Showing posts with label Omar al-Bashir. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Omar al-Bashir. Show all posts

TriskaidekaphiliCourt

Thirteen is a lucky number, at least for triskaidekaphiles.
Perhaps too for the International Criminal Court?
When the instrument of ratification Saint Lucia deposited with the U.N. Secretary-General this week takes effect on November 1, the number of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court will be 113.
The number of persons charged so far?
13, "most notably," Agence France-Presse noted, "Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir." (photo credit)
Perhaps the numeric coincidence will bring luck to efforts to execute arrest warrants. Most notably, for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

Darfur.Gitmo.dot.

There's a constant in the subtext of stories about Sudan.
For years, criticism of Sudan's treatment of its western and southern regions has come from many corners -- from college campuses, political candidates, human rights groups, aid workers, even states themselves. Not much progress, for all of that:
► The western region, Darfur, remains a humanitarian-aid disaster, as posted just days ago. Moreover, the current suspension of outright civil war in that region (in light green on the map at left) seems to have a rather short fuse.
► The warrant issued in March 2009 by the International Criminal Court, for the arrest of Sudan's President on charges of genocide and other atrocities in Darfur, remains unfulfilled. Indeed, it is flouted not only by its target, Omar al-Bashir, but also by the African Union, the regional organization through which some of Bashir's fellow leaders have promised him cover against the global court.
► Meanwhile, concerns mount that the government will put off a Southern Sudan independence referendum, which a 2005 peace agreement set for January 2011. Yesterday, according to the Associated Press, a local leader predicted "the collapse of a peace accord that ended a war that killed more than 2 million people if it stalls" the election, "which could turn the arid region," in red on the map at left, "into the world's newest nation and split Africa's largest country in two."
That's the text.
Why such disarray?
Why no change given the apparent consensus, at least in the West, that the Darfur conflict needs to come to an end?
Given further apparent consensus that the Southern Sudan peace agreement should be honored?
In short, what's the subtext?
In an article published this week, the Wall Street Journal's Jess Bravin connected dots that may answer some of these questions.
Reporting from Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, on a military commission's recommendation that "former al Qaeda cook Ibrahim al-Qosi" be sentenced to 14 years in prison, Bravin wrote:

The U.S. has been working with the Sudanese government to repatriate detainees from Guantanamo Bay, according to evidence presented ....
Indications are that upon imposition of sentence, Qosi will be repatriated to Sudan, along with 9 other Sudanese men detained at Gitmo. Adduced, Bravin wrote, was a letter which said:
'Sudan is ready to cooperate with President Obama in his effort to close down the Guantanamo facility ...'
Bravin connected this readiness to cooperate to Bashir's continuing at-large status. Experts he contacted -- Juan E. Méndez and IntLawGrrls' own guest/alumna, Mary Ellen O'Connell, disagreed on whether including Gitmo in the Sudan/ICC mix was a good or bad idea.
Truth is, given the way that countries interact, conflation of the 2 is probably inevitable. So too the add-on of concerns about the on-the-ground situation in Darfur -- even apart from consideration of the ICC charges. So three the add-on of concerns about what's up with Southern Sudan.
There's yet a 4th add-on, implicit but not quite overt in these Guantánamo revelations: Sudan's been a linchpin in counterterrorism at least since the days that the government tolerated Osama bin Laden's presence there, so that the United States and its allies are loathe to dismiss out of hand any aid the Sudanese government gives to anti-Qaeda efforts.
Kudos to Bravin for bringing subtext to light.
Time now for people who care to push the United States -- and other countries with clout, in the Security Council or elsewhere -- squarely to confront the complex of issues related to policy on Sudan.

Breaking News: Genocide Charges Against Al-Bashir

As we've blogged before (see here, here, here, here, here, and here, among others) the question of whether the violence in Darfur rises to the level of genocide has been an issue of some dispute. Today, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued a second warrant of arrest against Omar Al-Bashir, the newly re-elected President of Sudan. The issuance of the warrant is based on a finding (per Art. 58) that "there are reasonable grounds to believe" he is responsible for genocide against protected ethnic groups.
The particular manifestations of genocide charged are:
  • genocide by killing members of the group,
  • genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and
  • genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction.

The first arrest warrant covering war crimes and crimes against humanity (issued in March 2009) remains extant.
As you may recall, the Pre-Trial Chamber originally rejected the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest in respect of the crime of genocide. In July 2009, the Prosecutor appealed this decision. The Appeals Chamber in Feburary 2010 reversed and remanded, finding that the Pre-Trial Chamber had applied the wrong standard of proof. The new arrest warrant is the result of a reconsideration of all the evidence under the appropriate burden of proof. It concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Al-Bashir acted with specific intent to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups. (Photo, left, from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, which has excellent facts and figures on the crisis in Darfur here).
The Registrar will now prepare and submit a supplementary request for cooperation to the Sudanese authorities, all State Parties, and the Security Council, which originally referred the situation to the Court in March 2005.
At the moment, four cases are being heard in the Darfur situation:
  • The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”);
  • The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir;
  • The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and
  • The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus.

