Showing posts with label Guantánamo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Guantánamo. Show all posts

Law, not fear, should guide detention

(Delighted to welcome back alumna Laurie Blank, who contributes this guest post)

Hearings have begun on proposed House and Senate legislation designed to create a comprehensive framework for the detention of individuals captured in the course of U.S. counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Those who have decried the lack of a statutory framework for what appears to be the inevitable long-term detention of suspected terrorists will likely welcome the proposed legislation as the long-awaited antidote to the ad hoc process that has developed over the past nine-and-a-half years.
As I argue in a recent op-ed in the Atlanta Journal Constitution, entitled "Build Detainee Policy on Sound Law," however, mere legislation itself is not the answer.
Legislation based on the fundamental moral and legal principles that guide our country would be a giant step forward – for fair and effective counterterrorism that balances national security and individual rights. But neither the Detainee Security Act (House, proposed by Representative McKeon) nor the Military Detainee Procedures Improvement Act (Senate, proposed by Senators McCain, Graham, Lieberman and others) fits the bill.
These proposed bills are based primarily on fear. On the fear that civilian courts cannot handle terrorism cases and on the fear that courts will not defer completely to the Executive’s claims of national security when faced with grave violations of individual rights.
The first fear is unfounded.
Since September 11th, over two hundred suspected terrorists have been prosecuted in federal courts with a conviction rate over 91%. We have hundreds of convicted foreign terrorists in prison in the U.S. right now. In contrast, fewer than five have been tried before the military commissions and most of those have already been released. The military commissions have seen significant improvement from their first iteration, but still remain barely tested both in substance and numbers of prosecutions.
These numbers demonstrate that completely foreclosing all trials in civilian courts and all transfers of detainees to the United States is not grounded in careful policy analysis. It seems to be based instead on the fear of those who are suspected – not proven – of trying to kill Americans, and a reactive desire to therefore deny them rights. The worst serial murders in U.S. history got full and fair trials. What is it about the word “terrorist” that makes us forget where we come from?
But it is the second fear that should catch the breath of every American.
The proposed bills simply legislate the courts out of the picture altogether. The annual periodic review process created to assess the continued detainability of detainees at Guantánamo (or future detainees) has no appeal process. This is important enough to repeat – no appeal process. There is no doubt that an annual review is better than long-term detention with no review process at all. This incremental improvement is insignificant, however, when the review board is not accountable in any way to a court or any other method of independent judicial review.
The Senate bill actually goes one step further still. In a total bow to Executive authority, the legislation states that the review panel’s finding regarding a detainee’s continued detention is simply a recommendation and does not bind the President. This is the ultimate dagger in the heart of separation of powers and checks and balances – a Congressional license of complete Executive authority and no courts to say otherwise.
The Geneva Conventions do not, to be sure, mandate judicial review of all detention determinations, either for prisoners of war under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention or under Article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Both require necessary guarantees of independence and impartiality, not a particular type of forum, judicial or administrative or other. Beyond the fact that the proposed legislation raises serious questions about whether the review panels can meet this test, the lack of judicial involvement in the long-term detention review process poses a much greater problem. As I discussed in my recent article, on which I previously posted, to call the indefinite detention at Guantánamo – both ongoing and future – detention “under the laws of war”” is a significant stretch of the traditional concept of law of war detention. When we do not know how long this conflict will last or the parameters of the battlefield, when detention effectively serves a punitive purpose rather than a protective purpose, judicial engagement in the process is critical to ensuring protection of individual rights.
The only reason to keep the courts out, as the proposed legislation seeks to do, is the fear that the courts will not approve of the process, either in individual cases or overall. The fear that courts might actually inject individual rights into the equation, upsetting the current complete dominance of national security interests over any other interest, no matter how fundamental.
We have learned the lesson of an unchecked executive before – with the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War and the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II – and in both cases it was the courts that set us back on course and restored the balance between national security and individual rights.
As detailed in IntLawGrrls' many posts on Guantánamo, when detention there threatened to become truly a legal black hole in the first years after September 11th, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that detainees at Guantánamo have a right to legal representation and to habeas corpus – in essence, a right to exist in a legal framework. Let’s give our courts a direct role in that legal framework – detention without trial raises extraordinary challenges to American values; independent and robust judicial review throughout the process can help to mitigate those challenges and the risk to fundamental principles.
Supporters of indefinite detention – and likely of the proposed bills in the House and Senate – staunchly defend it as “detention under the laws of war.” If the detention is founded on fundamental legal principles signed and ratified by every nation around the world, then why keep the courts out of the business of reviewing and assessing the lawfulness of such detention?
Legislating based on panic is neither moral nor effective. America needs a counterterrorism strategy – including detention of suspected terrorists where appropriate – that is based on sound legal principles and paradigms, not just on the fear of a future attack.

