CWL---The Confederacy's Self-Inflicted Wound: Cleaning Out the Shenandoah in 1861

The Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, Michael Mahon, in Virginia At War, 1861, William C. Davis and James I. Roberston, Jr., University of Kentucky, 2005, pp. 131-148.

With the Blue Ridge Mountains on the east and the Allegheny Mountains on the west the Shenandoah River runs from the southwest and towards the northeast. Lynchburg lies at the southwest end and Harper's Ferry lies at the northeast end. Long but narrow, the valley was and still is an agriculturally very productive region of Virginia.

During the secession crisis of December 1860 through April 1861, most Valley citizens opposed secession and sent like-minded representatives to the secession convention in Richmond during the February through April meeting. Only four secessionists were among the 19 representatives from the Valley's voting districts. Lincoln's election and the secession of the lower South did not have the impact in the Valley districts as the events had in the Tidewater districts. The Republicans refusal to compromise on the extension of slavery became the wedge issue employed by the pro-secession delegates to nudge the state towards secession and were confident that Virginians would not move away from support of the new Confederacy.

Two major factors were responsible for unionism being so wide spread in the northern counties of the valley. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was the largest employer in this part of the valley and the politicians of Martinsburg guarded its regional economic impact. In addition, Winchester had a significant minority of Unionists and did northeastern (lower valley) counties of Berkeley, Clarke, Frederick and Jefferson counties had Unionist slight majorities or strong minorities.

The ascendancy of the Confederacy in these counties is directly related to the presence of Confederate forces. Troops under the command of Jackson during April, May and June. During this time 6,500 Valley men were organized into the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33rd Virginia regiments which later were recognized as the Stonewall Brigade. Though all state politicians in Richmond believed that the lower (northeastern) valley should be held by the Confederacy, Johnson and other military leaders believed it was indefensible. Tactically, the Winchester area was the further point of practical military defense. The fear that Union occupation of the Valley propelled Richmond leaders, Samuel Cooper in particular, ordered Johnson to strip the Valley of foodstuffs in 1861.

Wells J. Hawks, lifelong resident of the region and former mayor of Charlestown, became the chief commissary officer of Jackson's troops. By May, Hawks and his staff denuded the Winchester region of corn, oats, wheat and flour, as well as beef, pork and vegetables. By the end of 1861, Hawks reported to his superiors that he had purchased 1,300 barrels of flour and could obtain another 5,000 barrels during the winter months. Also in December Adjutant General Cooper telegraphed Major John Harmon, Jackson's quartermaster, that the Virginia Central railroad would be unable to transfer troops from the Valley to Manassas because all its cars and engine were transferring supplies.

In addition to selling the agricultural produce of their community, Valley citizens generated income by offering clothing, medical care, and horses to the Confederacy. The economic prosperity of the region increased as prices increased. Businesses not related to military demands took downturns in their gross sales and net profits; furniture and cabinet makers, jewelers and clothing retail stores suffered. Local residents realized both economic advantages and disadvantages; any business relating to taking care of soldiers was profitable and any business unrelated to taking care of soldiers was prostrate. Ironically, the cost of farm labor increased in the summer of 1861 which in turn diminished net returns on agricultural goods. There were less than 200 adult slaves in Shenandoah County, and local residents complained to state representatives that soldiers must be sent home to harvest the July, August and September crops.

Farm families struggles became acute when not only labor was scarce but also the heavy livestock used in the harvest became rare. Military impressment of teams of horses and oxen caused resentment toward the military. Even teams that were needed to transports those Southerners fleeing from Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, Shepardstown, Charlestown, and Berryville were hard to find and when available they were costly. As the war progressed, coffee, tea, sugar and salt were in shortage supply and their prices spiraled upward. The price of coffee doubled in August, rising from 25 cents to 50 cents a pound; the price of salt nearly quadrupled from 8 to 30 dollars a pound. "Our winter will, I fear, will be rather a hard one," wrote Julia Chase of Winchester. From the firing on Fort Sumter to the fall of 1861, economic prosperity and depression, and rising prices and rising costs, as well as the emotional shock of losing adult males on the battlefields and campgrounds, Southerners in the Valley were being afflicted by shortages of commodities and heartaches of losing kin. The empty cupboard and the vacant chair were becoming common in Valley households.