Breaking News: Al Bashir Can Be Prosecuted for Genocide

As we've blogged in the past (see, e.g., here, here, & here) the question of genocide in Darfur remained an open one. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC recently ruled that the Pre-Trial Chamber had erred in a prior ruling when it failed to confirm the genocide counts proposed by the Prosecution against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir (right).
The new ruling is premised on the burden of proof at the arrest warrant stage. The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) had essentially demanded proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Al Bashir's genocidal intent when it required proof that
the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn [from the evidence presented] is the existence of reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the [Government of Sudan's] dolus specialis/specific intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups.

In so holding, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the lone dissent on the PTC, Judge Anita Ušacka of Latvia (left), who argued that the Prosecution had met its burden at the arrest warrant stage.

In its ruling, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that
the evidentiary threshold of "reasonable grounds to believe" for the issuance of a warrant of arrest must be distinguished from the threshold required for the confirmation of charges ("substantial grounds to believe", article 61 (7) of the Statute) and the threshold for a conviction ("beyond reasonable doubt", article 66 (3) of the Statute).
The Pre-Trial Chamber has been directed to re-consider the scope of the arrest warrant pursuant to the appropriate standard of proof on remand. Stay tuned!

Look On! View the ICC film "The Reckoning" in D.C. Monday, on television Tuesday

(Look On! takes occasional note of noteworthy films.) No doubt IntLawGrrl Lucy Reed is not the only one of us who's already had the opportunity to view "The Reckoning: The Battle for the International Criminal Court." This coming week all of us will have the chance to see the documentary reviewed in Lucy's post above:
► On Monday, July 13, the documentary will be shown at 7:30 p.m. at the National Press Club, Murrow Room, 13th Floor, 529 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. A number of international law experts then will lead a discussion at this American Society of International Law event. Details and registration here.
► On Tuesday, July 14 (check time in your area here), the documentary will have its national television premiere on the Public Broadcasting Service program P.O.V.
As director Pamela Yates (pictured in Lucy's post above) explains here, she, along with producer Paco de Onís and editor Peter Kinoy, set out to tell the story of the ICC and its efforts. One focus, as described here and as depicted in this trailer, is on events leading to the indictment of Sudan President Omar al-Bashir for atrocities in Darfur.
P.O.V. also includes a link here for watching the film online from this Wednesday, July 15, through August 13. And the DVD can be purchased here.
One way or another, check it out.

Darfur/Chad. Genocide?

In Chad as in Sudan, those in power have problems of legitimacy. To maintain the conflict is for them the surest way to avoid shouldering their responsibilities.

-- Conclusion to "Guerre sans fin," a superb editorial in Le Monde. The essay begins by noting that anticipation of the arrival of annual rains, which largely preclude fighting, has once again stepped up combat on either side of the border between eastern Chad and the western Sudan region of Darfur. Even as some rebels prepare to attack the government of Chadian President Idriss Déby (left) from camps just across the border in Sudan, other rebels prepared to attack that of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (right) from camps in Chad. Anti-Déby rebels receive support from the government of Bashir, while anti-Bashir rebels receive support from that of Déby, Le Monde alleges, adding that neither Khartoum nor N'Djamena wishes to make war openly. Meanwhile, destitution reigns throughout the border region. The edito:
► Reminds of the complexity of naming the crisis "genocide" (a complexity creating a somewhat different set of problems in Cambodia, as today's post above details), as the United States but not many others have done. A recent Los Angeles Times article detailed the debate and posed the unanswered question of what international inertia means in the face of claims that Darfur is this century's 1st genocide.
► Underscores the need, about which we've posted in the past, for a regional solution to problems at this embattled frontier.

