Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts

Samantar accountability advances

(Delighted to welcome back IntLawGrrls alumna Pamela Merchant, who contributes this guest post)

I am pleased to update you on a recent development in Yousuf v. Samantar, a human rights case that five survivors of torture brought in 2004 against General Mohamed Ali Samantar, who was Minister of Defense in Somalia (left) during the brutal Siad Barre regime.

On February 15th, the U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema ruled that this former Somali offical is not immune from suit.

This ruling in the Eastern District of Virginia clears a legal hurdle that we have been contesting for years, including at the U.S. Supreme Court.

Last June, the Supreme Court held that General Samantar was not entitled to immunity under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, but left open the question of whether he is entitled immunity under the common law. (Prior IntLawGrrls posts available here.) Last month's district court ruling settled that question by deferring to a statement from the State Department which unequivocally declared that General Samantar is not entitled to any immunity from suit.

The intervention in the Samantar case by the State Department is particularly significant because the United States only occasionally intervenes in litigation, and very rarely intervenes to claim that a defendant is not entitled to immunity.

The ruling ensures that our march towards accountability will continue. To learn more about the case, filed by the San Francisco-based Center for Justice & Accountability, for which I serve as Executive Director, and pro bono co-counsel Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, please click here.


On 9/11, Remembering the Other’s Others: International Law & Muslim Fundamentalism