CWL---Moving the Target Closer to the Archer: From Montgomery to Richmond

Richmond Becomes the Capital, William C. Davis, in Virginia at War, 1861, William C. Davis and James I. Robertson, editors, University of Kentucky, 2005, pp. 113-130.

The secession movement was, for the most part, an uncoordinated event. If the 'Slave Power Conspiracy' existed, then the winter of 1860-1861 is the most apparent manifestation of the conspiracy. Outside interference in the matters of the states, both real and alleged, was the primary cause of the political actions taken in December 1860 and the early months of 1861. Secession leaders din not plan or coordinate the withdrawal from the Union and had not held "any serious discussion on whether or not to unify themselves afterward." (pp. 113-114)

On February 4, 1861, acting upon a invitation from South Carolina, the seceding states met at Montgomery, Alabama. Six states attended and within a week created a provisional constitution and chose Jefferson Davis as provisional president. Politicians and newspaper editors speculated for the next sixty days on the secession of Virginia, Maryland and Kentucky. If Maryland and Virginia removed themselves from the Union, then would Washington, D.C. become the capital of the confederated states?

The day after the first day of the confederation convention, February 5, a South Carolinian wrote to a Virginia senator that if Virginia secedes then the state will "have all things exactly as she wants them, including the capital." On April 17, was President Davis and Vice President Stephens were meeting, they were interrupted by the news that Virginia had seceded; basing his opinion on this news Davis told Stephens that the war was over before it had begun (pp. 115-117).

Promptly, Davis dispatched Stephens to Richmond. Reaching the Virginia state capital on April 22, Stephens met with Governor Letcher and the next day Stephens met, behind closed doors, with the state's secession convention. Stephens strongly encouraged the Virginia secession convention to adopt a treaty with the new Confederacy, adopted the Confederacy's provisional constitution and apply for statehood in the Confederacy. Stephens suggested the possibility that "if such an alliance is made . . . the seat of our government will, within a few weeks, be moved to this place." Stephens reiterated the remarks on April 23. His rationale, with which he hoped the Virginians agreed, was that the Yankee army would soon be knocking on Richmond doors and Virginians would be better off to have Confederate Army troops to help the Virginia militia greet the mudsill horde. (pp. 117-118)

Confederate strategy, at this point required a defensible border, and the Potomac River would make a fine one if Maryland chose to stay in the Union. By moving the Confederate capital to Richmond, Davis and the provisional Confederate congress understood that they were moving the target closer to the archer, but, there were advantages to be gained: Richmond and Petersburg were communication hubs for the railroad and the telegraph, and centers for manufacturing. It was taken for granted by Confederate strategists that the region east of the Appalachians and the Mississippi River provided the best pathways for Yankee invasions of Dixie. On the 25th the Virginia secession convention adopted the treaty and within a few minutes a Virginia delegate put forth a resolution that Virginia request the Confederation government move to Richmond. (pp. 118-119)

The Virginia secession convention did not readily endorse the resolution. A southwestern delegate attempted to have the resolution tabled. Another southwestern delegate declared it unseemly that Virginia would rush from secession, into the Confederacy and become its capital; it appeared to be a rush for political spoils and sullied the reputation and honor of the delegates. Other delegates spoke in favor of the resolution. Hadn't Stephens offered, in so many words, the capital to Virginia? Didn't Virginia need the resources of the Confederacy to withstand the expected military assaults that would soon come?

