'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

Because of our policy in supporting autocrats in that part of the world, ElBaradei's record of standing up to the U.S. in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion bolsters his credibility within Egypt, where he has not lived for many years.

-- Our colleague Bert B. Lockwood (below right), Editor-in-Chief of Human Rights Quarterly and Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Director of the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati, in an op-ed about Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Bert's colleague since both were at the Center for International Studies at New York University in the 1970s. Later the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a Nobel Peace Prizewinner, ElBaradei has emerged as a spokesperson for opponents of the current regime in Egypt. (credit for above left Reuters/Asmaa Waguih photo; video interview here.) Bert's op-ed provides welcome background on ElBaradei -- and acts as a complement to Scott Shane's thought-provoking New York Times piece, "America's Journeys With Strongmen."

On January 27

On this day in ...
... 1951 (60 years ago today), the United States conducted its 1st atomic-bomb test at Nevada Proving Ground, "a large swath of unpopulated desert land 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas" designated for the purpose by the Atomic Energy Commission. (photo credit) The "tremendous explosion" from the atmospheric test caused a "flash ... seen as far away as San Francisco." Within years testing, which had included exposing soldiers to radiation for study purposes, changed:

By 1957, though, the effects of radioactivity on the soldiers and the surrounding population led the government to begin testing bombs underground, and by 1962, all atmospheric testing had ceased.

(Prior January 27 posts are here, here, and here.)

Need for new nuclear containment tools

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute a 2-part series of guest posts. Part 2 is below; Part 1, published yesterday, is here)

Just announced are the terms for the next round of talks on Iran's nuclear technology. They are set for next Monday and Tuesday in Geneva, Switzerland, between:
► Catherine Ashton, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, formerly an officer of the London-based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament; and
► Dr. Saeed Jalili, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and its lead nuclear negotiator.
As demonstrated in my post yesterday, to date these negotations have been marked by lack of trust on all sides. Debate remains, however, to what extent the lack of trust can generate legal implications.
Some argue that without a ‘smoking gun’, there is no ground to act against Iran. They warn of the danger in relying on strategic assessment, which may prove to be misguided, as was the case of Iraq in 2003.
Others emphasise the severity of the risks, on the one hand, and the ability of proliferators to hide the evidence, on the other hand. They agree that comprehensive and logical assessments regarding nuclear proliferation need to include as much hard evidence as possible; nonetheless, they contend that in the interest of non-proliferation, such assessments should not be held hostage to the absence of such evidence. (credit for above logo from Iran's atomic energy site)
No less significant is the question of how to deal with a state once it is identified as a suspected proliferator.
Clearly the regime established by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is ill-equipped to deal with cases such as Iran’s.
The provisions of the treaty are not geared to seeking out and stopping suspected defectors; moreover, these provisions lack precise criteria for dealing with such suspicions when they arise. Drafters devoted little attention to the prospect that a state might develop an interest in becoming a nuclear-weapon state without first withdrawing from the treaty.

(credit for map showing states with nuclear weapons in red, treaty-established Nuclear Free Zone in blue, and nuclear sharing states in orange, and states that are none of the above yet members of the treaty) In a world of new instabilities, where nuclear technology is increasingly accessible, the treaty is failing to achieve containment. The treaty's consensual regime was established during the Cold War, which encouraged adherence to the treaty and to the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some argue that this consensual regime is not only increasingly ill-fitted to address nuclear weapons proliferation risk, but actually enhances the incentive to proliferate.
Various initiatives and proposals attempt to escape this impasse.
Some proposals would try to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime from the inside, both substantively and institutionally.
Other proposals move away from consensual mechanisms aimed at encouraging compliance, and towards effective enforcement. Even initiatives related directly to strengthening compliance with safeguard agreements invest in non-consensual mechanisms for strengthening the existing regime. Examples include:
► Generic Security Council resolutions to address the case of a state that has been found by the Agency to be deliberately in non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings; or
► Declaration that nuclear weapons proliferation constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’, thereby engaging the sanctions regime of U.N. Charter Chapter VII in every case of non-compliance with the Atomic Energy Agency.
None of these proposals, however, addresses what is perhaps the greatest obstacle to success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime: its unique formal asymmetry and the legacy of international practice. Whatever the legal extent of the obligation to disarm, undoubtedly the political legitimacy of the regime is being undermined by what is perceived as abuse of status by the 5 treaty-recognized nuclear weapons states, Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States.
It remains to be seen whether effective legal tools will be adopted in a timely manner to prevent Iran’s nuclear programme from maturing into a nuclear threat, or whether international law will continue to play a merely responsive role to that threat.

