 1999, Judgement in Tadić, but who knows?
I have remained fascinated with crimes against humanity ever since. One of the things that most intrigues me is that although this category of crimes is supposed to represent, along with genocide, the worst of the worst that people can do to each other, there is still lots of uncertainty about the elements and the theoretical underpinning of the legal prohibition.
The persistent uncertainties surrounding crimes against humanity are due in part to their historical origins. After World War II, the Allies wanted to prosecute the Nazis for crimes committed within German territory, conduct that was not covered by the laws of war. They found purchase for the new crime in the Martens Clause, part of the preamble of the Hague (IV) Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Invoking natural law protections for any lacunae in the laws of war, the Martens Clause provides that persons not otherwise covered in the 1907 Convention
remain under the protection and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
From those cryptic words, a new category of international crimes was born, without any diplomatic negotiations, drafting committees, or treaty ratifications.
This unusual history is only partly to blame for the persistent uncertainties that surround crimes against humanity, however. Figuring out what is meant by “crimes against humanity” has simply proven tricky for many smart people over the years. The International Law Commission debated the matter for decades, diplomats pondered the elements when they drafted the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, and the international community spent years trying to work out a definition for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Nonetheless, the ICC definition, in some ways the culmination of all these efforts, remains controversial in a number of important respects. Furthermore, the normative justification for crimes against humanity continues to engage deep thinkers, as illustrated by a number of recent treatments by such scholars as David Luban, Larry May, and Richard Vernon.
I explore some of the persistent normative debates and doctrinal ambiguities that surround crimes against humanity in my contribution to the forthcoming The Routledge Handbook on International Criminal Law, edited by our colleagues, William A. Schabas and IntLawGrrl guest/alumna Nadia Bernaz. My chapter first provides an overview of the evolution of the definition of crimes against humanity, before surveying the competing normative visions of this category of crimes. A number of justifications have been advanced for international jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, including that they:
► Threaten international peace and security;
► Are particularly grave and thus shock the conscience of humanity;
► Involve actions of states or state-like organizations that would otherwise go unpunished; and
► Target groups rather than isolated individuals.
I conclude that ultimately none of these approaches provides a clear and complete rationale for categorizing certain inhumane acts as crimes against humanity.
I then explore the doctrinal debates that necessarily result from the lack of clear philosophical underpinnings for these crimes:
► What constitutes a widespread or systematic attack?
► Is a policy required and, if so, what kind?
► What defines a “civilian population”?
► What connection is required between the individual inhumane act and the broader attack?
Last year, a group of experts on crimes against humanity gathered in St. Louis at the invitation of Washington University Law Professor Leila Nadya Sadat, an IntLawGrrls guest/alumna, to consider a Convention on Crimes Against Humanity. Initially, there was much discussion of how to “improve” the definition for inclusion in the Convention. Ultimately, however, the organizers decided it would be unwise to create a new definition that would compete with that included in the Rome Statute and simply adopted the latter’s definition. Perhaps the debates about crimes against humanity will now subside, and the Rome Statute’s definition as interpreted by the court will gain general acceptance.
In the meantime, I’ll continue to be intrigued.

Breaking News: The ICC Approves Kenya Investigation

Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC has authorized the first investigation by the Prosecution proprio motu (on his own motion) into the post-election violence of 2007-2008 in Kenya portrayed in this video. The decision, made pursuant to article 15(4) of the Rome Statute, responds to the Prosecutor’s "Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15" submitted on November 26, 2009.

Followers of the Court do not need to be reminded that Article 15 was one of the most controversial provisions of the ICC, with some states fearing that the Prosecutor would abuse his proprio motu powers by initiating politically motivated or frivolous investigations. To respond to these concerns, the drafters of the ICC Statute added a procedural hurdle relevant to Article 15 investigations only—the Prosecutor must with supporting material and victims’ representations convince a Pre-Trial Chamber that there is “a reasonable basis to proceed” at a very early stage in the investigation. This is the lowest evidentiary standard provided for in the Statute given the preliminary nature of the proceedings. Para. 27. In exercising this supervisory function, the PTC concluded that it should also consider the admissibility of the case as set forth in Article 53(1)(b) of the Statute.

With respect to the first requirement—that there is a reasonable justification for a belief that a crime falling within the subject matter, temporal, personal, and territorial jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed—the PTC found that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity were committed in Kenya. Most interesting in this regard is the PTC’s discussion of the requirement that the attack against a civilian population be pursuant to a State or organizational policy. The PTC noted that the attacks in questions tended to be ethnically-based and politically-motivated. Many attacks were between the key political parties in Kenya, such as the Orange Democratic Movement (which supported Raila Odinga in the 2007 presidential elections) and the Party of National Unity (which supported Mwai Kibaki), or were initiated by the police (left). The PTC noted that while some of the post-election violence was spontaneous or opportunistic,


a number of the attacks were planned, directed or organized by various groups including local leaders, businessmen and politicians associated with the two leading political parties, as well as by members of the police force. Para. 117.
The PTC determined that the crimes against humanity in question constituted murder, rape and other sexual violence, deportation or forcible transfer of the population, and other inhumane acts. In particular, the PTC noted that
  • At least 1,000 people were killed, over 3,000 injured, 900 raped, and 350,000 displaced between December and February 2007-8. Paras. 131, 190.