(credit for 2008 photo of Déby by Agence France-Presse/Karim Sahib; credit for 2009 photo of Bashir)

Indicting Al Bashir

As promised, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan (right) for crimes committed in the Darfur region of Sudan (map of Sudan, left) in response to a July 14, 2008 request from the ICC Prosecutor. (Prior posts addressing the indictment are available here). According to Article 58, the Pre-Trial Chamber will only issue an arrest warrant where the Prosecutor establishes that:
There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
In his application for a warrant, the Prosecutor must provide:
  1. The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information;

  2. A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the person is alleged to have committed;

  3. A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes;

  4. A summary of the evidence and any other information which establish reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed those crimes; and

  5. The reason why the Prosecutor believes that the arrest of the person is necessary.
Based on the Prosecutor's application, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir has committed war crimes (directing attacks against civilians and pillage) and crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, and rape) in connection with the counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur. The theory of liability is one of co-perpetration pursuant to Article 25(3)(a):

Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.
The Court declined to approve genocide charges, on the ground that the Prosecutor had failed to provide sufficient evidence of the President's specific intent to destroy a protected group. This omission provoked a dissent from judge Anita Ušacka (right). This may not be the end of the genocide story; pursuant to Article 58(6) of the ICC Statute:

The Prosecutor may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to amend the warrant of arrest by modifying or adding to the crimes specified therein. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall so amend the warrant if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the modified or
additional crimes.
That the Court planned to issue the indictment was "leaked" to the New York Times several weeks ago and then formally announced last week in order to give NGOs and others working on the ground in Sudan time to prepare for any fallout. And fallout there was. Adding further proof to the brutality of this regime, the Government of Sudan has demanded that aid groups, which feed and shelter millions of Sudanese citizens, leave.

My colleague Michael Kevane (left), a Sudan expert and Chair of Santa Clara's Department of Economics, and I published the following an op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle welcoming the arrest:

President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan has finally earned his day of infamy: On March 4, he became the first sitting head of state to be indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the fledgling International Criminal Court . He joins Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and Jean Kambanda of Rwanda as heads of state subject to international justice for their international crimes. The fact that al-Bashir - sitting at the apex of a corrupt and brutally repressive state - is being prosecuted internationally is more
important than the outcome of any particular charge in the indictment. While we believe his arrest will be easier than many think, the indictment alone represents a moral victory and an important milestone in the movement for international justice.

Notwithstanding that the United Nations Security Council orchestrated the referral of the crimes in Darfur to the ICC, diplomats are still scratching their heads over how al-Bashir can be arrested. The practicalities of his arrest will be aided by political factors that have been building against him: Al-Bashir will likely be handed over by members of his own regime. He commands no personal militia, unlike Ugandan Joseph Kony, who has evaded arrest by the ICC by hiding out in the dense tropical no-man's-land at the Congo-Uganda-Sudan border with his loyal private army.
Al-Bashir has become an extraordinary liability to the top powerbrokers of northern Sudan. Their oil revenue has been decimated by the collapse in oil prices. Their livestock and agriculture export fortunes are also collapsing as Middle Eastern demand for Sudanese exports dries up. Suddenly, reconciling with southern Sudan, the source of the oil revenue and a potential rival to the Muslim north, seems like a good strategy. Southern Vice President Salva Kiir will surely demand respect for international law as a precondition to continued North-South harmony. Al-Bashir's regime also remains under threat from rebel groups in Darfur, who have so far managed to resist Khartoum's counterinsurgency campaign.

These sources of instability are directly attributable to al-Bashir, and his inner circle will likely throw him to the ICC to enable them to remain in power. Indeed, there is every possibility that the same regime leaders who turn over al-Bashir will also give up his two fellow at-large indictees, Ahmed Haroun (who ironically serves as minister of state for humanitarian affairs) and Ali Kushayb (a janjaweed militia leader). In all likelihood, al-Bashir's co-defendants will turn against him as other subordinates have in past international prosecutions in exchange for some prosecutorial leniency.

The prosecutor has so far presented a very strong case against al-Bashir, and the indictment accordingly charges him with responsibility for a horrific array of crimes: murder, rape, attacking civilians, torture, and pillage. But even if ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo does not ultimately persuade the judges of al-Bashir's guilt on all counts in the indictment, he will have accomplished several important goals. A head of state who presided over war crimes and crimes against humanity will have been arrested and removed from power. The trial will create a set of evidentiary, legal and political precedents. After years of war and repression, Darfurian victims will finally have their day of justice.

ICC Prosecutor’s Application for Arrest Warrant for President al-Bashir of Sudan Highlights Rape and Sexual Violence as Evidence of Genocidal Intent

