Showing posts with label nuclear technology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear technology. Show all posts

Separating natural & environmental disasters

The twin natural disasters that struck Japan this month, earthquake and tsunami, left a trail of devastation in their path. Entire villages were lost. The death toll currently stands at more than 8,000 but is expected to rise much higher (more than 13,000 are missing). (Prior posts here and here.)
Even as survivors struggle for shelter, warmth and food, the natural disasters are being rapidly overshadowed by the unfolding disaster at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. (right) (photo credit)
The key difference is that the nuclear disaster didn’t have to happen.
The earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear meltdown are all wrapped up together right now as one big human tragedy. But it is important not to blur the lines between risks that are inherent to living on planet earth, and risks that we have created for ourselves. Natural disasters like earthquakes, hurricanes or tsunamis are woven into the very fabric of the earth’s geological systems. There is no way to avoid them, though obviously we can take steps to minimize their impacts.
Anger after Hurricane Katrina was not directed at the hurricane for forming and coming ashore, but at the federal, state and local governments for failing to prepare and respond adequately, and at corporate priorities that devastated Louisiana’s (protective) wetlands in order to facilitate shipping. (left) (photo credit) But for those human decisions—to channel the Mississippi in a fashion that prevented soil accretion; to cut channels through the marshes; to underinvest in the poorer parts of New Orleans; to neglect adequate evacuation planning—the natural disaster might never have become a human catastrophe.
Environmental disasters, by contrast, are catastrophes that flow directly from human-created risks.
In Japan, Reactor #3 may already be releasing MOX (mixed oxide), and all six reactors at the site are compromised, with at least three in partial meltdown. One of the most surprising aspects of this disaster has been our collective inability to get accurate information about the quantity of radiation that has been released, and how dangerous it might be. Turns out the radiation detectors were dependent on the same sources of power as the reactor cooling system, making them unavailable just when they matter most. While it may be unclear how much radiation has been released, both the Japanese government and Tokyo Electric have acknowledged that the released radiation is potentially fatal.
How does this disaster fit with industry assurances that nuclear power is safe and clean? It turns out the roots of this crisis date back to a 1973 decision by the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) that
'the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle have been shown to be relatively insignificant.'


