Showing posts with label Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Show all posts

Terrorism said to be defined

Terrorism law is the central concern of the Netherlands-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon, an internationalized tribunal about which we've posted in the past. Established in 2007, it is charged with investigation and adjudication stemming from the 2005 assassination in Beirut of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
An ASIL Insight by our colleague Michael P. Scharf reports that last month the tribunal's "Appeals Chamber handed down a landmark ruling"; to be precise, it sets forth what its judges consider to be "the customary international law definition of terrorism." Entitled Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging (available in Arabic, English, and French here), the 154-page decision was written by President Antonio Cassese (below right) (prior IntLawGrrls posts) on behalf of a five-man panel (men make up all the judges of this tribunal; a couple of the prosecution and defense officers listed are women).
Scharf quoted paragraph 85 of the decision -- issued in answer to request of the pre-trial chamber considering whether to confirm a pending indictment -- which sets forth the elements of the definition of terrorism at customary international law as follows:

► '[P]erpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act';
► '[I]ntent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it'; and
► '[T]he act involves a transnational element.'

Scharf predicted that the definition will have ramifications that extend past the work of this tribunal -- into the work of the U.N. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001), and even into national legal systems.
That is not an entirely comforting thought.
The definition, at least as stated above, would appear to know few bounds:
► The definition would seem to sweep in state as well as nonstate actors. That should make more than a few countries uncomfortable.
► What's more, the definition would seem potentially applicable to many transnational offenses not colloquially understood to be terrorism. To name one example, much violence committed in the course of cross-border smuggling enterprises would seem to fit the bill.
Those concerns are reflected in definitions set forth elsewhere on the subject.
► For instance, 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), which requires annual country reports on terrorism, withdraws many state actors from the net by stating:

the term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents ...

► The catchall definition set forth in Article 2(1)(b) of the 1999 International Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism also is narrower, for it applies only to acts
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict.

Arson of a structure known to be unoccupied -- or of a building occupied by combatants -- would be excluded from the Convention's definition, but not, it would seem, from the definition advanced in the new judgment from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
These 2 counterexamples of state practice stand in tension with the tribunal's contention that its definition constitutes customary international law.
The tribunal's decision, Scharf reports, further endorsed at least some aspects of the encompassing accomplice-liability doctrine of "joint criminal enterprise," about which we've frequently posted. That embrace of expansive culpability, coupled with the breadth of the definition stated above, creates a risk that the stigma of "international terrorist" could be applied well beyond advisable limits.


On October 20

On this day in ...
... 2005 (5 years ago), a commission appointed by the U.N. released a report which attributed the February car-bomb death of Lebanon's former Prime Minister to "a carefully planned terrorist act organized by Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services," the The New York Times reported. German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, who led the commission that produced what came to be called the Mehlis Report on the death of Rafik Hariri, told the Post: "'The assassination of 14 February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities.'" In 2007, as we've posted, the U.N. Security Council would establish a Special Tribunal for Lebanon at The Hague, Netherlands. to examine the case. To date the tribunal (logo at left; prior posts) has issued no formal charges against anyone. (Last week it appointed its appeals judges; from a look at the tribunal's website, it appears that all its judges are men.) Just a few days ago, a U.S. State Department representative visited Beirut to insist that the tribunal "be allowed to work independently," according to a United Press International report. It quoted him as follows:
'We believe that the tribunal should be allowed to complete its work on its
own timeline and without outside interference until those responsible for the assassinations … are brought to justice.'
(Prior October 20 posts are here, here, and here.)

ECCC Update

We've blogged before on the remarkable denouement of the trial of Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) (below right) wherein the defendant all but changed his plea in the final moments of the trial, eviscerating the careful defense that had been constructed for him by his brilliant Co-Defense Counsel, François Roux, and driving a final wedge between his foreign and Cambodian co-counsel (left). The latter, Kar Savuth, had himself also surprised everyone in attendance with an impassioned closing argument on behalf of his client; he attacked the prosecutor's case on both substantive and jurisdictional grounds, and asked for an acquittal on all counts in the Closing Order.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, it was announced Friday that Duch has officially asked to withdraw Roux as his Co-Defense Counsel. Defendants are allowed to change their counsel only under "exceptional circumstances."
The Defense Support Section of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia issued an administrative decision allowing for the withdrawal on the grounds that:
    1. There is no reason to doubt that Mr Kaing’s loss of confidence is genuine;
    2. There is no reason to believe that the Request is aimed at obstructing the proceedings;
    3. The withdrawal of Maitre Roux at this stage will not unduly delay the proceedings;
    4. The loss of confidence amounts to exceptional circumstances.
Savuth will represent Duch at the reading of the verdict on the 26th of this month. Roux, meanwhile, has taken the position as chief defense counsel for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
In other news from the ECCC, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon recently announced that he would appoint a U.N. Special Expert on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to monitor the tribunal and endeavor to prevent political interference. The scuttle is that the position will be taken up by Clint Williamson (left), former U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, starting very soon.