The ninth anniversary of September 11, 2001, finds the international community still grappling with the consequences of that terrible day.
Armed conflicts which began in the wake of 9/11 continue in Afghanistan and Iraq, spilling over now into Pakistan and Yemen with often devastating consequences for civilians. Human rights abuses in the “war on terror” remain largely unpunished, but will never be forgotten around the world. Xenophobia directed against Muslims serves as a useful tool for right-wing politicians in the West. And you may have heard that an idiot in Florida has been trying to decide whether or not he will burn hundreds of Qur’ans today.
At the same time, Muslim fundamentalist armed movements akin to those that perpetrated 9/11, like the various permutations of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, or Al Shabab in Somalia or Boko Haram in Nigeria, just to name a few, continue to pose major challenges to human rights in Muslim majority societies and around the world. For a terrifying insight into the worldview of defenders of such movements, see here.
Muslim fundamentalist armed movements often kill civilians indiscriminately, as they did on 9/11, a day to which Al Qaeda chillingly refers as “Holy Tuesday.” They also target artists, writers and freethinkers for assassination, and purvey systematic discrimination against women and religious minorities and LGBT individuals. They seek to impose their version of the Sharia on all Muslims everywhere – this often means advocating practices like stoning women for adultery. (credit for logo at right of the Global Campaign to Stop Stoning) Hence, such movements pose particular threats to international law in the areas of human rights, humanitarian law and conflict prevention, inter alia.
My article “Remembering the Other’s Others: Theorizing the Approach of International Law to Muslim Fundamentalism,” published this summer in the Columbia Human Rights Law Review, challenges international lawyers to develop a critical analysis of Muslim fundamentalist movements and to support the many Muslim human rights defenders battling fundamentalism.
Faced with the current polarized environment, this enterprise is unquestionably a daunting task, and I see the already constricted space for my argument narrowing further. Muslim fundamentalists – and those confused with them – have also themselves been the targets of a range of grave violations of international law by states in recent years, like torture. Racialized discourses and policies directed against people of Muslim heritage have proliferated since September 11, 2001, and are currently experiencing a particularly disturbing revival – what might be called hatredofmuslims version 20.10.
All of this fuels more fundamentalism.
Despite these real difficulties, offering a critical perspective on the contemporary problem of Muslim fundamentalism remains an essential project for international lawyers. As a discipline we in international law have mostly engaged critically with the (admittedly problematic) responses to Muslim fundamentalism, rather than with the phenomenon itself.
► Can we offer an accurate or useful commentary on the responses to Muslim fundamentalist movements if we overlook their existence and impact in the first place?
► Of what use is our critique of the “war on terror” if we are largely silent about one side of that “war”?
In fact, the failure of learned discourse in the United States – including in the field of international law – to name and thoughtfully explain the problem of Muslim fundamentalism actually risks facilitating discrimination against Muslims in general. This omission obscures the fact that contemporary terrorism and the “war on terror” actually revolve around a very specific set of politics and political actors, not around broader religious denominations or religious claims.
Ordinary Muslims or the Muslim religion as a whole must not be confused with specific fundamentalist movements and their adherents, just as most American Christians would not want to be identified with Christian fundamentalist Terry Jones. Yet, the mere critique of Muslim fundamentalist movements themselves is not per se an expression of anti-Muslim bias, just as criticism of the pyromaniacally inclined Pastor Jones is not an attack on Christianity. This, I fear, is a fact that is likely to get lost in the current cacophony.
Actually, Muslim fundamentalist armed groups’ primary victims, as the 2006 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism acknowledged, are often other people of Muslim heritage. Hence, defending the human rights of Muslims means successfully defeating fundamentalism (and vice versa).
In the contemporary period, Western discourse, including in the field of international law, has sometimes seemed to offer only two choices: the openly discriminatory or flawed characterization (Islam is inherently fundamentalist, all Muslims are fundamentalists and so on), or the one that is too politically correct to even broach the topic of fundamentalism. Neither one is helpful or accurate. What we need is a principled, human rights based critique of Muslim fundamentalism, alongside a principled, human rights based critique of discrimination against Muslims. To paraphrase a brilliant Pakistani colleague, I reject the idea that my choices are limited to accepting either Glenn Beck or the Sharia, and I reserve my right to criticize both. I utterly reject both the would be suicide bombers and the would be Qur’an burners, and neither one can ever justify the actions of the other.
Returning to today’s sad anniversary, I honor the memory of all the 2,976 victims of September 11. They were women, men and children who came from more than 90 countries, from many religious, racial and ethnic backgrounds, and from all walks of life. All are mourned by family and friends. In the current moment, I think about Amenia Rasool (left), a Guyanan-American Muslim woman who worked on the 95th floor of the World Trade Center. (photo credit) I first read about her in The New York Times remembrance section.
I am humbled by the thought of such a terrible death at the hands of Muslim fundamentalists, and compelled by the beautiful complexity of Amenia Rasool’s existence, a life which challenged all simple narratives about what it means to be a Muslim woman in America. Though she had an arranged marriage, she and her husband reportedly shared domestic tasks. She worked as an accountant by day, but in the evening when her chores were done, she was said to enjoy watching taped soap operas and painting her fingernails. All of these things – women working outside the home, dramatic entertainment and use of cosmetics are often prohibited by fundamentalists – sometimes on penalty of death. Meanwhile, many American right-wing racists cannot conceive of a Muslim woman with such a life, nor do those who wave hateful signs in protest against the proposed Muslim community center in Lower Manhattan (“No Islamic Settlements in America”) remember her, even in death. She would have been “the other” to some of these Americans, but was also “the other” for Muslim fundamentalists. It is this complex, multidirectional dynamic that I am trying to name with the title of my article, “Remembering the Other’s Others.”
I am hoping that human rights advocates will remember Amenia Rasool when they conceive of what human rights means in relation to September 11th and its aftermath. This means taking violence by nonstate actors – as well as by states – seriously, as I underscored in my September 11, 2008, post,"Terror/Torture." This means being relentless in demanding accountability for those surviving persons involved in such terrorist atrocities and for the atrocities of response that have followed. This means that we must face up to the menace of Muslim fundamentalism, while (and as one means of) staunchly defending the human rights of Muslims in the United States and beyond. (credit for 2009 photo of protest against Sudanese prosecution of Lubna Hussein for wearing pants)
The task of human rights, it seems to me, must be to create an international community that recognizes the complexity of a life story like Rasool’s, and that protects the Amenia Rasools of the world from all of the kinds of discrimination and coercion and horror and violence they can face – as women, as Muslims, as immigrants, as Americans, as civilians, as people who live these categories as overlapping and intersecting rather than opposing. Rasool left behind four children when she was murdered by Al Qaeda. Let us hope we can make that better world in their lifetime.
A few nights ago, I walked along the Hudson River, transfixed by the beams of the Tribute in Light, streaming upward where the Twin Towers used to stand, in commemoration of the approaching anniversary. (credit for 2009 photo, top left) The powerful illumination filled the sky where the most extreme Muslim fundamentalists had blown a terrible empty hole nine years ago. Despite that grave international crime, and all that has followed, for me these beams of light still reflect the simple promise that we human beings can do better in how we treat one another.

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

We have witnessed with shame the horrible events that occurred in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and even here in Kenya. Thousands of Africans have been killed and displaced, women raped and forced to live as sex slaves, property destroyed and communities displaced.
As a Kenyan, and as an African woman, I can affirm that whether it is here in Kenya or in Darfur, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Central African Republic or in Uganda, the need for justice is universal. The ICC is bringing us hope that we can finally see the fulfilment of the right of the victims to learn the truth, to see the perpetrators of these crimes tried, and to receive reparation. The only reason we might fear ICC is if we are guilty.