In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this decision—shutting the door to rigorous assessment of the environmental threats from spent nuclear fuel. At issue in the case, Vermont Yankee v. NRDC, was the AEC’s fuel cycle rule—which had concluded that the environmental effects of spent fuel rods would be so negligible that they could safely be disregarded. At a 1973 hearing on this fuel cycle rule, environmental groups raised the question of what would happen if a disaster caused the water cooling system for a spent rod storage facility to fail. Speaking for the agency, Dr. Frank Pittman responded that it would take a week for the cooling water to boil away, allowing time for “various corrective actions” to be taken. These corrective actions remained conveniently unspecified.
Now we see why.
In the wake of the earthquake and tsunami, all six of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors lost power, and the backup generators failed. Thus these reactors were left in exactly the plight environmental groups predicted in the 1973 hearing. With the risks of catastrophic meltdown looming, Tokyo Electric found itself with neither the time nor the capacity to implement “various corrective actions.”
In desperation, the Japanese military resorted to dropping seawater via helicopter, and Japanese police re-purposed water cannons from riot control to reactor cooling.
These last-ditch measures harken back to BP’s similarly flailing attempts to cap the gushing Macondo well. (right) The BP oil spill, which killed 11 workers and created one of the worst environmental disasters in United States history, flowed from a lethal combination of corporate greed, operational hubris and lax government oversight. (photo credit) I suspect we’ll find the same to be true in Japan. In both disasters, the economic, human and environmental toll is still being tallied, but will be immense.
Japanese regulators will inevitably face the same question American regulators faced after the BP oil spill: Why are we finding out that there is no Plan B only after disaster has struck?
It is foreseeable that a nuclear plant in an earthquake zone might lose power, and that its auxiliary backup generators might fail, just as it was foreseeable that a blowout protector might fail and thus not stem a gushing oil leak. In fact, not only were these disasters foreseeable, they were actually foreseen. It has been three decades since scientists inside the Nuclear Regulatory Commission first warned of design flaws in the Mark I reactors used in Fukushima. And, the scenario unfolding there is precisely the situation that Dr Pittman so blithely dismissed in 1973 -- that of a catastrophic accident causing the kind of containment system used at the Fukushima Daiichi facility to fail, subjecting everything and everyone nearby to dangerously high radiation. Similarly, almost a decade ago the Coast Guard began warning (p. 22-23) that oil companies were not developing adequate clean-up technology to keep pace with their newly acquired deep drilling capacities.
Yet, those warnings fell on deaf ears.
In both situations, regulators charged with protecting the public and the environment willingly accepted industry assurances not only that disaster would not happen, but also that it could be easily managed if it did. The corporations seeking regulatory approval made safety claims they could not back up, and the regulators too readily went along. This corporate equivalent of “don’t worry your pretty head about it” infects virtually every industry—leading to a dearth of worst case scenario planning. The local communities and the environment bear the brunt when things go disastrously awry.
It is the self-inflicted nature of the wounds that makes environmental disasters particularly galling.
► Yes, it was BP that cut corners in drilling the Macondo well.
► Yes, it is Tokyo Power that stored more than 11,000 spent rod assemblies at the Fukushima Daiichi site. (Incidentally, there are 23 boiling water nuclear reactors in the United States that share the same Mark I containment system design as the crippled Japanese reactors.)
► And yes, the corporate actors in charge of those facilities made these choices with an eye toward profit.
► But, to the extent that we demand cheap and reliable energy, we are all complicit.
The line of causation between the glittering lights of the Ginza and the unfolding Fukushima Daiichi disaster is fairly direct, as is the connection between the millions of U.S. automobile owners and the BP oil spill. In a very real sense, our insatiable thirst for more energy to power our growing collection of televisions, air-conditioners and electric toothbrushes is also responsible.
That means that fixing the problem has to proceed on both fronts at once.
► Clearly government agencies need to be re-invigorated and re-inspired. We can no longer allow politicians to dismantle our regulatory agencies under the false pretense that private actors, pursuing private ends will voluntarily safeguard the public interest. We must adequately fund oversight and enforcement of existing safety and environmental laws, and improve them where they are lacking. We must also stop the revolving door that corrupts agency values and leads regulators to confuse industry interests with the interests of their true client—the public. A hollowed out government cannot ensure public safety.
► At the same time, we also need to learn to slake our energy thirst, and thereby remove the political justification (and economic incentive) for these risky gambles.



(Cross-posted at CPRBlog)


Japan and the bugaboo of nuclear waste management

Poor Japan. Surely suffering a 9.0 earthquake and a devastating tsunami is disaster enough for one country to bear. At least 5,000 people are dead, and hundreds of thousands more are displaced. The scope and scale of the natural disaster is overwhelming. Yet, these twin natural disasters are rapidly being overshadowed (at least in the news coverage targeting those of us half a world away) by the unfolding nuclear disaster. (prior post)
A meltdown that was supposed to be “incredible” is happening before our eyes in prime time. A series of explosions and fires have created an industrial emergency of the first order. Units 1, 2 and 3 are in partial meltdown, while the spent fuel rods stored at Unit 4 exposed to the environment and releasing radiation. Worst of all, Unit 3 may be releasing MOX (mixed oxides). Radioactive cesium and iodine have been detected outside the Fukushima Daiichi The best case scenario at this point would be if authorities manage to pump, spray or airdrop enough seawater to cool the fuel rods, easing the crisis. In that case, the radioactivity released by this disaster would be limited to the unknown quantity already spewed into the air by explosions or controlled venting.
Yet, that best-case scenario is still pretty grim. The long-term effects of the radiation that has already been released are unclear. So far prevailing winds are directing the radiation plume toward the open ocean. That is surely good news for Tokyo’s 34 million inhabitants. But, the fact that no major human population centers are being directly affected (right now) does not mean that the radiation has gone “away.” There is no such place as “away.” The radiation is instead going into the sea where it will be yet another factor impacting an already stressed ocean ecosystem. We don’t know much about the risks to oceans and fisheries from radioactive fallout, or for that matter from more routine nuclear waste disposal.
Radioactivity will surely enter the ocean food chain, with unclear results. Indeed, Ireland and the UK have been locked in a bitter, decades-long legal struggle over the environmental effects of MOX contamination in ocean waters. Researchers have documented decreased wildlifepopulations and diversity, as well as increased animal deformities around Chernobyl. (the Fukushima Daiichi situation has not released anywhere near the radiation of Chernobyl, but it is not over yet.)
Shockingly, the environmental consequences associated with this kind of disaster were completely disregarded when regulators assessed the risks and benefits of nuclear power. Indeed, the key architect of the United States fuel cycle rule considered potential environmental effects to be a “bugaboo” based on unjustified fears. Based on his testimony, United States regulators dismissed negative environmental effects associated with radioactive releases from stored spent fuel rods as incredible. That decision, which focused on the Vermont Yankee nuclear facility approved the kind of boiling water reactor with above-ground spent rod storage used at the Fukushima Daiichi facility. So, even though the vulnerability of this kind of nuclear plant has been clear for decades, there are at least 32 such facilities continuing to operate around the world.