David Tolbert to Head the ICTJ

A short note by way of announcement: our colleague David Tolbert (prior post), a contributor to the International Criminal Law Review Special Issue on Women in International Criminal Law announced earlier and co-sponsored by IntLawGrrls (see the Call to Papers under our globe map at right)), will assume the position of President of the International Center for Transitional Justice in March 2010.
Tolbert has enjoyed a stellar career in international law. Prior to accepting this post, he was Registrar for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. He’s also served as a Senior Legal Advisor in the United Nations, Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY, and U.N. Assistant Secretary General with a focus on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
Heartfelt Congratulations!

Bucking the Trend on Pre-Trial Detention

We've blogged a bit before about the "newest tribunal on the block," the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (building at right) devoted to prosecuting political assassinations and acts of terrorism in Lebanon.
The Tribunal has been convened with Professor Antonio Cassese (below left), former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Chair of the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, as President (prior posts). It officially started to function on March 1, 2009. (Controversially (prior IntLawGrrls post), many of the other judges have been kept anonymous, putatively for their safety, raising the specter of faceless judges presiding over star chambers. Only four of the judges are Lebanese).

Later in the month of March, the Tribunal's Prosecutor requested the Lebanese authorities to undertake two actions: pursuant to Article 4 of the Tribunal’s Statute, to defer their investigation of the lethal attack against Rafik Hariri; and to hand over court records, any probative evidence, and the names of suspects. Article 4 reflects the system of primacy that characterizes relations between states and the 2 ad hoc international criminal tribunals, and that stands in contrast with the principle of complementarity that governs the International Criminal Court. Article 4 states:

Upon the assumption of office of the Prosecutor, as determined by the Secretary-General, and no later than two months thereafter, the Special Tribunal shall request the national judicial authority seized with the case of the attack against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others to defer to its competence. The Lebanese judicial authority shall refer to the Tribunal the results of the investigation and a copy of the court’s records, if any. Persons detained in connection with the investigation shall be transferred to the custody of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal issued its first ruling in April of 2009, releasing from pre-trial detention four individuals -- Jamil Mohamad Amin El Sayed, Ali Salah El Dine El Hajj, Raymond Fouad Azar, and Mostafa Fehmi Hamdan -- who had been detained by Lebanese authorities prior to the establishment of the Tribunal. The Rules granted the Prosecutor, Canadian Daniel A. Bellemare (left), limited time to bring charges against the four individuals, two of whom are Generals, two others, Brigadier Generals. But Bellemare determined that even with the Lebanese information, he had not yet marshaled sufficient evidence to justify continued detention; thus he requested the release of the four. (Indeed, apparently several witnesses modified their statements, and one key witness retracted his statement incriminating the accused (See here, para. 37)).

In ruling on the Prosecutor's decision to release the individuals, the Special Tribunal (at para. 22, note 7) cited jurisprudence from the Human Rights Committee, the body charged with interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for the proposition that

pre-trial detention should be the exception.

See Human Rights Committee, Hill v. Spain, Communication No. 525/1993, para. 12.3 (April 2, 1997).

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon concluded that the Prosecution did not make “a manifest error of judgment in exercising his discretionary power” and approved the release. The opinion is available here.

This ruling is notable when compared to the practice before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia where -- as we've discussed here, here, and here -- pre-trial detention, even for octogenarians, appears to be the norm.

A really bad international legal development

The 11 judges of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon were sworn in yesterday.
Who are they, you ask?
Can't say.
In what has to be among the more backward developments of the current proliferation of internationalized forums for criminal adjudication, these judges' "identities are being kept secret for their safety." So went CNN's uncritical account of the event.
Marlise Simons of The New York Times didn't even bother to remark on her failure to name the judges, though she did volunteer that "only four" are Lebanese. Simons then proceeded to describe what she deemed "an impressive arsenal of security devices, with an extra focus on forestalling car bombs," to be found at the Hague-area headquarters (below left; credit) of this new tribunal (prior posts). She told much of her story through "[l]awyers familiar with the court" who "requested anonymity because of the court’s rules" -- whatever that means.
Transparency and publicity are cornerstones of contemporary norms of criminal procedure, and for good reason. Experience -- ranging from the Star Chamber of 17th C. England to the "Faceless Courts" of 20th C. Latin America to the post-9/11 policies of 21st C. United States -- reveals that secrecy invites arbitrary behavior and unfair proceedings.
► On what ground does Special Tribunal for Lebanon go forward in robes of anonymity?
► Why is it that the judges' names are secret when the prosecutor's is not?
► What does its apparent fear of identification portend for the ability of this bench to presume the innocence of any suspect brought before it?
► How can affected communities evaluate the work of this tribunal if they must glimpse it through veils of unnamed sources?
No doubt some will respond that such precautions are necessary, that this tribunal cannot go forward any other way. Such a response begs yet another question:
► Is sending in the lawyers the right way to address insecurity in post-Hariri Lebanon?