-- The 2004 Nobel Peace Prizewinner, Dr. Wangari Maathai (above left), in an op-ed, which she published yesterday in the Nairobi-based Daily Nation, reflecting on the work of the Kampala International Criminal Court Conference. (credit for photo by Martin Rowe)

On the Job! Anti-piracy project

(On the Job! pays occasional notice to interesting intlaw job notices)

One Earth Future Foundation, a 2-year-old, Colorado-based nongovernmental organization, is seeking a full-time Project Manager for its Oceans Beyond Piracy project, which
engages representatives from maritime industries, ship owners, human rights organizations, governments, security firms, insurance companies, and other organizations to design and implement short and long term plans for dealing with maritime piracy.
Short-term focus will be on piracy off the coast of Somalia, an issue about which IntLawGrrls have addressed in posts available here. Long-term, the group plans to bring together an oceans working group.
Persons with considerable international experience sought; details here.


Human rights claims clear immunity hurdle

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute this guest post discussing a case on which I worked while an intern at the Center for Justice & Accountability)

The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously has rejected certain claims to immunity against civil actions alleging human rights violations. Still, questions remain.
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Court held last week that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not shield former government officials from liability for suits filed under either the Torture Victim Protection Act or the Alien Tort Statute.
As IntLawGrrls have posted (here, here, and here), during the late 1980s petitioner Mohamed Ali Samantar served as the First Vice President and Minister of Defense of Somalia for the regime headed by President Siad Barre. Under Samantar's direction, the Somali military subjected the seven respondents/plaintiffs, or their family members, to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or extrajudicial killings. These victims’ only "offense" was membership in the Isaaq clan, a prosperous and independent group perceived by the regime as a likely source for potential political rivals.
After the Barre regime collapsed, Samantar moved to the United States and took up residence in Virginia. In 2004 respondents filed suit under the Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien Tort Statute. These laws confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases regarding foreign torts committed in violation of international law -- in this case, torture and extrajudicial killing. Samantar moved to dismiss. The federal district court granted his motion, reasoning that he was acting within the scope of his authority as a foreign official and, therefore, that the FSIA shielded him from liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted respondents' petition for certiorari.
The high court’s just-issued decision is a victory for human rights advocates in this country, because it prevents former foreign officials from claiming immunity under the FSIA for their human rights abuses.
The principal opinion, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens (left), rests on a very detailed and technical reading of the terms “agency or instrumentality” and “foreign state” in the FSIA. “Agency or instrumentality,” as defined by the statute itself, is an “entity,” “separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,” or an “organ” of the state -- language the Court interprets to mean an organization or corporation, not an individual official.
Stevens wrote (slip op. at 16):
Reading the FSIA as a whole, there is nothing to suggest we should read 'foreign state' in § 1603(a) to include an official acting on behalf of the foreign state, and much to indicate that this meaning was not what Congress enacted.
As a result, the Court ruled that the petitioner/defendant does not qualify as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, even if he was acting within the scope of his official authority. Thus he cannot rely on the FSIA to protect him from liability.
The Court also looked to the legislative history and intent of the FSIA to bolster its reading of the statute. Examining the complicated interplay between immunity for foreign states and for foreign officials, it held that Congress intended to leave immunity for foreign officials outside the scope of the act. Not surprisingly, in separate concurring opinions, Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr., Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas took exception to the Court’s use of legislative history in its interpretation of the statute.
With this very narrow judgment the Court left open a series of important and niggling questions; for example:
► Do former government officials have immunity stemming from the common law?
► If so, what form does that immunity take and who determines it?
The Office of the Solicitor General has argued consistently that the Executive Branch, and more specifically the U.S. State Department, has the power to determine common law immunity, not the courts.
This is an interesting and infrequently litigated area, which will no doubt garner much debate in the coming years.

Ahoy, there! New tribunal?

Keep reading that ad hoc criminal tribunals are destined for Davey Jones' locker.
Apparently no one's given the United Nations that memo.
Not only did that intergovernmental organization establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon a while back (prior posts), but also yesterday the U.N. Security Council unanimously resolved to consider an international piracy tribunal.
The latest in a 2-years-on series of resolutions on "The situation in Somalia," Resolution 1918 (2010) 1st recited a litany of concerns about attacks by pirates off the coast of that horn-of-Africa nation. (See Beth Van Schaack's post today, above, as well as IntLawGrrls' prior posts). Then it alluded to problems in bringing offenders to account, even as it noted that there've been some prosecutions in some national courts. (Justice systems specifically mentioned were Kenya (right) (photo credit) and the Seychelles. A few pirates also have found themselves haled before national courts in the United States and elsewhere.)
After urging more concerted efforts by all countries, the Security Council, in ¶ 4 of Resolution 1918, requested U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
to present to the Security Council within 3 months a report on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia ...
Options explicitly contemplated:
► "creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components"
► "a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements"
In preparing its report, Ban's staff is to consider the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, as well as "the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals ..."
Time will tell if yet another tribunal weighs anchor.