Yesterday, the New York Times reported that judges of the International Criminal Court had decided to issue a warrant of arrest for President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (right) of Sudan. Today, the Court issued a statement indicating that "[n]o decision has yet been taken by the judges." Despite the confusion, it appears that the Court is likely to make a decision on the ICC Prosecutor’s application for the issuance of an arrest warrant some time this month. (Prior IntLawGrrls posts.)
The application made by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo (below left) contains 10 counts:
► 3 of genocide,
► 5 of crimes against humanity, and
► 2 of war crimes.
Even if the Court issues the arrest warrant, it is not clear whether the warrant will include all 10 counts. The counts of genocide, in particular, have been the subject of much debate. Indeed, several commentators have questioned whether the application presents sufficient evidence to support the legal characterization of the crimes committed in Darfur as genocide (see, for instance, the recent article by Alex de Waal).
Genocide is notoriously difficult to prove. Proving genocidal intent demands a showing that perpetrators not only targeted members of a protected group, but also that they did so specifically seeking to destroy the group, in whole or in part. It is generally not enough to show that an accused is aware that his acts will result in the destruction of the group; the accused must seek to achieve the destruction, in whole or in part, of the protected group. Recognizing the difficulty of proving genocidal intent, the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have determined that, in the absence of a confession, genocidal intent can be inferred from other facts and circumstances, such as speeches or statements against the targeted group, acts of violence against cultural symbols associated with the group, other policies of discrimination against members of the group, and the brutality, scale and/or systematic nature of the atrocities against the particular group. Of course, when inferential evidence is relied upon to prove genocidal intent, the tribunals have cautioned that the
inference must be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.
Although there may be disagreement as to what inferences can be drawn from the evidence presented by the Prosecutor in support of the arrest warrant application, one of the remarkable aspects about the application is that -- unlike the analysis of genocidal intent conducted in 2005 by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) tasked with investigating violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur -- it explicitly makes reference to pattern evidence of sexual violence as one of several factors that the Court should look to in assessing whether genocidal intent can be inferred. Indeed, in his submissions to the Court, the Prosecutor clearly stated that
the magnitude of the rapes and sexual assaults carried out by forces and agents under the control of Al-Bashir during attacks on villages and around IDP settlements and camps . . . indicates an intent to destroy the target group as such.
Although the COI had suggested an inference of genocidal intent was not warranted because, among other things, persons forcibly dislodged from their villages were not exterminated but rather "collected" in camps for internally displaced persons and allowed to receive humanitarian assistance, the Prosecutor has indicated that the attacks against the targeted group —particularly the widespread rapes — have continued in the camps, and that this suggests an intent not just to forcibly displace the targeted groups but, in fact, to destroy them. As he noted,
In view of the social stigma associated with rape and other forms of sexual violence among the [targeted groups], these acts [have] caused significant and irreversible harm, [not only] to individual women, [but] also to their communities.
Additionally, while the COI also supported its conclusion that genocidal intent was lacking by pointing to the fact that not everyone who was targeted was killed, the Prosecutor has argued —and the jurisprudence of the ICTY supports his position — that the failure to kill every member of the group does not necessarily negate other evidence of genocidal intent. To the contrary, the Prosecutor has argued, attacking the surviving members of the targeted group via, among other means, the infliction of sexual violence, is actually an efficient strategy to achieve the eventual destruction of the group, given that the "slow death" and disintegration of the group via these means has given rise to more muted international outrage than outright killings of members of the group might have engendered.
Although it is ultimately up to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the issuance of an arrest warrant for genocide, the Prosecutor’s consideration of pattern evidence of sexual violence as potential evidence of intent should be commended. Indeed, although sexual violence has been recognized as a means by which to destroy a particular group (see landmark ICTR case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu), it has rarely been recognized as one of the factors that should be considered in assessing whether genocidal intent can be inferred. For instance, as alluded to above, despite finding that rapes had been used to terrorize, demoralize, and humiliate the targeted population in Darfur, the COI essentially ignored this evidence when making its assessment as to whether the facts supported an inference of genocidal intent. In light of how difficult genocidal intent is to prove, ignoring potentially valuable evidence of intent does a disservice to all who suffered under the perpetrators' genocidal scheme, including, of course, the victims of sexual violence themselves.