Teaching Terrorism

As we've discussed, Santa Clara University School of Law recently co-hosted a workshop with the International Committee of the Red Cross for law students interested in international humanitarian law. The various PowerPoint presentations delivered at that workshop have now been posted here.

The workshop culminated in a negotiation exercise involving a Working Group formed to generate a draft statute for a fictitious International Tribunal to Prosecute Acts of [International] Terrorism (ITPAT). Students were assigned to teams of 3-4 to represent the United States, the Philippines, Russia, Israel, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and other states with a particular interest in terrorism. Each team received a packet of materials on their “client” and its historical experience with, and legal approach to, terrorism. Like all diplomatic works-in-progress, the draft statutes itself was riven with brackets (even the title of the body remained contested). Students were charged with obtaining consensus on the open issues in formal and informal negotiations, whether multilateral or bilateral.
The key open issues were in many respects inter-related and reflect ongoing debates within the international law field:

► Students had to resolve whether the ITPAT would have jurisdiction over acts that would also implicate international humanitarian law, or the law of war. Draft language would have divested jurisdiction where the acts in question were committed within the context of an armed conflict, whether international or non-international. Alternative language enabled conduct to be simultaneously charged as war crimes and as acts of terrorism, where appropriate. In addition, this option proposed the creation of new international crimes of war, such as the crime of directly participating in hostilities (DPH). At the moment, the DPH doctrine is a feature of the principle of distinction and provides that individuals forfeit their protected civilian status when they directly participate in hostilities without the privilege of doing so. Such participation may render individuals subject to being targeted with military force, but it is not a war crime per se under contemporary IHL unless, e.g.,
  • it also constitutes perfidy
  • civilian objects are targeted or
  • disproportionate force is employed.
Teams that opted to include war crimes within the ITPAT’s subject matter jurisdiction had to decide whether to require some sort of nexus to terrorism crimes or allow for the prosecution of stand-alone war crimes, risking overlap with the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

► Students next had to grapple with how to define prosecutable crimes of terrorism. As I note in a recent article, the international community has defined terrorism in a piecemeal fashion; a consensus omnibus definition has remained elusive. Nonetheless, crimes of terrorism contain similar structural elements, and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism comes close to a global definition:

Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Students had the option of incorporating only existing terrorism treaties, or trying to craft their own omnibus definition.



► As the debate over the tribunal’s name reveals, students had to decide whether to assert jurisdiction only over acts of international, as opposed to purely domestic, terrorism. If a purely international definition was preferred, the students had to formulate an internationalizing element that would distinguish international from domestic terrorism.

► It was necessary to decide whether the Tribunal would exercise jurisdiction over non-state actors only or whether it would have jurisdiction over state actors.


In addition to these questions of subject matter jurisdiction, teams were invited to weigh in on trigger mechanisms, preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, the role of the Security Council in initiated or blocking prosecutions, and whether the ITPAT would be governed by principles of complementarity or primacy vis-à-vis domestic courts that may also have jurisdiction over the acts in question. These draft provisions were modeled roughly on the International Criminal Court Statute and draft iterations thereof.

Interestingly, students this year took an entirely different tack from last year. Last year, students almost unanimously agreed that the treaty should cover only acts of terrorism that occurred outside of a state of armed conflict. Under this approach, where the crimes had some nexus to an armed conflict, the ITPAT would have no jurisdiction. Last year's students also hesitated to assert international jurisdiction over acts of domestic terrorism.


By contrast, this year, students contemplated a tribunal with jurisdiction over war crimes in the traditional sense so long as they were connected with crimes of terrorism in terms of the purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the attacks (modus operandi), or the identity of the perpetrators. Participants favored language that would give a comprehensive tool set to the prosecution and fill holes in the existing international criminal law regime without creating redundancies or excessive overlap with the ICC, which does not assert jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism stricto sensu. Participants were also concerned that any ITPAT would necessarily adjudicate IHL in any case, as the Tribunal would have to decide whether the level of violence triggered the application of IHL. At the same time, while war crimes committed against so-called protected persons (like civilians or POWs) were easy to include in the proposed tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction, students grappled with how to precisely define crimes committed against combatants—both privileged and non-privileged. This group also favored the inclusion of both domestic and international terrorism, on the ground that the line between the two would be too difficult to draw in light of transnational terrorism networks and weapons markets.