African lessons on terror detention

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute this guest post)

On 7 March President Barack Obama signed an executive order facilitating the indefinite detention of a group of Guantánamo prisoners. As IntLawGrrl Beth Van Schaack posted, the order introduces a new system of periodic review of Guantanamo prisoners as well as the resumption of military trials.
Human rights activists view this as a step backwards.
I believe South Africa's Apartheid experience has a special relevance and resonance for the so-called ‘war on terror’.
Much of the current concern regarding the impact of security legislation on human rights centers on the treatment of detainees in places of detention. "The Regulation of Detention in the Age of Terror - Lessons from the Apartheid Experience", an article that my co-author James Fowkes and I published in 2009 in the South African Law Journal, considered the regulation of detention during Apartheid to see what principles or lessons can be gleaned from that experience that can be useful for regulating detention in the context of terrorism.
Following a summary of the most important security legislation during Apartheid, the article examines the nature of the Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines). These Guidelines, drawn up in 2002 by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (logo below left), aimed at the punishment and prevention of torture in Africa. It is the aim of the Robben Island Guidelines to assist African countries in designing systems that will be effective in combating torture. It is our contention that the Apartheid experience reveals several respects in which they are not an adequate guide. Whereas the monitoring mechanisms of the Guidelines should be taken seriously, they can be improved upon.
The paper examines the behaviour of the Apartheid judiciary and its performance in providing oversight of the executive’s actions. It then turns to consider the performance of the Apartheid judiciary in two areas key to court regulation of torture:
► The approach to the admissibility of evidence, and
► The weighing of fact in adjudicating torture allegations.
We conclude that even in authoritarian systems threats to national security (whether real or imaginary) seldom fall exclusively within the domain of the executive. It is therefore not naïve to believe that the law can have a positive effect on the way detainees are treated. We offer proposals in the article, as a contribution to the African effort to design systems that will be resilient to practices such as torture in security situations. We believe our proposals have a wider significance and can be a resource upon which lawyers all over the world can draw.


Breaking News: Obama's Executive Order on Guantánamo

The White House released today the long-promised Executive Order on detainee policy along with a fact sheet setting forth additional policy points (see prior posts here, here and here). President Obama's statement on the new policy is here.

The E.O. states that it has been issued pursuant to the President's constitutional authority as well as the September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. It does not purport to establish any additional or separate source of detention authority. The Order and fact sheet articulate the following elements:

1. The fact sheet calls for the resumption of trials before military commissions "for international terrorists that [sic] fall within their jurisdiction" in light of "key reforms" to the military commission system, including the bar on the use of statements taken as a result of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. As our readers will recall, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court confirmed that military commissions may only assert jurisdiction over violations of the law of war as opposed over crimes that are defined by general international criminal law, domestic law, or the international prohibitions against terrorism. Here is Secretary of Defence Gates's statement rescinding the moratorium.

2. The E.O. establishes a periodic review of the continued detention of current detainees who have been deemed to qualify for prolonged security detention by the inter-agency review mandated by E.O. 13492 (Jan. 22, 2009) or those individuals who have been referred for prosecution but have not yet been charged or prosecuted. By the terms of the E.O., this periodic review will not apply to future detainees. This review is also separate and apart from the habeas rights already being asserted with varying degrees of success by detainees in federal courts. Although some details of this process are provided in the E.O., full implementing guidelines will be issued by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Attorney General. The standard for continued detention is that an individual's detention is

necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States.
3. Each current detainee is entitled to a full initial review within one year of this date before an inter-agency Periodic Review Board (PRB) composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice and Homeland Security as well as the offices of the Director of National Intelligence and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then, detainees are entitled to a "file review" every 6 months that will consider "relevant new information" compiled by the Secretary of Defense plus a written statement from the detainee. The file review may result in a full review if "a significant question is raised as to whether the detainee's continued detention is warranted." Barring this, subsequent full reviews are to be provided triennially. (Note: The 4th Geneva Convention calls for a 6-month review of all security detentions of non-POWs).

4. The initial and periodic full reviews shall involve the following procedural steps and protections:
  • the provision of notice of the review and a summary of the factors to be considered by the PRB in determining whether continued detention is warranted;
  • the right of the detainee to submit evidence and witness testimony relevant to the determination of whether the detention remains necessary;
  • the provision of all information relevant to the inquiry, including "mitigating information," except where there are national security concerns that might require the provision of "a sufficient substitute or summary" rather than the raw material;
  • there is no adversarial discovery allowed from the government;
  • the detainee is entitled to a personal representative (who is an advocate) and private counsel (at the detainee's expense);
  • a "reliability" determination of all the information provided by the PRB;
  • a "prompt" written disposition, including recommendations for transfer conditions in the event that the continued detention standard has not been met;
  • review by a Review Committee (composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the AG, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) on that Committee's discretion or if consensus within the PRB cannot be reached;
  • no appeal of any review process is available to the detainee.
5. According to this review process, once an individual's detention is no longer "necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States," the Secretaries of State and Defense are to identify a suitable transfer location outside the United States consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The Secretary of State shall be responsible for obtaining appropriate security and humane treatment assurances regarding transferees. Transfer efforts shall be reviewed annually by the Review Committee. This will include a consideratin of those individuals whose detention is no longer deemed warranted pursuant to the new periodic review process as well as those individuals whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been granted.

6. The fact sheet promises the launch of additional criminal prosecutions in Article III courts. The fact sheets criticizes Congress's "intrusion" into this process and promises to seek the repeal of restrictions on the prosecution of detainees in federal courts (see our discussion here and here).