Framework for peace and justice

First, I’d like to thank IntLawGrrls for inviting me to be a guest blogger. I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to the blog’s discussion of current issues in international law.
A while back, an IntLawGrrls' 'Nuff said post illustrated how the issue of peace versus justice is in the news again. My own recent scholarship has focused on how the International Criminal Court can balance the demands of peace and justice in, for example, its case in Northern Uganda. The ICC Prosecutor issued arrest warrants against Joseph Kony and other leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) despite fears that such a step would impede ongoing peace negotiations. More recently, the Prosecutor sparked debate with his announcement that he is seeking an arrest warrant for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. Critics contend that the Prosecutor’s move will endanger prospects for peace in Darfur. Others, such as Justice Richard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, take the position that the prosecutor’s job is to prosecute, leaving political questions to others.
Under the ICC statute, there are several ways that the peace versus justice issue can be raised. I’ve examined these issues in my article, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 Conn. J. Int’l L. 209 (2008), and in a shorter, more general essay, The False Dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal Court, just published in the Hague Justice Journal (in English, with French translation). I offer a framework for balancing peace with justice based on the theoretical underpinnings of the ICC. In my article, I have two objectives:
► First, to offer a solution to a pressing problem at the ICC: how the ICC should respond to calls to drop the arrest warrants in favor of Ugandan alternative justice mechanisms.
► Second, to propose a theoretical framework to apply to the inevitable reoccurrence of the peace versus justice dilemma at the ICC, such as the situation in Darfur and the most recent site of inquiry, Colombia.
With regard to the Ugandan situation, the ICC Prosecutor has characterized the demands of the LRA for immunity from ICC prosecution as blackmail and extortion. The LRA is notorious for atrocities including mutilating and killing civilians, often at the hands of children it has forcibly abducted into its forces. The ICC was created to end impunity for international crimes. But can it insist that states reject trading peace for justice when the cost of refusal is measured in human lives?
While many speak in terms of peace versus justice, it is possible to achieve both peace and justice. The ICC’s institutional mandate is to prosecute or to facilitate prosecution at the national level. The Rome Statute is sufficiently ambiguous to allow the ICC to defer to nonprosecutorial alternatives in extreme circumstances. For example, the ICC might be faced with a request to suspend the case from the U.N. Security Council pursuant to Article 16 of the ICC Statute. The ICC might consider whether an alternative process such as a truth commission blocks the case under the principle of complementarity (Article 17) or under ne bis in idem (Article 20). Finally, the Prosecutor, with the acquiescence of the Court, might decide not to investigate or prosecute as a matter of discretion, in the “interests of justice” (Article 53).
In interpreting these provisions, the ICC should not only consider statutory interpretation, but also assess the proposed alternative:
► It should first evaluate whether nonprosecutorial alternatives are necessary and legitimate.
► If they are, the ICC then should examine the goals of international criminal justice.
Where the alternative mechanism furthers retribution, deterrence, expressivism, and/or restorative justice to an extent similar to that provided by international prosecution, the ICC should defer. In this way, the ICC might ensure that there is at least some measure of accountability for international criminals without blocking peace initiatives vital to ending mass killings and other atrocities.
This framework offers only a starting point for solving the very complicated problem of balancing peace with justice. In Uganda, for example, the peace plan offers a confusing mix of alternatives to ICC prosecution, making reference to both traditional justice mechanisms and domestic prosecution. The Uganda situation is still fluid, with some negotiators attempting to keep the peace process alive despite Kony’s failure to sign the peace deal, while others argue for a military solution. (credit for USAID photos of some of Uganda's internally displaced children)
The ICC can, of course, be only part of the solution to complex conflicts, in Africa and elsewhere.

France giveth to the ICC, but ...

... taketh France away as well?
Better late than never comes news that this summer France now fully accepts the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, even as to allegations that war crimes were committed by its nationals or on its territory. It joined the ICC in 2000 during the Presidency of Jacques Chirac (below, at far left). At that time France -- alone among all states parties so far -- invoked Article 124 of the Rome Statute of the ICC in order to put a 7-year hold on war crimes jurisdiction. The switch of positions is largely cosmetic given that France's "hold-on-a-minute" declaration would have expired on its own in mid-2009. (Other "interpretive declarations" by France, detailed here, apparently remain intact.) Still, withdrawal of the declaration operates as an endorsement of the ICC, and that has to be a good thing.
Less clear: whether France's behavior in the interim several months will prove an equally good thing.
In mid-September IntLawGrrls posted on machinations at the U.N. Security Council in reaction to the request for a head-of-state warrant in connection with the war his government is waging in the western Sudan region of Darfur. Debate concerns whether to defer the case for a year by invocation of Article 16 (inapt, at least 1 Rome Statute negotiator argues). Though there's been much focus on resistance by 1 member of the Council's Permanent Five -- China -- others in the P-5 also may favor deferral.
A trial balloon floated into public view on September 19, when Agence France-Presse reported the indication by an unnamed aide to France's current President, Nicolas Sarkozy, that
France is not hostile to a suspension of the ICC proceedings targeting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, accused by the prosecutor of genocide in Darfur, on the condition that Khartoum make a 'gesture.'