Interpreting foreign officials' immunity

(IntLawGrrls is delighted to welcome a new guest post, from alumna Chimène Keitner, on an amicus brief she's just filed in an Alien Tort case before the U.S. Supreme Court)

A year ago January, as Beth Van Schaack then posted, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt a “blow” to foreign sovereign immunity in Yousuf v. Samantar, which held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not apply to individuals. Samantar, who lives in Virginia and is the former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Somalia, faces claims for torture and extrajudicial killing brought under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Samantar’s petition for certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision interpreting the FSIA, as posted last fall by IntLawGrrls guest/alumna Pamela Merchant, Executive Director of the Center for Justice & Accountability. (The Huffington Post has published Pamela's thought-provoking summary of the case; moreover, information on the case and links to legal documents are available on the CJA’s website.) Briefing is currently in progress, and oral arguments are scheduled for March 3.
Strictly speaking, the questions before the Court at this juncture are, simply,
► Whether the FSIA provides immunity to individual foreign officials and,
► If it does, whether it also provides immunity to former foreign officials.
The Fourth Circuit found that the FSIA does not apply to individuals, and it remanded the question of whether other sources of immunity might nonetheless apply. The Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme Court to affirm the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the FSIA. Numerous briefs that have been filed by other amici may be found here.
The Brief of Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents -- for which I was counsel of record and whose signatories include IntLawGrrl guest/alumna Mary Ellen O'Connell -- systematically examines non-FSIA case law involving the immunities of foreign officials from civil suit. In the context of this case, the amicus brief refutes two unsupported assertions made by petitioner Samantar:
► First, Samantar asserts that “pre-1976 common law immunized a state’s officials for their official acts.” He relies heavily on this assertion for his conclusion that the FSIA should be read to include former foreign officials notwithstanding the omission in FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), of any reference to individuals in its definition of the term “foreign state.”
► Second, Samantar claims that “the overwhelming current international authority” provides immunity to former foreign officials sued in their personal capacity for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing. The authorities he cites, and significant authorities that he omits to cite, do not support these assertions. Non-FSIA sources of foreign official immunity do not provide a blanket shield from personal liability for universally recognized international law violations, even if such violations were committed by individuals who held government positions.

Children's rights against violence

This month the world duly marked the 20th anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (prior post), to which my country of residence, France, and all countries except Somalia and the United States, are states parties. Article 19 of that Convention provides:

States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
The Convention says nothing specifically about protecting children from such violence when they are out on the street. But one of its overall goals, as stated in the preamble, is to ensure that children are

fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity.
In a radio program here last weekend, a link was vaguely made between protecting children both from suffering violence and from becoming violent. In particular, there was a discussion of whether watching violent films or playing violent video games makes children/adolescents violent.
This reminded me of a study I read over 20 years ago, which concluded that after watching a violent film, adolescents are de-sensitized to violence. I suspect this effect is more widespread than that of actually becoming violent, and should be cause for greater concern.
The psychologist interviewed on the radio said all societies need to represent violence.
But consider the recent attack on a 15-year-old girl in California's Bay Area (which I describe here in haiku in honor of a friend's new "Haiku Friday" kick):

After the school dance
For two and a half hours
They watched her gang raped.

The attack is an indicator that current representations of violence (beyond videos and films specifically labeled "violent") are not having any positive socializing effects. Indeed, they seem to run counter to the above-mentioned goal of the Children's Convention, and perhaps thus deny children their right to be raised and live in a manner that meets that goal.

Piracy & Terrorism: A Convergence

We've discussed before the international and domestic legal regimes governing the crime of piracy and the capture of Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse (left), presumed to be a Somali pirate involved in the attack against the Maersk Alabama (below right) back in April 2009.
Muse has now been indicted (the probable cause complaint against him is available here) under the following substantive statutes:


He's also convicted of engaging in a conspiracy to commit same. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3238, the U.S. will prosecute Muse in the Southern District of New York, which was the jurisdiction to which he was first brought after allegedly committing his crimes on the high seas. The 10-count indictment is discussed here.

The indictment reveals the emerging conceptual overlap between crimes of terrorism and piracy--both types of organized crime habitually committed by non-state actors enjoying refuge in lawless regions in situations of asymetrical power and resources that do not trigger the application of humanitarian law (the law of war). The second and third statutes mentioned above appear in the anti-terrorism chapters of Title 18. (Indeed, the FBI agent swearing the complaint is part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York). Section 1203 was implemented in connection with the United States' ratification of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which defines the offense as follows:

Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention.

The third offense traces its origins to the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), promulgated in the wake of the 1985 Achille Lauro attack (ship at left) undertaken by alleged Palestinian Liberation Front members who hijacked the ship to protest the incarceration of a group of Palestinians by Israel. In the course of the incident, a disabled Jewish tourist (Leon Klinghoffer) was brutally killed. (In a subsequent lawsuit, the cruise-line defendants impleaded the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which eventually settled the case after losing a motion to dismiss on foreign sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction grounds. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione, etc., 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Achille Lauro attack, while called "piratical," fell outside the technical definition of piracy, because the attackers were passengers on board the ship (thus failing to two-vessel requirement of piracy) and they acted for political, rather than private, ends.