Negotiating Iran’s nuclear activities

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute a 2-part series of guest posts. Part 1 is below)

The recent announcement that Iran is willing to resume negotiations over its nuclear activities presents an opportunity to recap the development of the conflict over this issue, which erupted over eight years ago.
This conflict and its legal implications are considered in my book The Iran Nuclear Issue (Hart Publishing, 2010), on which this series of guest posts draws. In addition to a legal analysis, the book contains a detailed chronology and the texts of documents which underlie the evolution of the conflict.
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of two previously undisclosed nuclear facilities under construction in Iran.
In December 2002, the United States published satellite pictures of the two facilities, as proof of its long-held suspicions that Iran was pursuing both weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile capabilities.
Iran reacted by stating repeatedly that it was committed to the prevailing international legal regimes on weapons of mass destruction, including the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran contended that its commitment derived not merely from its contractual obligations but, more importantly, from its religious convictions and historical experience. Iran maintained that its programme, which was aimed at mastering the complete fuel cycle, was intended solely to support a civilian nuclear energy programme. It explained that it had operated clandestinely because of obstructions, by the United States and other countries, to its overt activities.
Suspicion nonetheless arose and increased among various states, and the matter was taken up by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which began an intensive inspection and verification operation in Iran. The Agency found that Iran had made substantial efforts over the previous two decades to master an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and was carrying out research and development activities related to the treatment, storage and disposal of radioactive waste.
In June 2003, and several times subsequently, the Atomic Energy Agency declared that Iran had failed to comply with obligations under its bilateral Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement.
Calls ensued, on the one hand, to take decisive measures against Iran, including referral to the U.N. Security Council, and on the other hand, to give Iran a chance to rectify its conduct.
Amid this debate, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany -- the EU3 -- undertook to negotiate directly with Iran. In October 2003, the two sides issued the Tehran Statement, in which Iran agreed to cooperate fully with the Atomic Energy Agency in order to settle all outstanding issues and to correct any failures to comply with its Safeguards Agreement. The EU3, meanwhile, informed Iran that if it complied with its commitments, the EU3 would not seek referral of Iran’s dossier to the Security Council.
In mid-2004, Iran resumed work on uranium conversion.
To defuse the crisis that followed, the EU3 engaged again in negotiations with Iran; overall, however, those negotiations did not result in any change of policy. Both sides expressed disappointment with what each deemed the other’s broken promises, procrastination, and bad faith.
The EU3 consequently aligned with the United States, which had already been pressing the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors to refer the Iranian issue to the Security Council. This Board urged Iran to re-establish full, Agency-verified suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.
In January 2006, Iran began to enrich uranium in centrifuges at its Natanz plant. In reaction, the Agency's Board of Governors referred the Iran dossier to the Security Council, which has since adopted six resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. These resolutions imposed enforcement measures on Iran until it complied with the previous demands of the Security Council and the requests of the Board of Governors. The resolutions further added the suspension of work on all heavy-water-related projects, including the construction of the heavy-water research reactor in Arak (left). (photo credit) Enforcement measures include:
► A trade embargo on items and technologies which could contribute to the activities Iran was ordered to suspend; and
► A travel notification requirement and asset freeze with respect to designated individuals and entities involved in the activities Iran was ordered to suspend.
In August 2007, the Agency Secretariat and Iran negotiated a work plan to address a limited number of issues regarding Iran’s past nuclear programme. Outstanding issues have largely been addressed. But the Agency is still requesting that Iran:
► Account for and explain a series of documents found in its possession which point to nuclear weapons-related research; and
► Respond fully to queries on weapons studies that Iran had allegedly conducted. Iran denies the existence of any such studies.
These outstanding issues -- in addition to Iran’s continued refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and construction of the heavy-water reactor and adhere to the Additional Protocol -- form the basis upon which the Security Council maintains the Iran dossier and pursues sanctions against Iran.
Iran, however, argues that the work plan issues have been resolved satisfactorily. It further argues that even under the Security Council’s own terms, there is no basis for continuing the sanctions regime or for maintaining the Iran case before the Security Council. Iran claims that nothing short of its total capitulation will satisfy the Western powers, and regards this as extortion.
Others accuse Iran of being the one engaging in blackmail, in its demand for economic assistance permitted under Articles III and IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for the release of sanctions as conditions for returning to the path of non-proliferation. Western states argue that, given Iran’s past record of concealment and its overall policy, Iran cannot benefit from the doubt as to its ultimate goal. It seems that any stance adopted by Iran which falls short of complete acquiescence is regarded not only as an act of defiance but also as an indication that Iran has something to hide.