Asked what "gesture" might suffice, the aide demurred, noting only that the ICC prosecutor already had targeted 2 other Sudanese -- neither of whom Khartoum has turned over to The Hague. (credit for above AP photo of Bashir with Chirac, at 2007 summit in Cannes)
Last week reports surfaced that Sarkozy himself confirmed the position while in New York for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly. According to Reuters,

Sarkozy announced that if Sudan changes its behavior and actively supports growing international calls for peace in Darfur, Paris would back suspending any indictments the International Criminal Court (ICC) issues against Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.
Sarkozy made clear there would be strings attached. In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, the French leader said Sudan would have to 'radically' alter its policy towards Darfur, where international experts say at least 200,000 people have died since 2003. It would have to remove a cabinet minister indicted for war crimes in Darfur from the Khartoum government and stop delaying the deployment of international peacekeepers.

Curiously, the official French government account of the speech says only that Sarkozy mentioned Darfur only once -- that he opened his U.N. address by declaring:

'On ne peut pas attendre pour faire la paix et mettre fin à la tragédie du Darfour.'
that is,

'We cannot wait to make peace and put an end to tragedy in Darfur.'

But other accounts (here and here) affirm that Sarkozy called for "radically" changing Sudanese policies at a press conference during the same GA session; indeed, with these words he made such change a Sudanese sine qua non:
'Things must be clear, there will be no recourse to Article 16 unless there is radical and immediate change in Sudan’s policies.'

Perhaps in keeping with that claim, France last week helped broker a 6-month extension of the mandate of the U.N. Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on Sudan -- an extension secured notwithstanding that Sudan's diplomat "violently attacked" the "extremely critical" report delivered by that rapporteur, Sima Samar (right), who's served in Cabinet posts in Afghanistan and heads the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.
Now we must wait, to see how France and others in the P-5 next move through the Sudan/Darfur/ICC mess.

On seeking shelter from the ICC

The fact established in Monday's post -- "'unsignature' affords Bashir no refuge" from prosecution by the International Criminal Court -- provokes an obvious question:
Where else might Sudan's President sing "Gimme Shelter"?
The answer, of course, is the Security Council of the United Nations. Set up 6 decades ago to promote states' collective advancement of international peace and security, often as not the Council has been immobilized by states' disagreement, thus permitting conflict and insecurity to continue.
For years Darfur (left) has proved an issue rife with disagreement. And as our colleague, Northwestern University Law Professor David Scheffer, notes in his recent Jurist op-ed, the request of ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo for an arrest warrant against President Omar al-Bashir has by no means abated disagreement. The Security Council has divided into 2 camps, Scheffer writes:
► 1st, "those members willing to permit justice to run its course against President Bashir," and
► 2d, "those members seeking to derail Mr. Moreno-Ocampo's move ... for the ostensible purposes of advancing peace objectives in Darfur ...."
How might the Council take the case away from the ICC judges now mulling whether to grant the warrant application?
The proffered mechanism is this provision of the Rome Statute of the ICC:

Article 16
Deferral of investigation or prosecution
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.


But in the view of Scheffer -- who, as U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues led the U.S. delegation at the 1998 treaty-drafting conference in Rome -- Article 16 can't carry the weight that opponents of the Bashir prosecution want it to bear. Tracing the negotiating history, Scheffer explains that the provision was intended solely to permit a Security Council check on "premature" referrals by nation-states or the independent prosecutor -- and not on the prior decision of the Security Council itself to refer a matter to the ICC. He adds:

It would have astonished my colleagues and me in 1997 and 1998 to be told that Article 16, which was conceived as a compromise procedure to use at the infancy of a situation before the ICC, would be applied some day to short-circuit a Security Council referral lodged more than three years ago ... If that scenario had been presented to the negotiators more than a decade ago, Article 16 never would have been approved ....

Scheffer bolsters this conclusion with policy reasons against deferring the Darfur case. (Reasons also are set forth in this Article 16 Q&A posted by Human Rights Watch.) Before so doing, however, he includes a host of questions that he says would have been debated at Rome had states believed that Article 16 might operate in this manner.
Strikes me that such questions themselves point to a structural argument against construing Article 16 to allow a Security Council short-circuit.
Security Council referral is authorized as follows:

Article 13
Exercise of jurisdiction
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
....
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; ....


Nothing in the structure of the Rome Statute connects Article 13(b) to Article 16. The 2 are disjunctive, separate. In between them are Article 14 and 15, which detail conditions for the state party referral and prosecution action, respectively. The absence of any provision detailing Security Council referral indicates that Article 16 pertains only to the methods discussed in Articles 14 and 15. By this reading, the Rome Statute contains no clawback of the 3d method, Security Council referral.
Time will tell how the Council itself chooses to read the Statute.

(credit for U.S. Agency for International Development photo of transit camp near Nyala, Darfur, for persons internally displaced by the conflict in that western region of Sudan)

'Nuff said

(Occasional item taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

Mugabe proved he still had his despotic chops by recently winning an election that he lost.