Nuclear moratorium

In "a change in tone over 24 hours" that Le Monde deems "spectacular," Chancellor Angela Merkel has declared a 3-month moratorium in Germany on old nuclear power plants.
Prompting the longtime proponent to halt production in certain plants is, of course, the nuclear disaster looming in Japan. There, plant explosions have led to a "much higher than normal level" of radiation in Japan since the 9.0 earthquake last Friday. (credit for map showing Japan's nuclear power plants)
That effort contrasts with Merkel's announcement of plans for inspection of Germany's 17 reactors, some with designs much like that in Japan. (In similar vein, French President Nicolas Sarkozy expressed "disquiet" over the still-unfolding tragedy.)
Merkel described the catastrophe in Japan as a moment for reflection by "the entire world."
Let's hope that reflection entails robust application of the precautionary principle.

Need for new nuclear containment tools

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute a 2-part series of guest posts. Part 2 is below; Part 1, published yesterday, is here)

Just announced are the terms for the next round of talks on Iran's nuclear technology. They are set for next Monday and Tuesday in Geneva, Switzerland, between:
Catherine Ashton, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, formerly an officer of the London-based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament; and
► Dr. Saeed Jalili, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and its lead nuclear negotiator.
As demonstrated in my post yesterday, to date these negotations have been marked by lack of trust on all sides. Debate remains, however, to what extent the lack of trust can generate legal implications.
Some argue that without a ‘smoking gun’, there is no ground to act against Iran. They warn of the danger in relying on strategic assessment, which may prove to be misguided, as was the case of Iraq in 2003.
Others emphasise the severity of the risks, on the one hand, and the ability of proliferators to hide the evidence, on the other hand. They agree that comprehensive and logical assessments regarding nuclear proliferation need to include as much hard evidence as possible; nonetheless, they contend that in the interest of non-proliferation, such assessments should not be held hostage to the absence of such evidence. (credit for above logo from Iran's atomic energy site)
No less significant is the question of how to deal with a state once it is identified as a suspected proliferator.
Clearly the regime established by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is ill-equipped to deal with cases such as Iran’s.
The provisions of the treaty are not geared to seeking out and stopping suspected defectors; moreover, these provisions lack precise criteria for dealing with such suspicions when they arise. Drafters devoted little attention to the prospect that a state might develop an interest in becoming a nuclear-weapon state without first withdrawing from the treaty.