Objections to the resolution continued: Virginians had not ratified the Ordinance of secession; yes that was expected but not until May. But if it failed and the Confederate capital was already in Richmond? A vote was taken and the resolution passed 63 to 13; but there were enough absent members that the total number of voters did not constitute a quorum. Another vote was taken the next day; it was 76 to 16 in favor of the resolution. All of this was done behind closed doors and when the resolution was announced, the citizens of Richmond gave it mixed reviews as did many hard-core secessionists who were making their quarters that month in Montgomery Alabama. (pp. 119-121)

Alabama secessionists did not want to give up the capital and told Davis that he was elected the president of the Confederacy and not of Virginia. Georgian secessionists viewed Virginian secessionists as coming late to the party and bringing a lot of make-peace moderates to the government. The treaty between Virginia and the provisional Confederate Congress was ratified on May 6 and the next day Virginia was admitted to the Confederate States of America. Virginia's Governor Letcher had the reputation, among provisional Confederate congressman, as being an obstructionist and a drunk. In May, the new Confederate Virginia senators and representatives arrived in Montgomery and joined Davis, Stephens and their cabinet in lobbying for the removal of the government offices to Richmond. On May 11, a resolution was placed before the Confederate congress to adjourned on May 23 and reconvene on July 20 in Richmond, or wherever else provisional president designated. This resolution passed May 13; the resolution was sent to the Judiciary Committee which passed it on May 15 and placed it on Davis' desk for a signature.

Hardcore secessionists newspaper editors stated that the move to Richmond was only a partial step, that the real goal was to take the CSA to Washington and then seek a compromise and readmission into the Union. Davis surprised all when he returned the bill unsigned to the committee. The bill moved the President and the Congress to Richmond and left the judiciary and all else in Montgomery. (pp. 123-124)

A debate continued as Arkansas seceded from the Union and sent delegates to Montgomery. A vote came on May 20. Arkansas, Georgia, Texas and Virginia voted in favor of removing the government to Richmond; Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina voted against it. Louisiana's delegation split on the issue. Congress adjourned at 2:00pm and set a time in the evening to reconvene. Many delegates began to travel to Atlanta for trains to their home states. That evening with the absence of two of the three Florida delegates, and a one vote change from Louisiana and second vote was taken and the resolution passed 6 states to 3 states with the actual count of the delegates 24 to 20. By the thinnest of margins the Confederate capital was moved from Alabama to Virginia on May 20th 1861. Jefferson Davis was on a train heading north on May 26 and arrived in Richmond on May 29.

CWL ---- A New Meaning for the Term 'Guard Mount': Alexandria and Richmond, Virginia in 1861

"Prostitution in Virginia," first chapter in Sexual Misbehavior in the Civil War: A Conpendium, Thomas P. Lowry, XLibris Corporation, 2006.

If there was no change since the 1860 census, in May 1861 when the Union army seized Alexandria, Virginia, it found seven whores gainfully employed in two houses of prostitution in the city. The next month, women passing from Union-held Alexandria to the Confederate camps were suspected of being prostitutes by Captain Thomas Jordan, on Beauregard's staff and in charge of efforts to smuggle information out of Washington, D.C.

Thomas Radcliffe, captain in the 118th NY was dismissed from the service in late 1862 for behavior in summer of 1861; he had lived with a prostitute whom he had frequently but not consistently passed off as his wife. Hamiltion Hare, a lieutenant of the 31st NY was court-martialed for being drunk on a reconnaissance mission, exposing his penis while in camp, consorting with a prostitute in his tent while he kept the tent flaps open. Consorting consisted of singing obscene songs, quarreling and falling asleep naked.

Three men of the 16th West Virginia, in October 1862, testified against Lieutenant H.D. Davis; his behavior was that of a pimp who was associated with at least two whorehouses, one was located on Railroad Steet and employed six negro wenches. After the testimony, the provost gaurd was sent to pick up Davis. The gaurd found evidence that been to four Alexandrian houses of prostitution that day and finally located him at his 'headquarters' on King Street; he was drunk and asleep in his bunk. Both the 16th West Virginia and the 53rd New York were entirely disbanded before ten months had passed on their three year enlistment.

CWL --- African-Virginians, African-Confederates and African American Attitudes in 1861

Afro-Virginians Attitudes on Secession and Civil War, 1861, Ervin L. Jordan, Jr., in Virginia At War, 1861William C. Davis and James I. Robertson, Jr., University of Kentucky, 2005, pp. 89-112.