5. The fact sheet indicates that the Executive remains committed to exercising its discretion to choose the appropriate forum for further prosecutions, including with respect to individuals whom the United States may "apprehend in the future." The fact sheet argues:
A one-size-fits-all policy for the prosecution of suspected terrorists, whether for past or future cases, undermines our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts and harms our national security.
6. The fact sheet expresses support for two "components" of the international legal framework governing armed conflicts:

a. Protocol II, i.e., the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (June 8, 1977), and
b. Article 75 of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

With respect to the former, the Administration recommends ratification, particularly in light of the fact that an inter-agency review has concluded that U.S. military practice is consistent with the Protocol and its imperative of humane treatment in the conduct of armed conflicts. With respect to the latter, the United States is already on record indicating that Article 75 of Protocol I constitutes customary international law vis-a-vis international armed conflicts (query its relevance here given that the conflict has been characterized as non-international by the Supreme Court in Hamdan). The fact sheet does not repeat this observation, but it does reaffirm that the Article is "consistent with our current policies" and has historically earned our support. Article 75 provides certain "fundamental protections" that apply in international armed conflicts, broadly defined, to those individuals "in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol." These basic protections include:

► The right to be treated humanely in all circumstances and without discrimination.
► The right to respect for the person, honour, convictions and religious practices of all such persons.
► Prohibitions on the following acts "at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents:"
  • violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, including (i) murder; (ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental; (iii) corporal punishment; and
    (iv) mutilation;
  • outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
  • the taking of hostages;
  • collective punishments; and
  • threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

► The right of any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict to be informed promptly of the reasons for the detention. Any such preventative detention must be as short as possible:
Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.

► The right to have any sentence or penalty be made pursuant to "a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure." These protections include the following:
  • the right to be informed of charges without delay,
  • all necessary rights and means to launch a defense,
  • the right to be judged based upon one's individual responsibility,
  • the protection against ex post facto prosecution,
  • the principle of lenity,
  • the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty,
  • rights to be present at trial, confrontation rights and the protection against self-incrimination, and
  • the protection of res judicata
7. The fact sheet reiterates the administration's long-term policy of closing the detention facility on Guantánamo.

8. This law-of-war detention policy shall be reviewed every four years.

News flash: Ghailani gets life

A federal trial judge in New York just gave a former Guantánamo detainee the maximum sentence of life imprisonment following his November conviction for an offense related to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. (photo credit) As this 'Grrl wrote last November respecting the conviction (here and here), this no-surprise sentence

confirmed the capacity of federal criminal courts to protect both individual rights and public safety.

Food for thought amid rumors that trials before GTMO military commissions soon may resume.


Guantánamo 9 years on

Today, January 11, 2011, marks the ninth year of the existence of the detention center (left) at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Translate that to measure the effect on human beings. What this means is that scores of men have been detained by the United States for nine years now, in prison-like conditions, without trial.
Detention for nine years without trial.
If I appear impassioned, forgive me. But, yours truly has represented Guantánamo detainees for close to nine years—almost as long as the detention camp has been around. Over the years, I have:
► Played a direct role in the litigation journey that ended in the U.S. Supreme Court judgment in Boumediene v. Bush (2008) (prior posts).
► Seen several bills pass in attempt to restrict the rights of the detainees.
► Seen numerous military commissions start and stop. Child soldier Omar Khadr (right), whom I represented for a short time, has faced no fewer than three different military commissions, operating under different rules.
Seen my clients on hunger strike. And I heard from my fellow habeas counsel the stories of attempted suicides, successful suicides and whispers of homicide. In total, six men have died in custody.
A lot has happened in these last nine years, though for the detainees there, frankly, too little has happened. In those circumstances nine years can seem like a lifetime. And for some of those men, detention at Guantánamo may be a lifetime.
This brings us to the current state of Guantánamo and the detainees.
Of the original 779 detainees, 599 have been released, but 173 men remain in the detention camp. Despite the executive order issued by President Obama in January 2009 that calls for the closure of the detention camp within a year, which I wrote about here, Guantánamo remains open. And as posted by IntLawGrrl Diane Marie Amann this weekend, the most recent piece of legislation signed into law just a few days ago—The National Defense Authorization Act for 2011—makes it clear that closing Guantánamo will be very difficult. This Act:
► Prohibits the use of funds authorized by the bill for the transfer or release to the United States (or any U.S territory or possession) of Guantánamo detainees, including 9/11 defendant Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is specifically named.
► Requires certification from a foreign country regarding the transfer of Guantánamo detainees to that foreign country. The country must certify, among other items, that it: is not a sponsor of terrorism; maintains control over the detention facility; has agreed to take steps to ensure the individual won’t take action to threaten the U.S.; and has agreed to share information with the U.S. regarding the individual.
► Prohibits the use of funds authorized by the bill to modify or construct facilities in the U.S. to house detainees from Guantánamo for detention or imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Defense.
On Friday, January 7, President Obama signed the bill into law but issued a signing statement that specifically address two of the provisions relating to Guantánamo: the restriction on transfer into the U.S. and the certification requirement from foreign countries. (photo credit) Some criticized it as weak. But as Diane's post observed, the signing statement includes a pretty clear denouncement of Congress’ attempt to intrude on executive prerogative. Obama wrote:
'Section 1032 represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch authority to determine when and where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees, based on the facts and the circumstances of each case and our national security interests. The prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is a powerful tool in our efforts to protect the Nation and must be among the options available to us. Any attempt to deprive the executive branch of that tool undermines our Nation's counterterrorism efforts and has the potential to harm our national security.'
President Obama also stated that his administration would
'work with the Congress to seek repeal of these restrictions, will seek to mitigate their effects, and will oppose any attempt to extend or expand them in the future.'
The confrontation between the two branches is certainly interesting, and will require a watchful eye as to exactly how the administration will work with a new Congress that now has a Republican majority in the House.
A more interesting and disheartening development, I believe, are reports of a pending executive order on indefinite detention.
On Sunday, Laurie Blank contributed an IntLawGrrls guest post criticizing such an attempt to routinize indefinite detention. Also well worth reading is the extended article by Dafna Linzer (right), a ProPublica national security reporter, available here. (credit for photo by Lars Klove)
According to Linzer, the White House has been busy for over a year preparing an executive order that sets forth a system for indefinite detention. This system would enable detainees to challenge their detention on a regular basis by requiring a minimal review every six months and then a more lengthy annual review before a ‘parole-like’ board made up of officials from civilian and military agencies. Further, detainees would have access to an attorney to assist them in the process. This review would not replace the court habeas review required by Boumediene, but would supplement it. In essence, the executive review would weigh the necessity of the detention, rather than its lawfulness. The ‘parole board’ would have the authority to release the detainee if appropriate.
The National Defense law just enacted, however, with its severe restrictions on transfer to third countries, would fairly undermine this assertion of executive authority.
In the end:
There are still men at Guantánamo, who by either court order or executive determination (recall the Guantanamo Review Task Force Report that identified approximately 50 men who could neither be tried or released), will continue to be detained without trial either at Guantánamo or elsewhere.
It has already been nine years of detention for the men at Guantánamo, and recent events only confirm that indefinite detention may very well be a reality for some of these men. Equally disturbing, it may very well be a permanent part of our democratic society.