(credit for map showing states with nuclear weapons in red, treaty-established Nuclear Free Zone in blue, and nuclear sharing states in orange, and states that are none of the above yet members of the treaty) In a world of new instabilities, where nuclear technology is increasingly accessible, the treaty is failing to achieve containment. The treaty's consensual regime was established during the Cold War, which encouraged adherence to the treaty and to the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some argue that this consensual regime is not only increasingly ill-fitted to address nuclear weapons proliferation risk, but actually enhances the incentive to proliferate.
Various initiatives and proposals attempt to escape this impasse.
Some proposals would try to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime from the inside, both substantively and institutionally.
Other proposals move away from consensual mechanisms aimed at encouraging compliance, and towards effective enforcement. Even initiatives related directly to strengthening compliance with safeguard agreements invest in non-consensual mechanisms for strengthening the existing regime. Examples include:
Generic Security Council resolutions to address the case of a state that has been found by the Agency to be deliberately in non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings; or
► Declaration that nuclear weapons proliferation constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’, thereby engaging the sanctions regime of U.N. Charter Chapter VII in every case of non-compliance with the Atomic Energy Agency.
None of these proposals, however, addresses what is perhaps the greatest obstacle to success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime: its unique formal asymmetry and the legacy of international practice. Whatever the legal extent of the obligation to disarm, undoubtedly the political legitimacy of the regime is being undermined by what is perceived as abuse of status by the 5 treaty-recognized nuclear weapons states, Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States.
It remains to be seen whether effective legal tools will be adopted in a timely manner to prevent Iran’s nuclear programme from maturing into a nuclear threat, or whether international law will continue to play a merely responsive role to that threat.

Negotiating Iran’s nuclear activities

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute a 2-part series of guest posts. Part 1 is below)

The recent announcement that Iran is willing to resume negotiations over its nuclear activities presents an opportunity to recap the development of the conflict over this issue, which erupted over eight years ago.
This conflict and its legal implications are considered in my book The Iran Nuclear Issue (Hart Publishing, 2010), on which this series of guest posts draws. In addition to a legal analysis, the book contains a detailed chronology and the texts of documents which underlie the evolution of the conflict.
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of two previously undisclosed nuclear facilities under construction in Iran.
In December 2002, the United States published satellite pictures of the two facilities, as proof of its long-held suspicions that Iran was pursuing both weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile capabilities.
Iran reacted by stating repeatedly that it was committed to the prevailing international legal regimes on weapons of mass destruction, including the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran contended that its commitment derived not merely from its contractual obligations but, more importantly, from its religious convictions and historical experience. Iran maintained that its programme, which was aimed at mastering the complete fuel cycle, was intended solely to support a civilian nuclear energy programme. It explained that it had operated clandestinely because of obstructions, by the United States and other countries, to its overt activities.
Suspicion nonetheless arose and increased among various states, and the matter was taken up by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which began an intensive inspection and verification operation in Iran. The Agency found that Iran had made substantial efforts over the previous two decades to master an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and was carrying out research and development activities related to the treatment, storage and disposal of radioactive waste.
In June 2003, and several times subsequently, the Atomic Energy Agency declared that Iran had failed to comply with obligations under its bilateral Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement.
Calls ensued, on the one hand, to take decisive measures against Iran, including referral to the U.N. Security Council, and on the other hand, to give Iran a chance to rectify its conduct.
Amid this debate, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany -- the EU3 -- undertook to negotiate directly with Iran. In October 2003, the two sides issued the Tehran Statement, in which Iran agreed to cooperate fully with the Atomic Energy Agency in order to settle all outstanding issues and to correct any failures to comply with its Safeguards Agreement. The EU3, meanwhile, informed Iran that if it complied with its commitments, the EU3 would not seek referral of Iran’s dossier to the Security Council.
In mid-2004, Iran resumed work on uranium conversion.
To defuse the crisis that followed, the EU3 engaged again in negotiations with Iran; overall, however, those negotiations did not result in any change of policy. Both sides expressed disappointment with what each deemed the other’s broken promises, procrastination, and bad faith.
The EU3 consequently aligned with the United States, which had already been pressing the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors to refer the Iranian issue to the Security Council. This Board urged Iran to re-establish full, Agency-verified suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.
In January 2006, Iran began to enrich uranium in centrifuges at its Natanz plant. In reaction, the Agency's Board of Governors referred the Iran dossier to the Security Council, which has since adopted six resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. These resolutions imposed enforcement measures on Iran until it complied with the previous demands of the Security Council and the requests of the Board of Governors. The resolutions further added the suspension of work on all heavy-water-related projects, including the construction of the heavy-water research reactor in Arak (left). (photo credit) Enforcement measures include:
► A trade embargo on items and technologies which could contribute to the activities Iran was ordered to suspend; and
► A travel notification requirement and asset freeze with respect to designated individuals and entities involved in the activities Iran was ordered to suspend.
In August 2007, the Agency Secretariat and Iran negotiated a work plan to address a limited number of issues regarding Iran’s past nuclear programme. Outstanding issues have largely been addressed. But the Agency is still requesting that Iran:
► Account for and explain a series of documents found in its possession which point to nuclear weapons-related research; and
► Respond fully to queries on weapons studies that Iran had allegedly conducted. Iran denies the existence of any such studies.
These outstanding issues -- in addition to Iran’s continued refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and construction of the heavy-water reactor and adhere to the Additional Protocol -- form the basis upon which the Security Council maintains the Iran dossier and pursues sanctions against Iran.
Iran, however, argues that the work plan issues have been resolved satisfactorily. It further argues that even under the Security Council’s own terms, there is no basis for continuing the sanctions regime or for maintaining the Iran case before the Security Council. Iran claims that nothing short of its total capitulation will satisfy the Western powers, and regards this as extortion.
Others accuse Iran of being the one engaging in blackmail, in its demand for economic assistance permitted under Articles III and IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for the release of sanctions as conditions for returning to the path of non-proliferation. Western states argue that, given Iran’s past record of concealment and its overall policy, Iran cannot benefit from the doubt as to its ultimate goal. It seems that any stance adopted by Iran which falls short of complete acquiescence is regarded not only as an act of defiance but also as an indication that Iran has something to hide.