-- Daily Show commentator Lewis Black, on why Robert Mugabe (left) of Zimbabwe won the gold medal in Black's "Evil Dictator Awards" contest. (Latest news on Zimbabwe's election crisis here.) Sudan's Omar al-Bashir took the silver medal, and the bronze medal went to former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić.
Video of the award "ceremony" here.

Sudan "Lost Boy" finds honor in new land ...

Carrying the U.S. flag at tomorrow's Olympic Games opening ceremony in Beijing will be Lopez Lomong, who "spent a decade in a refugee camp in Kenya as one of the 'Lost Boys of the Sudan'" before he was relocated "in the United States as a teenager with a family in Syracuse," New York.
"Lost Boys" is the name given to tens of thousands of boys -- and some girls -- separated from their families during the late-20th century war that pitted southern Sudanese rebels against the Khartoum government led by President Omar al-Bashir. The children wandered for hundreds of miles, eventually reaching refugee camps like Kakuma in northern Kenya. Many died along the way; some found their way to new homes in the United States.
The man given the birth name Lopepe Lomong -- he calls himself "Lopez" now -- is one of those. (Yesterday ImmigrationProf Blog named Lomong, above left its Immigrant of the Day.) Lomong ran track at Northern Arizona University. (photo credit) And last month in Eugene, Oregon, he won a spot on Team USA by placing 3d in the 1,500 meters. Friday he will lead that team into the Olympic stadium. He will bring as well thoughts of his native country, according to this report:

Lomong, 23, is a member of Team Darfur, a global coalition of athletes using the focus on the Beijing Olympics to urge China to exert its influence on the Sudanese government to alleviate the suffering in the country's Darfur region.

Not all his team members will be near at hand, however; see below.

... but China bars his Darfur Team-mates

Among those who will have to watch on TV as Lopez Lomong carries the American flag at the Olympics is Joey Cheek.
Like Lomong, profiled above, Joey Cheek is a U.S. Olympian. Cheek (left) won gold and silver speedskating medals at the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy. That year the U.S. Olympic Committee named him the male athlete of the year -- as noted by the official website of the Olympic Games set to begin tomorrow.
Yet the host of this summer's games, China, has revoked Cheek's visa to attend.
Why?
Turns out Cheek is a founder of Team Darfur, "an international coalition of athletes committed to raising awareness about and bringing an end to the crisis in Darfur, Sudan." (credit for images) In a few years its ranks have swollen to more than 360 athletes from dozens of countries. Turns out at least 1 other Team Darfur member, the synchronized-swimming-bronze-medalist-turned-journalist at right, Kendra Zanotto, also was denied a visa.
And it's alleged

that four athletes competing in Beijing who are part of Team Darfur were pressured by the Chinese Embassies in their respective countries to withdraw from Team Darfur. They were told they would otherwise be closely watched and dubbed as 'troublemakers' ....

Such moves seem unlikely to stifle all talk of Darfur -- or of China's ties to the regime of President Omar al-Bashir, whom the International Criminal Court Prosecutor's charged with genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. For it's estimated that more than 70 Team Darfur members will compete in Beijing.
One of those Team Darfur athletes is Lomong, the onetime Sudanese "Lost Boy" chosen to lead his team into the Olympic stadium.