Detention, trials & American values

(Delighted to welcome back alumna Laurie Blank, who contributes this guest post)

As Professor Amos Guiora and I argue in "Don’t Deny Detainees Their Day in Court," an op-ed published a few days ago in the Los Angeles Times, the idea that every person deserves his or her "day in court" is a fundamental principle in the United States and many countries worldwide. Yet more than nine years after 9/11, the United States remains paralyzed not just about how to give the thousands of detainees in U.S. custody around the world their day in court but about whether to give them that day in court.
Multiple judicial forums have been created to try nonstate actors who have perpetrated war crimes from Rwanda to Sierra Leone to Cambodia to the former Yugoslavia — to give them their day in court. That makes the failure to answer this question for post-9/11 detainees particularly perplexing and deeply troubling.
Two successive administrations have been incapable of answering what should be the most basic questions: if, how and where to try terrorists. In the meantime, post-9/11 detainees languish in indefinite detention. The result is a fundamental and overwhelming violation of the rights of individuals who are no more than suspects, in either past or (more problematic) future acts.
The Obama administration reportedly now intends to issue an executive order establishing indefinite detention without trial for detainees at Guantánamo Bay. Such a decision would formalize this violation of basic rights. Denying individual accountability would now be official U.S. policy and law.
The claim that granting prisoners the right to file petitions for habeas corpus and receive regular reviews is sufficient is disingenuous. At best, that only addresses detention status, without doubt an important question. But it does not facilitate the resolution of individual accountability, the principle that requires that an individual have the opportunity for adjudication of his or her guilt or innocence. It is wrong morally, not to mention legally.
The first step, therefore, is to determine that individuals detained post 9/11 deserve their day in court, just like domestic criminals and perpetrators of war crimes. The next step is to implement a mechanism that can do so fairly and effectively. Speedy resolution is, by now, wishful thinking at best.
Unfortunately, for the last nine years, the U.S. has skipped the first step, and has let narrow political considerations devoid of morality, legality and decency determine the nature of the second step. Decision-makers talk of constitutional law and a "beacon on the hill," but acting on that talk seems to present overwhelming challenges. Principles have been discarded in the name of expediency.
Just as crimes grant the state the power to punish, so the state owes the detainees a duty of resolution, a duty to give them their day in court and either prosecute or release, convict or acquit. In the absence of an effective framework to do so, the state is engaging in unconscionable behavior - with an immunity largely granted by Congress and courts alike. Supreme Court and congressional acquiescence in the face of executive power has historically ill-served the American people.
Those who argue that indefinite detention accords with the treatment of prisoners of war gloss over two key distinctions: POWs are held in protective custody and released at the end of hostilities, whereas post-9/11 detainees are held in de facto punitive detention and terrorism has no end to trigger release. Those who want to argue that we are at war with al-Qaeda and other terrorists fail to consider that the law of war and principles of morality in armed conflict do not countenance such an approach, where detainees face the prospect of generational, even lifetime, detention without charge or trial.
Under the law of war, detention is a fundamental aspect of the authority to wage war and has the critical purpose of removing enemy fighters from the battlefield.
Within this framework, POWs are held as a preventive measure – states cannot prosecute POWs for engaging in lawful belligerent acts, i.e., for simply being enemy soldiers fighting on the battlefield. Battlefield detention is lawful and appropriate within this framework and there is no obligation to prosecute or release in this paradigm. The similarity to the indefinite detention we talk about today for detainees at Guantanamo thus lies in the fact that POWs are held without charge and for an unknown (but, critically, not undefined) period of time.
It is the differences that are critical here, though. The differences stretch traditional law of war detention to the extreme and create the effect of forcing a square peg into a round hole. Geography, lawful belligerency, suspected criminality, time parameters – each of these creates another stretch, another tear in the fabric.
► First, battlefield detention is just that – detention of those picked up on the battlefield.
As I’ve noted in an earlier blog post, defining the battlefield in the current conflict against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups is a critical task, albeit one not yet undertaken or accomplished. We therefore face a situation in which detainees may be held indefinitely under this new framework even if they were picked up either far from a battlefield or – perhaps – in an area where we are uncertain if it is the battlefield. If we cannot identify the battlefield, how can we identify battlefield detainees?
► Second, law of war detention is designed to hold enemy fighters until the “cessation of active hostilities.” In World War II, we held German soldiers for several years, until the end of the war. Several years – not a lifetime. The nature of terrorism and counterterrorism is that we are not going to defeat terrorism; rather, terrorism is something to be managed, minimized, defended against. Not only can we not envision an end to the hostilities, but more problematic, we have absolutely no way of identifying what that end might look like. Sure, we might defeat Al Qaeda in some meaningful way, ending their ability to launch any effective attacks against the U.S. or its allies, but some other terrorist group will take up, or have already taken up, the same fight and we will still be engaged in a conflict with terrorist groups. The consequence of this uncertainty and this very nature of terrorism is that indefinite detention effectively means generational, if not lifetime, detention. Such detention is on another scale entirely from law of war detention as we know it.
► Finally, belligerency and criminality also raise questions here. Law of war detention is primarily designed for lawful belligerents, prisoners of war. The U.S. has gone to great pains – and rightly so in most cases – to argue and demonstrate that the folks at Guantanamo are not lawful belligerents. Rather, they are persons not entitled to any form of privileged combatancy under traditional principles of international law. Still more, they are generally persons we suspect (or could likely prove depending on the evidence available) have committed violent crimes against Americans, American interests and our allies. Unlike law of war detention, therefore, where individuals held in protective custody are specifically not suspected of or charged with any crime, the detainees to be held in indefinite detention are effectively held in punitive custody, suspected of culpability in violent, criminal terrorist attacks but neither charged nor prosecuted.
Indefinite detention in these circumstances is a square peg in a round hole and completely undermines the basic notion of individual accountability, thus constituting a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The United States, uncertain whether the detainees are criminals or more akin to fighters in an armed conflict, must still grant them the basic right to a day in court. Without that, individual accountability is simply eliminated, effectively saying that the adjudication of individual liability is burdensome, perhaps even irrelevant.
This is not the American way; rather, it is a repudiation of American values. Whatever method of trial one prefers – civilian courts, national security courts, or military commissions, the time has come to decide and adjudicate.