(Tomorrow, Part 2: Implications of this negotiating history)

On September 29

On this day in ...
... 1954, the European Organization for Nuclear Research began operations. Dissolved was the provisional council on nuclear research in the region, which had been established a couple years earlier; nonetheless, the French acronym by which that first effort had been known, CERN, remains the shorthand term for this organization to this day. The organization now has 20 member states. Its laboratory, which "sits astride the Franco–Swiss border near Geneva," is a center for physics research; a number of its scientists have earned Nobel Prizes in the field.

(Prior September 29 posts are here, here, and here.)

On December 18

On this day in ...
... 1957, the 1st U.S. nuclear power plant (right) used to generate electricity on a large scale went on line near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The New York Times reported of the plant, which would remain in operation until 1982:

As a developmental project, the Shippingport plant will produce high-cost power that will be far from competitive with conventional power. Its developers hope it will lead the way, however, to future atomic-power plants that will produce economical electricity.
... 1993 (10 years ago today), Grace Hartman died. She'd been born in 1918 in Toronto, Canada, and dropped out of school in 11th grade to help support her family. Securing clerical jobs despite discrimination against women in the profession at the time, she became active in the labor movement. In 1975 -- International Women’s Year -- she was elected President of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the 1st woman to lead a major union in North America. The CUPE website states:

As a trade unionist, feminist, and social activist she was forever committed to women’s rights and creating positive change.

On December 8

On this day in ...
... 1993 (15 years ago today) , the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed into U.S. law by President Bill Clinton. The tripartite treaty known as NAFTA, subject of many IntLawGrrls posts, eliminated nearly all trade restrictions among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

... 1953 (55 years ago today), U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered to the U.N. General Assembly in New York what came to be known as the "Atoms for Peace" speech, in which he proposed that countries with nuclear programs should give fissionable materials to nonnuclear countries in order that the technology be put to use for peaceful purposes. The marked-up text of his speech is here.

On November 21

On this day in ...
... 1898 (110 years ago today), radium was discovered by Marie Sklodowska Curie and her husband Pierre Curie. It was 1 of 2 elements the couple isolated that year; the other was polonium. Together the discoveries of la radioactivité -- the word she coined the same year -- brought the world a step closer to the nuclear age. Born in Warsaw on November 7, 1867, Marie Curie (left) would become the 1st woman professor at the Collège de France, the Paris institution of higher education founded in 1530. She's the only woman ever to have won 2 Nobel Prizes, Physics in 1903 for and in Chemistry in 1911. (As we've posted, the 1st depended on her husband's intervention.) She died in Savoy, France, in 1934. (photo credit)
... 2004, having met for 5 days, the "informal group of official creditors" known as the Club de Paris/Paris Club agreed to a 3-phase reduction, by 80%, of Iraq's external debt, a move that amounted to tens of billions of dollars of debt relief.