SUA defines its offense at Article 3(1) as follows:

Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally:

  1. seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any
    other form of intimidation; or

  2. performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is
    likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or

  3. destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely
    to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or

  4. places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device
    or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship
    or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
    that ship; or * * *

  5. injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the
    attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) to
    (f).
The victim ship must be in international transit to trigger SUA (Art. 4). Although many terrorism crimes are defined in terms of some surplus of intent or motive (usually to intimidate a civilian population or influence a government), neither of these two crimes contains such a requirement beyond the hijacking statute's vague compulsion element.

These terrorism crimes thus fill several of the gaps in the conventional definition of piracy, which requires two vessels (some commentators suggest that an attack by a skiff (right) doesn't count), the attack must occur on the the high seas or in a state's exclusive economic zone, and the attack must be for private ends. This point is emphasized in a recent case out of the 9th Circuit. In Lei Shi v. U.S., 525 F. 3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008), the defendant was prosecuted under section 2280 after he mutinied and took control of the ship in international waters off the coast of Hawaii. Lei Shi argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. The court ruled that the U.S. Constitution at §8, cl. 10 empowers Congress to define and punish piracies and felonies on the high seas and that §2280(a)(1)(A)-(B) defines an offense that meets the definition of piracy. Id. at 721. The defendant also claimed that there was an insufficient nexus between his acts and the United States, thus offending the 5th Amendment due process clause. The court ruled that due process requires a nexus only when international law requires such a nexus. The crime of piracy, it noted, first gave rise to the concept of universal jurisdiction and defendant was thus on notice that he could be prosecuted for his crimes in any nation-state in which he could be found. Id. at 724.

Muse has pled not guilty and will be tried as an adult, although his age is contested. Stay tuned!

U.S. Supreme Court soon to hear Somalia human rights case

(IntLawGrrls welcomes this guest post from our guest/alumna Pamela Merchant)

At the start of its new Term this month, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it will hear arguments in Case No. 08-1555, Samantar v. Yousuf. The decision represents a 1st for the nongovernmental organization that I head, the San Francisco-based Center for Justice and Accountability.
In 2004, CJA and and pro bono co-counsel at the law firm of Cooley Godward Kronish sued Somali General Mohamed Ali Samantar on behalf of 4 Somali men and 1 Somali woman. The complaint, based on the Torture Victim Protection Act and filed in the the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, accused Samantar of a wide range of human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killing, and war crimes, committed during the regime of Siad Barré during the 1980s. Samantar was Somalia's Minister of Defense from 1980 to 1986 and Prime Minister from 1987 to 1990; he now resides in Fairfax, Virginia.
This past January, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reinstated the suit, thus reversing the district court's 2007 dismissal.
Here's the issue before the Supreme Court:
Whether a foreign state’s immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1604, extends to an individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign state and whether an individual who is no longer an official of a foreign state at the time suit is filed retains immunity for acts taken in the individual’s former capacity as an official acting on behalf of a foreign state.
To date, no person has ever been held legally responsible for the abuses committed by the military government against the civilian population of Somalia in the 1980s.
The Supreme Court's decision to hear Samantar represents a key point in CJA's struggle to combat the recent rise of immunity defenses to avoid accountability in human rights cases. Given the fact that the Supreme Court takes only 80 cases per year, we were surprised that a CJA human rights case made it to the top of the docket. Having said that, we are confident that we prevail and that our clients will ultimately have their day in court.


'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

Nearly a third of Namibians under 5 years of age have no legal existence. ... Fifty-one million children born in 2007 were not registered, of whom 9.7 million were in sub-Saharan Africa. In Somalia, scarcely 3% have a birth certificate.
This absence of legal existence works many harms on families and children.

-- Le Monde article, written in Windhoek, Namibia, and based Progress for Children: A Report Card on Child Protection, a just-released UNICEF report. The problem described by Le Monde stands at odds with Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states: "Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law." The news article attributes the problem both to governmental deficiencies and to cultural practices. It also offers other sobering statistics to be found in the report; for instance: "More than a billion children now live in a country or territory plagued by armed conflict. 5.8 million of them are refugees, living outside their birth country."