"potential to harm our national security"


Several hours after yesterday's sentencing hearing in the 1st civilian trial of a onetime Guantánamo detainee -- convicted of an offense that carries a potential life sentence -- President Barack Obama challenged Congress as acting against U.S. security. His exact words:
The prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is a powerful tool in our efforts to protect the Nation and must be among the options available to us. Any attempt to deprive the executive branch of that tool undermines our Nation's counterterrorism efforts and has the potential to harm our national security.
Such an attempt in fact had been made. Successfully.
Tucked into the annual defense spending bill -- passed by Republicans and Democrats alike in last month's lame-duck session -- were:
► Section 1032, which, as Obama explained "bars the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 2011 to transfer Guantanamo detainees into the United States"; and
► Section 1033, which "bars the use of certain funds to transfer detainees to the custody or effective control of foreign countries unless specified conditions are met."
Despite contending that these sections may "harm our national security," Obama chose against a veto. He signed the bill into law lest ongoing military efforts go unfunded. The quoted words thus appear in a signing statement that may have little practical effect other than to emphasize the approach of 2 anniversaries:
► This Tuesday, January 11, will mark 9 years since the 1st post-9/11 detainees arrived at GTMO, on orders of President George W. Bush.
► 2 weeks from today, Saturday, January 22, will mark 1 year after GTMO was to have been closed according to the order that Obama issued, in fulfillment of a key campaign promise, the day after becoming President.
Of the estimated 700 boys and men who are said to have passed through the detention center in the last 9 years, 173 remain.



My 2¢ on Ghailani verdict

Pleased to have contributed to today's The New York Times' Room for Debate forum my thoughts on the decision of a New York federal jury to convict Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani of 1 count, and to acquit him on 284 others, related to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
My commentary on the verdict against the former Guantánamo detainee (left) is entitled A Proper Conviction. It concludes that the Ghailani

trial confirmed the capacity of federal criminal courts to protect both individual rights and public safety.

Comments by co-contributors may be found here.

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

'What Congress member is going to want to spend their political capital on passing a bill to pay money to suspected terrorists?'

-- IntLawGrrl Jenny S. Martinez right), on the slim chance of U.S. compensation for post-9/11 detainees, in a Wall Street Journal article about yesterday's news that Britain will pay about a half-dozen ex-detainees a settlement to end challenges to Britain's role in how the men were treated at Guantánamo.