In terms of the proposed Tribunal’s jurisdictional structure, students recommended adopting an express provision for self-referrals on the argument that there might be valid grounds for states to externalize the prosecution of crimes of terrorism — even purely domestic terrorism — committed in their midst. Where a state could in essence consent to jurisdiction, issues of complementarity less would be less pressing. They also suggested that the Security Council alone should be able to trigger cases involving state terrorism, on the idea that allowing state referrals for state terrorism would become too politicized.


At the moment, there is no movement toward an international tribunal for terrorism, although the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will assert jurisdiction over terrorism crimes as defined by Lebanese domestic law and the Rwanda and Sierra Leone Tribunals assert jurisdiction over the war crime of terrorizing civilians. The United Nations continues to work on a Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism. More on the United Nations’ efforts to combat terrorism can be found here.

The workshop is held annually and law students interested in international law and relations are encouraged to apply.

On this day

On March 14, ...
... 1991, 6 men arrested in 1974 following pub bombings that killed 21 persons were freed after 16 years in prison when a British court quashed their convictions based on evidence of misconduct by police and prosecutors. Representing the exonerated men, who'd become known as the Birmingham Six, was Gareth Peirce (above), a British barrister known for her representation of persons accused of terrorist acts. Among the recent clients of Peirce, whom the BBC's described as "an unreconstructed, old-fashioned, radical lawyer": some of the men whom the United States has detained at Guantánamo. (photo credit)
... 2005, political turmoil touched off by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri exactly 1 month earlier -- Lebanon's "Cedar Revolution" -- continued. The Associated Press reported that
symbols of Syrian power began coming down ... as Syrian military intelligence agents emptied their offices in Beirut and Tripoli and workers took down an imposing portrait of Syria's president in the capital's seaside boulevard. Lebanese citizens quickly hoisted their national flag -- red and white with a green cedar tree in the middle -- near the sites.

As we've posted, a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, charged with adjudicating crimes related to the Hariri killing, has been authorized but is not yet in operation.

Newest tribunal on the international block

Among the anniversaries just marked was that of the February 14, 2005, assassination of Rafiq Hariri, former Prime Minister of Lebanon (flag at right). Hariri died in Beirut, along with more than a dozen others, when a bomb exploded near his motorcade. Suspicions that some other state -- Syria, for example -- might be behind the incident made the incident a political hot potato. After much wrangling, last May the U.N. Security Council , by Resolution 1757 (2007), established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It joined a host of other ad hoc tribunals charged with adjudicating crimes in places like Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. (A Burundi tribunal also appears to be forthcoming.)
Thus it was fitting that members of ASIL-West, the regional pilot project of the American Society of International Law, met in San Francisco last week to hear about the new Lebanon Tribunal from the State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser for African and Near Eastern Affairs, Linda Jacobson. That session prompts this review of the progress of that Tribunal in these months since the Security Council's action last spring.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal has the potential to encompass a number of incidents. Article 1 of its Statute refers not only to "the attack of 14 February 2005, but also to "other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, or any later date decided by the Parties and with the consent of the Security Council, are connected" to the 1st attack. "Connection" is defined broadly, to include linkage by "criminal intent (motive), the purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the attacks (modus operandi) and the perpetrators."
Unlike in other hybrid tribunals, in Article 2 the applicable law is not international but rather, exclusively, national law:
► provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the maerial elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy; and ...
► ... Lebanese law ... on 'Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle.

Like many hybrid tribunals, this one will be situated at The Hague. And as in other hybrids, in this Tribunal positions will be divided between Lebanese and "internationals," both appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General from selection lists provided by states. To date a Chief Prosecutor's been named -- Daniel Bellemare of Canada, a founder and vice president of the International Association of Prosecutors. Bellemare's also serving as Commissioner of the U.N. International Independent Investigation Commission that's setting up the Tribunal. Judges too have been appointed, according to a a recent Los Angeles Times editorial.
But that same editorial reports that Syria (flag at right) is trying to thwart full implementation of the Tribunal. Last Thursday's anniversary thus was marked not by the gaveling to order of a new Tribunal, but rather by promises, from U.S. officials like President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as well as the U.N. Secretary-General's office, to keep on pushing toward that end.
 
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