On May 18

On this day in ...
... 1904 (105 years ago today), in Paris, France, diplomats from that country as well as Britain, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and Norway, and Switzerland, signed the International Agreement for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic", the quotes indicating the then-in-use term for the trafficking of women and girls across national borders for purposes of the sex trade. The agreement entered into force on July 18, 1905.
... 1991, upon the collapse of centralized government in Somalia, leaders in the country's northwesternmost territory (depicted in salmon at right, bordering Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Gulf of Aden, comprising, much of the former protectorate of British Somaliland), proclaimed the independent Republic of Somaliland. The region has operated with considerable autonomy since that date, and maintains some "political contacts" with a handful of countries, but has never received international recognition as an independent state.

(Prior May 18 posts are here and here.)

The Return of Piracy

My seven-year-old has become an avid reader of the New York Times. His inspiration? Piracy off the coast of Somalia.

We’ve all heard by now about the dramatic and almost unbelievable rescue of Captain Richard Phillips by Navy SEALs (choppy waters, night vision, three shots, three pirates down—it is the stuff of Hollywood). The United States has indicated that it will prosecute the one captured pirate in a U.S. court for the crimes of hostage taking and/or piracy.

Piracy is one of the oldest international crimes, and its international prohibition in many respects gave rise to the principle of universal jurisdiction. The concept that all states could prosecute the pirate was embodied in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and its successor, the 1982 U.N. Convention in the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (affectionately called “a constitution for the oceans”), which defines piracy at Article 101 as a phenomenon of the high seas:

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

According to this definition, acts of violence or depredation that occur within a state’s territorial or internal waters are considered acts of armed robbery at sea within the territory of the littoral state rather than as piracy per se.

Both treaties also codified the customary principle of universal jurisdiction. Article 105 of UNCLOS reads:

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

The phenomenon of piracy in the Gulf of Aden has sparked considerable and escalating U.N. Security Council activity. On June 2, 2008, the Council adopted Resolution 1816 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which—in characteristic diplo-speak—expressed grave concern about the threats posed by acts of piracy to humanitarian aid and commercial shipping and deplored recent attacks. It urged states interested in commercial maritime routes off the coast of Somalia to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter piracy in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the internationally recognized government of Somalia (such as it is) and the 14th attempt to create a functioning government since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Most significantly, for a period of six months from the date of the resolution, the resolution permitted states cooperating with the TFG to enter Somali territorial waters to suppress acts of piracy (art. 7(a)) in a fashion that exceeds the traditional doctrine of hot pursuit (see Art. 111 of UNCLOS). States are also encouraged to cooperate in determining jurisdiction for the prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.

Subsequently, S.C. Resolution 1838 called upon states whose naval vessels and military aircraft operated in the region to use

the necessary means, in conformity with international law, … for the repression of piracy.

Resolution 1846 extended Resolution 1816 and also tied acts of piracy to the terrorism multilateral treaty regime by invoking the 1988 Convention for the Suppression f Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), promulgated in the wake of the Achille Lauro hijacking by the Palestine Liberation Front. Pursuant to Article 3, a person commits a breach of that that treaty if s/he:

(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or

(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or

(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or

(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or …

(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).

That treaty embodies territorial (including flagship), nationality (both active and passive), and custodial jurisdiction.

Finally, S.C. Resolution 1851 extended the authority of states cooperating in the fight against piracy on land as well as sea, enabling states to

undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea … provided, however, that any measures undertaken pursuant to the authority of this paragraph shall be undertaken consistent with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.

All the Security Council resolutions emphasized that their authorizations are limited to the situation in Somalia and should not be considered as establishing customary international law. In the debates surrounding these resolutions, several states emphasized that the phenomenon of piracy could not be divorced from the humanitarian and political crisis within Somalia. They also noted that piracy is not just a problem for flag ships & private industry; 3.5 million people in Somalia are dependent on food aid, and the World Food Program’s maritime deliveries have been impacted by piracy.

Traditionally, the anti-piracy policy of the international community was one of deterrence rather than prosecution. Captured pirates were simply released, and private companies (or their insurance companies) would pay the necessary ransoms as a cost of doing business. As pirate attacks and ransom requests increase exponentially, however, states (including France, the Netherlands, and Kenya) are beginning to prosecute offenders. (The U.K. has so far refused to bring pirates to its territory out of fear they will raise asylum or non-refoulement claims).

Under U.S. law, pirates can be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1651, which provides that

Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.

The Supreme Court determined that Congress constitutionally enacted the predecessor of this provision under its power

to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against law of nations.

U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 10. See U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S.C. 153 (1820). Subsequent sections of Title 18 set forth further refinements to this crime (e.g., arming of privateers, confederating with pirates, plunder of a distressed vessel, the receipt of pirated goods, etc.).

Pirates can also potentially be prosecuted for

  • acts of terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 2332b et seq.),
  • violence against maritime navigation (18 U.S.C. § 2280)
  • hostage-taking (18 U.S.C. § 1203) or
  • interfering with commerce by threats or violence (18 U.S.C. § 1951).