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

I found it odd that Welner felt the need to emphasize repeatedly alleged crimes for which family members hadn’t been convicted and ones totally unrelated to terrorism. When you have a family with an al Qaeda connection, is it really necessary to list every black mark?
-- One of many trenchant queries by our colleague Michelle McCluer (prior IntLawGrrls posts), Executive Director of the National Institute of Military Justice, in her eyewitness posts on the plea hearing and subsequent sentencing proceedings against Omar Khadr, which she's been attending at a courthouse at Guantánamo (above right).
Well worth a read.

Update: Khadr pleads guilty


Omar Khadr has pleaded guilty to 5 terrorism charges.
According to a report by the Washington Post's Peter Finn, the plea entered this morning by a military commissions judge at Guantánamo provides for an additional year of detention at that U.S. naval base, followed by 7 years more in prison in Canada, Khadr's birthplace.
Below are my thoughts posted in anticipation of this latest development in this case of a captured child soldier.

Khadr to settle?

Emanating from Guantánamo yesterday:
News stories reporting rumors that the military commissions case of United States of America v. Omar Ahmed Khadr is about to end with a plea bargain.
If not, trial is set to begin later this morning in a GTMO courtroom.
Confirming rumors reported by the Los Angeles Times' Carol J. Williams on Saturday, Reuters' Jane Sutton speculated on a reputed agreement by which Khadr, now 24 (above right), would serve "one more year at Guantanamo, followed by seven years in his native Canada." (image credit) Sutton added that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had talked Sunday with her counterpart in Canada, which would have to approve any such deal.
Later on Sunday, Michelle Shepard of the Toronto Star, author of a book on the case, acknowledged such speculation, but stressed the statement by "Khadr’s Canadian lawyer Dennis Edney" that "there was no deal, 'as of this moment.'" Shepard thus continued with a preview of the trial, should it occur.
The Miami Herald's Carol Rosenberg, meanwhile, led with concern that any Khadr deal might remain secret (as has that of another detainee). Such secrecy would challenge "[t]he Obama administration's quest to show that military commissions can be as transparent and fair as other U.S. courts," Rosenberg reported.
(Indeed, as posted in the update above, this morning Khadr did plead. The agreement was not released, but is believed to provide for the sentence described in this post.)
As blogreaders well know from our prior posts, Khadr was 15 (above, middle) when seized by U.S. military personnel during a firefight in Afghanistan. He has spent 1/3 of his life in American custody. As detailed in his Department of Defense case file, Khadr now faces trial on charges of, inter alia, throwing a grenade that killed a member of the U.S. special forces during the firefight.
At the preliminary hearing that I attended in December 2008, defense lawyers indicated that proof of the charges at trial may prove difficult. From the beginning, however, proceedings have focused on 2 other aspects of the case:
1st, what Khadr suffered, including treatment as a "human mop."
2d, that if the acts alleged in fact occurred, Khadr was a child soldier. That fact alone ought to preclude prosecution and punishment, many have argued -- among them our colleague David M. Crane, former Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
The plea agreement bruited in yesterday's media would seem to take neither aspect into account.
Assuming speculation is correct, Khadr would not see release until after having served 16 years in custody -- a sentence scarcely seeming to incorporate much mitigation on account of detention conditions or any other reason.
The reputed deal departs markedly from international law with regard to child soldiers.
Consider the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. In Article 6(3) states parties agree to

take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service. States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to such persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.
Article 7(1) continues in like vein:

States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of the present Protocol, including in the prevention of any activity contrary thereto and in the rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary thereto, including through technical cooperation and financial assistance. Such assistance and cooperation will be undertaken in consultation with the States Parties concerned and the relevant international organizations.
The treaty's view that the children are "victims" and deserving of "rehabilitation and social reintegration," as well as "physical and psychological recovery," is obviously at odds with a prosecution and punishment strategy with regard to these same children.
It is at odds, then, with the reported disposition of Khadr.
Canada became a full state party to the protocol in July 2000; the United States, in December 2002. The countries' statements at ratification said nothing to undercut the force of the articles quoted -- which, as indicated in this report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, jibe with other treaties.
Wonder whether either state will address this discrepancy.

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

Imagine the events that led to those and similarly-grounded judgments as they actually took place in real life. Picture the school where women were held with unrestrained soldiers, the prison camp guarded by drunken, ill-disciplined troops; the compound surrounded by Hutus, where terrified Tutsi women had sought refuge and protection. Place these situations in their very real context of ethnic cleansing and genocide and then ask yourselves if consent could have anything to do, or have any meaning at all, in such circumstances.

-- Navanethem Pillay (above right), U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, former Judge of the International Criminal Court, and former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (prior posts), in "Sexual Violence: Standing by the Victim." Her 2009 lecture appears in a 2010 edition of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, which also includes papers (one by IntLawGrrls' guest/alumna Laura M. Olson) from an "After Guantánamo" symposium.