On October 27

On this day in ...
... 1968 (40 years ago today), a month shy of her 90th birthday, Lise Meitner (right) died in Cambridge, England. The 3d of 8 children born into a Viennese family, Meitner surmounted "Austrian restrictions on female education" to enroll in 1901 at the University of Vienna, where she earned a doctorate in physics, then went to Berlin, where eventually she and a collaborator, Otto Hahn, "achieved important results in the new field of nuclear physics, competing with Irène Curie" and other scientists. The rise of Nazism forced Meitner to emigrate in 1938; this forced separation "led to the Nobel committee's failure to understand her part in the work" that she and Hahn did in the development of nuclear fission -- work for which he alone received the 1944 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. She has been otherwise recognized, however; as 1 example, the radioactive element Meitnerium (abbreviated Mt, No. 109 on the periodic table) was named after her. (photo credit)
... 1983 (25 years ago today), the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding the retreating of all "foreign forces" from Cambodia (flag at left) -- a country then occupied by Vietnam.

Glam diplomacy boils down to oil

Copyright won’t let me post the photo: dark glasses covering ¼ of his face, bright white blazer over black shirt, black handkerchief flowing out the breast pocket, is Moammar Gadhafi, President of Libya (flag below right). Next to him walks Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France (flag below left). As they shake hands for the camera, neither looks at or turns toward the other, neither smiles, though Sarkozy has something like a sheepish half-grin on his face. And shouldn’t he look sheepish? We don’t negotiate with terrorists, don’t pay ransoms for hostages, but the EU (and Qatar) paid roughly $500 million to secure not the pardon, not the release, but commutation of 6 death sentences pronounced by Libyan courts to life behind bars. Extradition through regular channels may take up to a year. The 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Bulgaro-Palestinian doctor accompanying them have already spent 8 years in Libyan jails. Bursts onto the scene the “rebel wife” of the French president, reported as saying she does not want to be a potiche (figurehead), and who apparently needs some sort of first-ladyish good works to do. It was made clear that she had no negotiating authority and well publicized that Mr. Sarkozy stayed up all night, speaking on the phone more than once with Gadhafi and José Manuel Barroso, current president of the European Commission. So after the conclusion of some undisclosed deal, Mme Sarkozy flies off to Bulgaria with the 6 former hostages (oops, prisoners), where they are immediately pardoned. Libya called the consul of Bulgaria (flag above right) on the carpet for that, but welcomed Mr. Sarkozy to firm up commercial deals with France, including, apparently, the sale of nuclear technology. As the European deputy I heard on the radio said, we don’t believe Iran’s civil nuclear program will remain civil, so not only is the French diplomatic splash procedurally irregular, its nuclear deal is irresponsible. But nuclear’s not all. Naturally, there’s oil. After 8 years of strained Euro-Libyan relations, the end of the prisoner (hostage) crisis means “all-out cooperation” to Sarkozy: nuclear tech for Libya, oil and gas for France, normalized trade relations (with Europe as well) that will bring Libya back into the “concert of nations”. Condoleezza Rice thinks the same way, though she reportedly has no specific program in mind. Maybe if the US can start buying oil in Libya, we can stop killing for it in Iraq?

Trying the talking cure

A tip of the diplomat's silk hat to any and all responsible for getting the United States and Iran to sit down and talk yesterday. It was the 1st formal session between the 2 since 1979, the year that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led an Islamic revolution marked by the ouster of Iran's Shah, invasion of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and seizure of 52 Americans who were held hostage for more than a year. Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, reported that he met with Hassan Kazemi Qomi, his Iranian counterpart, for about 4 hours in Baghdad, in a "businesslike" discussion of the security situation in Iraq. "We're taking this step by step," Crocker told reporters, adding that "the point of these discussions is not about U.S.-Iranian relations. It's about what can make things better in Iraq."
One hesitates to overstate the significance of this small rapprochement. Its scope was circumscribed, and there are many points of contention between the countries, among them Iran's nuclear program and its detention of scholar Halef Esfandiari and 2 other Iranian-Americans on charges of espionage. Still, yesterday's supplanting of what at times has seemed media grandstanding with serious, civil, face-to-face dialogue can only be a good thing.
 
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