Really big news about global justice

The last few weeks seem to indicate that international courts are getting some teeth, or, at least, are teething ...
► First, the International Criminal Court’s Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, gets Belgium to arrest Jean-Pierre Bemba, the loser in the 2006 presidential election in the Democratic Republic of Congo and head of one of the more infamous militias in that country. Perhaps to avoid charges of political meddling in DRC politics, Bemba has been charged at the ICC (left) not with crimes at home, but with involvement in mass rapes in the next-door Central African Republic.
► Then the ICC Prosecutor really gets serious, issuing an indictment for the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. (IntLawGrrls posts below, here, here, and here.) That should take some of the wind out of the sails of those ICC skeptics who pointedly asked why, after a nearly 3-year investigation, the ICC had managed only the indictments of a mid-level militia commander and a single Sudanese minister. They asked: Was the Prosecutor focusing just on non-state actors rather than powerful state figures? The Al-Bashir indictment is Moreno-Ocampo’s answer. But it leads to another question: Will the U.N. Security Council use the leverage Moreno-Ocampo has given it to push for real concessions from the Sudanese government, or will it squander the chance?
► Finally, Radovan Karadžić has come in from the cold; he's due to appear in court at The Hague today. (Prior IntLawGrrls post here.) The onetime self-proclaimed president of the Bosnian Serb Republic was arrested by his erstwhile Serbian ex-backers. They are now apparently more interested in securing for Serbia a place in the European Union than in thumbing their nose at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (right).
So far, so good. But it is still true that prosecutions by international courts of high-ranking military and government officials remain few and far between.
The really interesting story is the rise in national-level prosecutions of such officials:
► In the same few weeks, Alberto Fujimori (on whose extradition IntLawGrrls posted here) continued to stand trial in Peru, with military officers confirming that the former president indeed knew of the killings carried out in the name of combating subversion. Fujimori, like Slobodan Milosevic, had delayed the proceedings due to ill-health, but trial is now scheduled to be completed by the fall.
► Then, Argentine courts convicted the Butcher of Córdoba, Benjamín Meléndez, of orchestrating killings and secret death camps during the 1976-83 dictatorship. Since the country’s Supreme Court annulled prior amnesty laws, courts have convicted a number of the top military and police officials, and even a military priest accused of abetting torture. Trials continue throughout the country.
► Next door in Chile, the head of the secret police and his henchmen were convicted of blowing up General Carlos Prats, the former army head, and his wife, in a 1974 bombing in Buenos Aires. And that’s just on one continent. (credit for Chilean Supreme Court photo below left)
Indeed, according to a soon-to-be-published book on trying heads of state, edited by Ellen Lutz and Caitlin Reiger, since 1990, no fewer than 57 heads of state from around the globe have been indicted, at a minimum, for misconduct while in office. True, about half these are corruption cases, not violations of human rights or humanitarian law. True as well, in far fewer cases do the indictments turn into trials and convictions, and fewer still result in actual prison stints. Nonetheless, there is clearly a trend, and it points to the diffuse – but key – influence of the new architecture of international justice on national judges and courts.
That’s the really big news.


'Nuff said

(Occasional item taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes.)

Critics claim that Ocampo has imperiled peace negotiations -- but those negotiations were not progressing even before the ICC prosecutor named Bashir.


-- our colleague James C. O'Brien, a principal at The Albright Group, and Presidential Envoy for the Balkans during the Clinton Administration, in a Los Angeles Times op-ed comparing and contrasting this month's application for an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (above left) by International Criminal Court Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo (IntLawGrrls posts above, here, here, and here) with the 1999 indictment of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic (above right) by International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Prosecutor Louise Arbour.

Prosecutorial Puzzler Answered

(Solution to today's Prosecutorial Puzzler above)

a. 4

b. Heads of state who've been prosecuted, other than Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir, are:
(1) Charles Taylor (above left), indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone while he was the sitting President of Liberia. The Court, sitting specially at The Hague, is trying him now. Yesterday Chief Prosecutor Stephen Rapp said "that the case was in its fifth month of hearing the prosecution’s evidence, and could possibly wrap up 'within a year.'" (photo credit)
(2) Slobodan Milosevic (right), indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia while he was the incumbent President of Serbia. He was put on trial for genocide and other offenses, but died before any verdict could be rendered.
(3) Jean Kambanda (left), former Prime Minister of Rwanda. His 1998 plea of guilty to genocide, crimes against humanity, and related offense marked the 1st conviction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
(4) Karl Dönitz (right). Though best known as Nazi Germany's top naval officer, Dönitz served as President for the 23 days after Adolf Hitler committed suicide and before the end of World War II in Europe. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg convicted him of crimes against peace -- known today as aggression -- and crimes against humanity; he served 10 years in prison, then lived in Germany till his death by heart attack in 1980.

Head of state in ICC sights? Indeed.

(UPDATE: As expected, the ICC Prosecutor asked for a warrant against Sudan's President today. The charges: "genocide and crimes against humanity committed during the last five years of bloodshed in his country's Darfur region." The theory of liability, command responsibility. According to the International Herald Tribune report of Marlise Simons and Lydia Polgreen, the Prosecutor declared at a press conference: "Al-Bashir organized the destitution, insecurity and harassment of the survivors. He did not need bullets. He used other weapons: rapes, hunger and fear. As efficient, but silent." ICC Press Release is here; summary of charges here.)

In a public filing at 1 p.m. Hague time today (7 a.m. Eastern time), International Criminal Court "Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo will submit to the Judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I his evidence on crimes committed in the whole of Darfur over the last five years."
Rumors swirl that he'll be asking judges to issue what would be the 1st ICC arrest warrant against a head of state -- President Omar al-Bashir (left), who seized power in a 1989 coup d'état. Allegations that Sudan's President bears criminal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are anticipated, so much so that yesterday "thousands of people rallied in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, in support of President Bashir and denouncing the anticipated charges."
As we've posted, the ICC already has indicted 2 other Sudanese on charges related to Darfur; however, both indictees remain at large.
(credit for Associated Press photo by Gregorio Borgia)

 
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