Read On! Zeitoun

(Read On! ... occasional posts on writing we're reading)

Feel a bit late to the table commenting on Zeitoun, the 2009 book by Dave Eggers. Blurbs on and in the paperback edition indicate that a host of reviews named it a best book of last year. Yet it's new to me, and worth a word or 2.
In Zeitoun Eggers writes at the overlap of fiction and nonfiction, novelizing the "true story" of persons whom he's interviewed extensively. It's a technique he also employed in What Is the What (2007), an epic biographical novel/autobiography of a man who'd been a Lost Boy during the war in Southern Sudan. Zeitoun is slimmer and makes no claim to autobiography; in this author's humble opinion, the newer book works less well, and perhaps that is one reason why.
(Eggers deserves much credit for his Voice of Witness efforts to publish stories of victims of human rights violations, and for his establishment of charities, like The Zeitoun Foundation, to continue his books' good works.)
The new book's principal characters are the Zeitouns, a Syrian-born husband of Arab heritage and his Louisiana-born wife of European heritage. Their home is New Orleans. Both are Muslims --he by birth, she by conversion shortly before meeting him -- and both suffered during and after Hurricana Katrina.
Eggers tries to present the story through the eyes of this couple, but the narrational voice remains his own. Thus at times certain passages, like that which attributes to the wife a reference to Islam, Judaism, and Christianity as "not-so-distantly related branches of the same monotheistic Abrahamic faith" (p. 66), lack an authentic ring.
Perhaps it's because of the Eggers' apparent outrage at how the couple were treated. That outrage is entirely appropriate, but his desire to explain the couple and their family, to contextualize their experience, occasionally gets in the way of their story. To name another example: even if it had been made far less overtly, caring contemporary readers would get the Guantánamo comparison that underlay the husband's travails and his wife's traumatic response to them.
That said, any caring reader will profit from pondering the story of the Zeitouns. It is, as Eggers recognizes, inevitably a story of contemporary policy and practice regarding human and national security.

(Not) facing the nation

IntLawGrrls formed in 2007 partly out of concern about the narrow range of what passes for wide-ranging public discourse.
Examples:
►A congressional hearing on the question of what to do about Guantánamo featured a panel purportedly representing the spectrum of answers. A photo in the next day's paper told a different story. Every witness had once worked in the U.S. Executive Branch and lived on the East Coast. All but one were of European ancestry, and only one could lay claim to any expertise in human rights law. None was a woman. (The picture in mind appeared in late 2006, if memory serves. But it's replicated weekly on Capitol Hill. (credit for 2009 photo of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Iran))
►Op-ed pages of major newspapers feature men in proportions far greater than that of men among the U.S. population. This phenomenon spluttered onto news pages in 2005, when the University of Southern California law professor at right, Susan Estrich, complained, and an op-ed editor pushed back. Disparity in the sex of cybercommentators, then and now, appears even greater.
IntLawGrrls endeavors to help change things, by: offering a virtual-world space for commentary by women; pointing out women's accomplishments through items like our expert series; and improving real-world public discourse through events like our "Women and International Criminal Law" roundtable to be held this October 29.
Now comes a new study charting that in the world of Sunday morning talk shows -- reputedly a world to which official Washington pays close attention -- disproportions are, well, off the chart.
The evidence is presented forcefully in "Guess Who Won't Be Coming to the Studio: An Unknown Congress," published in the Summer 2010 edition of the law journal Green Bag. The author is Alex B. Mitchell (left), a 3d-year law student at George Mason University School of Law in Arlington, Virginia.
Mitchell analyzed who appeared as guests in 2008-2009 on CBS' "Face the Nation," NBC's "Meet the Press," ABC's "This Week," "Fox News Sunday," and CNN's "State of the Union." All his findings are well worth pondering with regard to representation not only on talk shows but also in the halls of Congress. Here're his key bottom lines:
Minorities: More than a third of Americans -- 36.9% of the population -- belong to this category. Among them, of course, is President Barack Obama. Yet their representation in Congress is less than half the overall number -- 14.6%. And their representation on the talk shows? A near-infinitesimal 2.5%.
Women: More than half of Americans -- 50.8% of the population -- are female. Among them, of course, are House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, women who stand 3d and 5th, respectively, in the line of presidential succession. Yet women's representation in Congress is less than a third the overall number -- 16.9%. And women's representation on the talk shows? 13.5%, two-thirds smaller than their representation among all Americans.
Further skewing matters are a few other facts that Mitchell unearthed.
At a time when 58.6% of all members of Congress were Democrats (credit for 2008 photo of "freshmen" members of Congress), 49.8% of all talk-show guests were Republicans. Whereas Senators made up fewer than 20% of the Congress, more than 80% of all talk-show guests came from that upper chamber. And though fewer than 10% of all members of Congress fit into the category that Mitchell defined as "white, male U.S. Senators in office 6+ years," more than 60% of all talk-show guests fit in this category.
Bottom line on this set of facts:
► During the period studied, only 1 woman ranked among the top 10 repeat Congressional guests on these shows. Today's puzzler: Can you name her? (Answer below.)
The implications of Mitchell's research could fill volumes. Mitchell put it succinctly:

Explanations aside, the empirical effect of predominantly interviewing one demographic ... is that the wealth of diversity of ideas that make up our nation is stifled.

'Nuff said.