Unlike the piracy statute, these other statutes often require some nexus to the United States (e.g., the hostage was a U.S. citizen, the organization sought to be compelled is the U.S. government, or the goods were in transit from or to the U.S.).

On March 25

On this day in ...
... 1802, France and Britain signed the Treaty of Amiens, which, as the political cartoon at right illustrates (credit), was intended to be a "definitive" peace accord between the 2 countries. The agreement broke down within a couple years.
... 1994 (15 years ago today), U.S. troop withdrawal from Somalia was virtually complete, with

[o]nly a few hundred marines remain[ing] offshore to assist with any noncombatant evacuation mission that might occur in the event violence broke out that necessitated the removal of the over 1,000 U.S. civilians and military advisers remaining as part of the U.S. liaison mission. All UN and U.S. personnel were finally withdrawn almost a year later in March 1995.

The withdrawal came 5 months after the "Blackhawk Down" incident about which we posted here.

(Prior March 25 posts are here and here.)

Go On! Modern-Day Piracy Off Somalia

(Go On! is an occasional item on symposia of interest) An evening of discussion of international legal issues on the current situation of modern-day piracy -- entitled "Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia: Challenges to Deterrence, Pursuit, and Prosecution" -- is on hand from 5 to 7 p.m. Monday, March 2, at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California. Cosponsors of are Pacific McGeorge's Global Center for Business & Development and ASIL-West, a regional project of the American Society of International Law.
Opening the discussion moderated by Linda Carter (Pacific McGeorge) will be Fausto Pocar (left), the University of Milan international law professor who serves as a Judge on the Appeals Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and who is the former President of the ICTY and a past member of the Human Rights Committee, the U.N. body that monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Leading the ensuing open discussion will be ASIL-West Co-Chair David D. Caron (California-Berkeley), John Cary Sims (Pacific McGeorge), and IntLawGrrl Beth Van Schaack (Santa Clara).
Details and registration here.

A Blow To Foreign Sovereign Immunity

The 4th Circuit recently issued an important ruling in an Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") case involving a Somalian defendant brought by the Center for Justice & Accountability. (map of Somalia to the right; credit)
In Yousuf v. Samantar, plaintiffs are suing Mohamed Ali Samantar (found living in Virginia) for alleged acts of torture and other human rights violations committed against them by government agents commanded by Samantar during the brutal regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The district court concluded that Samantar should enjoy immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The 4th Circuit, bucking a contrary jurisprudential trend, recently concluded that the FSIA does not apply to individuals and reinstated the case.
Historically, states were immune from suit, subject to the whims of the executive. As the Supreme Court stated in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden (1812):


One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to this independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.

Later, an inclination toward restrictive immunity emerged that withheld immunity for private acts of the state (jure gestionis, i..e. acts that could be undertaken by a non-governmental entity) while maintaining immunity over its public acts (jure imperii, i.e., acts that could only be committed by a state).

In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA in many respects to codify the doctrine of restrictive immunity and depoliticize determinations of sovereign immunity. The FSIA reaffirmed immunity as a default defense in litigation against states and their agencies or instrumentalities, subject to a series of exceptions. Enumerated exceptions include
► situations in which a foreign state has “waived its immunity either expressly or by implication,”
► cases in which “the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States,” and
► suits against a foreign state for “personal injury or death or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment.”

The courts have been split as to whether an individual may constitute an agency or instrumentality of a state under the FSIA. A majority rule seemed to be emerging to the effect that they can. See Belhas v. Ya’Alon, 515 F. 3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“concluding that defendant was acting as an agency or instrumentality of [a] foreign state”); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering the term “agency or instrumentality” to be broad enough to encompass “senior members of a foreign state’s government”). But see Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting this approach as inconsistent with the statutory text).

In these cases, the courts determined that only where an enumerated exception to immunity exists, or where the defendant acted in his or her “personal or private” capacity, may individual state actors be sued under the ATS (or its sibling, the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA")). This construction of the interaction between the two statutes has the potential to effectively eviscerate the TVPA and much of the ATS, because satisfying any state action requirement inherent to the tort alleged (such as torture, which requires a showing of state action) might automatically trigger the applicability of the FSIA. This is notwithstanding that the TVPA was passed after the FSIA and should not be subordinated to it without explicit Congressional guidance to that effect. The Belhas court, and courts following its lead, also failed to recognize that acts of torture and other human rights abuses can never be within the “official” functions of a foreign official, even where such actions are putatively undertaken in the service of the policies or interests of the sovereign, because such acts are unlawful under international law.