  • The Nairobi Women’s Hospital alone treated 443 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence during the relevant period.

  • Many of these cases involved gang rapes and aggravated brutality and were conducted in front of members of the victim’s family. Para. 154.

  • Inhumane acts included traumatic circumcisions and genital amputations, amputations, and other non-lethal injuries. Paras. 167-171.

With respect to the second requirement—Articles 17/18 admissibility, which invokes both complementarity and gravity—the PTC concluded that it would focus on potential cases that could be brought against potential defendants implicated in particular crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the relevant state is conducting national proceedings in relation to those crimes. Paras. 51-52. In finding the situation to be admissible, the PTC considered the following:

The PTC further attempted to pin down the concept of gravity by noting that

it is not the number of victims that matter but rather the existence of some aggravating or qualitative factors attached to the commission of crimes … [such as]
  • the scale of the alleged crimes (including assessment of geographical and temporal intensity);

  • the nature of the unlawful behaviour or of the crimes allegedly committed;

  • the employed means for the execution of the crimes (i.e., the manner of their commission); and

  • the impact of the crimes and the harm caused to victims and their families.

Throughout this assessment, the PTC cited from the representations of the victims to gauge the gravity of the crimes alleged. Para. 196. The PTC noted the particular brutality of many of the attacks alleged. Paras. 193, 199. In addition, many rape victims contracted HIV and were abandoned by their families and many people lost their homes and possessions. Para. 195. The PTC concluded that the crimes alleged satisfy the elements of scale and noted with approval that the Prosecutor intended to focus on those in high-ranking positions who planned, incited, financed, or otherwise contributed to the organization of violence.

Although the Prosecutor’s request had focused on the immediate post-election period, the decision authorized him to investigate events since June 1, 2005 to the extent they relate to the crimes against humanity committed. Para. 205.

Judge Hans-Peter Kaul (Germany, at right)) dissented from the authorization to commence an investigation on the ground that the acts alleged did not constitute crimes against humanity in that they were not committed as part of an “attack against any civilian population” “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Para. 4. He emphasized that in his estimation the ICC is not the right forum to investigate the crimes alleged and expressed concern that the majority opinion blurred the demarcation line between domestic crimes, prosecutable in domestic courts, and international crimes, of concern to the entire international community. Paras. 6, 9. Broadening the Court’s jurisdiction in this regard infringes upon state sovereignty, will generate perceptions of arbitrariness when the Court does not tackle all such situations, and risks turning the Court into

a hopelessly overstretched, inefficient international court, with related risks for its standing and credibility. Para. 10.

This ruling comes on the heels of the resignation of Betty Murungi (right) from her position as Co-Chair of the Truth Justice & Reconciliation Commission (she did not relinquish her spot on the Commission), about which we’ve blogged before. Murungi’s protest comes after she and our friend and colleague Ron Slye (the only non-African on the Commission) publicly asked the Chair of the Commission, Bethuel Kiplagat (also right), to step down from the Commission, because he has been named as a potential witness to the murder of former Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Ouko during the Moi regime and because certain questionable property transactions involving him fall within the Commission’s mandate. The ICC did not mention the current stalemate with the TJRC as a ground for its admissibility ruling, but the unwillingness of Kiplagat to step aside so that the Commission can continue its work is consistent with the impression that there are elements within Kenya who would rather see impunity than accountability.

The International Center for Transtional Justice (ICTJ) has a detailed analysis of transitional justice in Kenya here.

French courts, international crimes

Le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (left), the criminal court in France's capital, soon may adjudicate charges of international offenses.
In a joint op-ed appearing in Le Monde, Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Justice Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie (below right) announced that in the 2010 courts bill the legislature will be asked to give to the Paris court competence to hear cases involving allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity. As quoted by Agence France-Presse, the 2 ministers wrote, in a reference to the complementarity principle at the heart of the International Criminal Court structure:
'Il ne s'agit pas de mettre en place la compétence universelle mais de faire valoir les principes du droit international au sein de juridictions nationales dans le respect du traité de Rome de 1998.'
That is:

'It's not a matter of establishing universal jurisdiction but rather of giving force to the international law principles applicable to national court systems by dint of the 1998 Rome Statute.'


(courtroom photo credit; Alliot-Marie photo credit)

 
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