Nottebohm’s Nightmare

(Delighted to welcome back IntLawGrrls alumna Cindy Galway Buys, who contributes this guest post on her scholarship)

Many international law professors likely teach the 1955 International Court of Justice decision in The Nottebohm Case.
If so, they will recall that Frederic Nottebohm was a German-born businessman living in Guatemala at the time of World War II. He traveled to Liechtenstein during the war and became a citizen of that country in very short order. Guatemala refused to recognize his change in citizenship, leading Liechtenstein to bring suit against Guatemala at the ICJ. The ICJ held that Guatemala did not have to recognize Liechtenstein’s grant of citizenship to Nottebohm because he did not have a genuine connection to Liechtenstein.
Reading the ICJ decision always left me with unanswered questions. Accordingly, I began digging into the history a bit more to better understand why the ICJ reached the decision that it did.My research revealed that Nottebohm was the victim a little-known program run by the United States during World War II in which the United States pressured Latin American countries like Guatemala to identify persons of German nationality or ancestry and turn them over to the United States for internment for the duration of the war. Many of these persons were arrested and detained for lengthy periods of time as Nazi sympathizers on the basis of mere accusations unsupported by any real investigation or evidence. Sadly, as with the Japanese-Americans who were forced into detention camps during World War II, U.S. law and courts allowed these arrests and detentions of persons with German connections with little or no proof of Nazi sympathies, much less subversive activities. (credit for photo at right of arrival at Camp Kennedy, Texas, whose detainees included Germans from Latin America)
The original motivation for the U.S.-Latin American Detention Program appears to have been national security concerns, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. However, as time went on, the United States continued detaining persons who, like Nottebohm, had been deemed to present little or no security risks, because it was beneficial for the United States and Latin American governments to do so for economic reasons.
Thus, what started as a national security measure evolved into a program aimed at increasing U.S. economic influence in Latin America. Continuing to treat Nottebohm as an alien enemy ultimately paved the way for the Guatemalan government to expropriate his assets in Guatemala without compensation. The wartime setting and the alien enemy accusations also may have influenced the ICJ in its decision.
The article begins by telling the story of how Frederic Nottebohm and his extended family came to be caught up in the U.S.-Latin American Detention Program. It relates the motivations behind the creation of the program and analyzes the legality of the program under both United States and international law existing at the time. The article next examines the extent to which the law has evolved and whether the changes in the law would lead to a different result today. (credit for photo at left of Crystal City, Texas, detention camp for interned Latin American families)
The article then draws parallels between the arrest, detention, and trial of alleged alien enemies during World War II and those practices being employed today with respect to alleged “unlawful enemy combatants” in the current fight against terrorism. Finally, the article suggests some lessons that may be learned regarding the treatment of so-called alien enemies during times of conflict that have relevance for current U.S. policies regarding the arrest, detention and trial of suspected foreign terrorists.

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

[T]he act of state doctrine, 'whatever it might be – has no application where it is alleged that Commonwealth officials have acted beyond the bounds of their authority under Commonwealth law.' His Honour noted that, consistent with the principle enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, the limits of executive action raised a justiciable question which courts exercising federal jurisdiction were obliged to scrutinize as a basic element of the rule of law.

-- Dr. Stephen Tully, in an ASIL Insight entitled "Australian Court Permits Damages Claim for Torture by former Guantánamo Bay Detainee to Proceed." Tully was quoting the opinion of Judge Nye Perram in a recent ruling by the Federal Court of Australia. The court permitted to go forward a torture lawsuit brought by former a Guantánamo detainee against Australian law enforcement and intelligence agents. Judge Perram had invoked Marbury (1803), the landmark judgment by John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States, in concluding that doctrines such as act of state did not preclude further judicial review of the claims brought by ex-detainee Mamdouh Habib. In his Insight, Tully underscored the contrast between this judgment and U.S. rulings that have preclude further review in analogous post-9/11 lawsuits. Tully allowed, however, that chances for ultimate success in Habib's suit remain "slim."

A "child soldier"

Much in "U.S. Wary of Example Set by Tribunal Case," a story about Omar Khadr will not be new to our readers, who no doubt will have read IntLawGrrls' many prior posts.
What is noteworthy appears in the lead sentence of this recent New York Times article:

After working for a year to redeem the international reputation of military commissions, Obama administration officials are alarmed by the first case to go to trial under revamped rules: the prosecution of a former child soldier whom an American interrogator implicitly threatened with gang rape.

Khadr was seized in Afghanistan at age 15 and soon shipped to Guantánamo. He's been in U.S. custody more than 8 years -- nearly 1/3 of his life, which began with his birth in Toronto, Canada, to a family that had emigrated from Syria.
The Times article labels him, more than once and without hesitation, a "child soldier."
It's a label that wasn't often seen when initially used on this blog 3-1/2 years ago. The unquestioned use of the term in this Times article marks an important mindset-shift in a mainstream publication that seems yet to have a consistent rule on what deserves the label "torture." It's a shift that owes much not only to judicial decisions like this and this, but also to the release of "Oh, Mommy" interrogation videos (photo credit), to NGO advocacy, to the book Guantanamo's Child (2008), and to principal and amicus litigation.
Time will tell whether and how the shift affects the ultimate fate of this alleged child soldier -- if, that is, his oft-delayed criminal case, set to resume on October 18, ever proceeds to verdict.

 
Bloggers Team