(Tomorrow, Part 2: Implications of this negotiating history)

On October 26

On this day in ...

... 2001, as congressional leaders looked on, Pub. L. 107-56 was signed into law by U.S. President George W. Bush. Formally titled "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism," this USA PATRIOT Act included the easing of surveillance and hundreds of pages of other measures adopted in near-immediate response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

... 1956, the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency was opened for signature "by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies." That same month "81 nations unanimously approved" the founding instrument of the IAEA, set up a year later in the temporary headquarters at right. The Vienna-based agency now has 145 member states.

On July 1

On this day in ...
... 1903 (105 years ago today), Amy Johnson (right) was born in Hull, Yorkshire, England. After receiving her bachelor's degree from Sheffield University in 1923, she worked as a legal secretary in London; there she became interested in aviation. She qualified as the 1st British-trained woman ground engineer. and for a while was the only woman performing this work in the world. Among her other achievements: 1st woman to fly solo from England to Australia, in 1930, in record time; record-setting flight from england to Japan, in 1931; and record-setting solo flight from England to South Africa, in 1936. When World War II broke out Johnson served in the Air Transport Auxiliary, "a pool of experienced pilots who were ineligible" for service in the Royal Air Force. On one of these flights, in 1941, her plane crashed in the Thames; Johnson's body never was recovered.
... 1968 (40 years ago today), 61 countries signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature simultaneously in Washington, London, and Moscow. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, entered into force in 1970 and now has 187 states parties. It is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is preparing for a treaty review conference in 2010.

On October 22,

... 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1270, which established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, a country torn apart by a decade of civil war. The UNAMSIL complement was to include 6,000 military troops, among them 260 military observers. This mission was completed in December 2005; today the "United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) ... help[s] consolidate peace in the country."
... 1958, Blanche Margaret Meagher (right), formerly a high school teacher, was appointed Ambassador to Israel, making her Canada's 1st woman Ambassador. She held the position until 1961; thereafter she served as Ambassador to Austria and to Sweden. She was Canada's governor on, and later chairman of, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and also helped negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the People's Republic of China. Born in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1911, Meagher died in her hometown in 1999.

On July 29, ...

...1957 (50 years ago today), the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency came into force. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly and its President, Mme. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 4 years earlier, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had urged establishment of an "Atoms for Peace" agency:

[T]he American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all. Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
....
[T]he atomic realities of today comprehend two facts .... First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.
....
The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.
...
The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.

...

Today the agency, "an independent international organization related to the United Nations system" by special agreement, works toward such goals from its headquarters in Vienna and other offices across the globe. The IAEA and its Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, shared the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize "for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way." (photo of Eisenhower's speech courtesy of the United Nations)

...3 women Members of the U.S. Congress were born: U.S. Rep. Diana DeGette (D-Colo.), in 1957, in Tachikawa, Japan; U.S. Rep. Deborah Pryce (R-Ohio), in 1951, in Warren, Ohio; and U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Dole (R-N.C.), in 1936, in Salisbury, North Carolina.