In Samantar, the 4th Circuit joined the 7th Circuit in ruling that
► the plain text of the statute,
► the entire statutory scheme,
► the legislative history, and
► the FSIA's object and purpose
did not support the district court opinion. Citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 480 (2003), the 4th Circuit also indicated, in what is essentially dicta, that in any case, the FSIA would not apply to former government officials, such as Samantar (shown on the left).
The case was thus remanded for further proceedings, which will likely include a consideration on whether the plaintiffs failed to exhaust local remedies or whether the case is time-barred.

Additional details on the case are available here. Defendant has apparently moved for rehearing en banc and has announced he'll also seek cert if he does not prevail on his appeal.

Sirius Piracy

Piracy will be drawing the attention of the international community to a much greater degree after last weekend's hijacking of the very large Saudi-owned, Liberia-flagged oil tanker, the Sirius Star. This is reported to be the biggest tanker ever to be successfully grabbed by pirates. (photo credit) The pirates overtook the ship and its crew while they were sailing off the Kenyan coast headed for the United States. Now, the pirates have anchored the Sirius Star off the Somali coast. The ship has been reported to be carrying $100 million of oil, as well as an international crew, including nationals of the Philippines, Croatia, Saudi Arabia, Poland, and the United Kingdom.
This seizure indicates the mounting capabilities of pirates in the region as well as the difficulty of stemming the growing tide of modern piracy.
Despite a multinational naval task force having been assembled earlier this year to address Somali piracy, there have been continued and increasingly troublesome hijackings in the region. The International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services' report on the incident includes this statement from Pottengal Mukundan, the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Director:

Although this is just the latest of a large spike in attacks off the east coast of Africa, this incident is significant on two counts. Firstly, this is the largest vessel to have been hijacked. Secondly, the distance from the shore would suggest a highly organised operation -- this is not mere opportunism.

The BBC reports that the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre

said it had records of 92 attacks against vessels so far this year, including 36 successful hijackings. This month alone, pirates have seized a Japanese cargo ship off Somalia, a Chinese fishing boat off Kenya and a Turkish ship transporting chemicals off Yemen.
An interactive map of pirate activity in 2008 can be found here.

Sex and Death


On Friday, Amnesty International reported the stoning death of a 13 year-old-girl in Somalia (map credit here). According to Amnesty, a group of approximately 50 men stoned Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow to death in a stadium with about 1000 spectators. Duhulow had apparently been raped by three men and reported the rape to the armed opposition group in Kismayo. Rather than investigate the rape, members of the al-Shabab militia accused Duhulow of adultery, detained her, and executed her.
In 2003, the international women’s human rights community mobilized to stop the stoning death of a Nigerian woman, Amina Lawal, who was accused of adultery under Islamic law. Lawal was convicted of adultery in March 2002, but the Katsina State Shariah Court of Appeals overturned the conviction on September 26, 2003.
Although the details vary, these stories represent modern, violent community-based efforts to control women’s sexuality. And the stories are replicated all over the world. From the domestic violence victim in the United States whose partner beats her whenever she speaks to another man to the rape victim accused of adultery in Somalia, the narrative is similar. Women’s sexuality is seen as a threat not only to morality but, more importantly, to male power as well.
The international movement to combat violence against women offers some hope. In only a decade and a half, the international movement to end gender-based violence has gained momentum and enjoyed some limited success. But to have widespread impact, the movement will need to confront deeply held beliefs – all around the world – that men may, indeed should, control women’s sexuality. Despite the early successes of the anti-violence movement, the pace of real cultural reform is painstakingly slow, and Duhulow’s story serves as a heart wrenching reminder of the task ahead.

Security Council Resolves to Fight (Some) Piracy

As I mentioned in an earlier post about a French ship's run in with pirates in the Gulf of Aden, France asked the Security Council (right) for action, particularly in the form of “regular international surveillance” and changing the definition of "piracy" in the Law of the Sea Treaty to allow states to pursue pirates even in the coastal waters off Somalia. Earlier this month, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1838, which authorizes states to take action against acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels off the Somalian coast. Having determined
that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia exacerbate the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat against international peace and security in the region,
the Security Council encourages states to deploy "naval vessels and military aircraft" in the area (photo credit). Leery of establishing a precedent, the Council clearly states that the Resolution applies only to Somalia and "underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law." Interesting.
Apparently, the Security Council was not willing to go as far as France had proposed: it authorizes military undertakings in Somalia's coastal waters to combat piracy as a tributary to or aggravating factor in the international-peace-threatening situation in Somalia, but the definition of "piracy" would still seem to limit the crime to acts on the high seas. Though piracy was the original threat to collective security, giving birth to universal jurisdiction and providing the model for actions against today's perpetrators of international crimes, it no longer seems to be considered as such. Instead, in this particular situation, it is a hook for a sort of externalized R2P--we intervene at water's edge to protect our interests on the theory that this will improve, or at least help keep from worsening, the situation within Somalia.
 
Bloggers Team