Virginia, a bi-racial commonwealth of 500,000 blacks and 1,000,000 whites in 1861 "had more black inhabitants than anywhere else in North America and the most enslaved blacks in the Western Hemisphere except Brazil." Of the Confederacy's 3,700,000 African Americans, Virginia was home to one-sixth of them. The explore their feelings, attitudes and commitments is a difficult thing to do. Very little first-hand documentation of the blacks' voices exists. The record of black voices is mediated by the whites recording of the words and behaviors. In the Southland, the nearly complete lack of African American editorial voices, diaries, letters, makes discovery of African Americans hearts and minds inherently hard work for the researcher. (pp. 89-90)

"Possibly the best means of ascertaining black Virginians' collective and individual perspectives about the times is to examine their works and deeds concerning slavery, free blacks, and Afro-Confederates; there surreptitious longings for freedom as manifested by running away; their relations with the Union army; and limited attempts to rise up against their racial suppressors." The lack of slave revolts is not a sign of lack of desire for freedom. While the Brown raid on Harper's Ferry, VA in October 1859, exposed the climate of fear among slaveholders, the raid came is signify to blacks the coming of a possible future, a meteor of war to use Herman Melville's term. (pp. 90-92)

After Virginia seceded on April 17 and the voters ratified the decision in mid-May, the black servant who daily raised the national colors over the state capitol, rescued the Stars and Stripes from the trash bin and hid it under his bed for the duration of the war. On the other hand, a slaveholder asked Jefferson Davis "Can we really expect the Negroes to stand with us?" Several slaveholders forced their slave families to emigrate to Missouri or Texas. Jordan, the essay's author, states "Confederate Virginians generally regarded slavery and white supremacy as a fundamentally natural order and divinely ordered way of life." Alexander Stephens viewed the Confederate Revolution as a keeping the world right side up and the Northern aggressor as desiring to turn the natural order of things upside down. For Stephens, slavery was the cornerstone of social, political and economic Confederate temple.(pp.93-94)

Desiring freedom, the slaves understood the constraints of the racist society in which they lived and which employed personal violence against them. Free blacks in Virginia faced a two horned dilemma: stay free and avoid the suspicion that they would become the Nat Turners of their day. The slave Nat Turner led a three day massacre in southeastern Virginia in 1831 which accomplished the deaths of over sixty whites and the swift, white response of executing well over 100 slaves.

Free blacks became Afro-Confederates as a means of preserving what freedoms they had.
They volunteered for work details building forts, served in CSA regiments as musicians and as commissary aides. "Afro-Confederates' scruples were either coerced, feigned or sincere," Jordan states. The two-horned dilemma is apparent is the instance of Mortimer Raymond, a black Richmond police informer who "reported on black offenders" but to his own astonishment was sent to the whipping post for the crime of associating "with a white woman upon terms of closer familiarity than the law permitted." His loyalty to whites did not mean that he could exercise a freedom of association with them. (95-97)

During the autumn of 1861, the enthusiasm of Afro-Confederates began to wane. Harsh camp treatment, broken promises and forced labor diminished the early 1861 desire to please and fit into the new Confederate society. Rumors of white led slave revolts were common throughout 1861; arrests and punishments with little or no evidence of revolt were just as common. Jordan states that 1861 closed Afro-Virginians, whether slaves, freemen, or serving in CSA forces, looked to the future "with pragmatic hope." (104-105)

CWL --- The First Confederate Soldiers

Confederate Soldiers in Virginia 1861, Joseph T. Glatthaar, Jr., in Virginia At War, 1861, William C. Davis, and James I. Robertson, Jr., University of Kentucky Press, 2005, pp. 45-63.

Northern mudsills versus Southern woodsmen. Yankee urban dwellers versus Southern farmboys. Better riding, independent-minded, superior shots, the men in 1861 who became the Army of Northern Virginia in mid-1862 would be able to take out 3, 5 or 7 Yankees. Just how “knowledgeable and experienced where these rural men who fought for the Confederacy in Virginia . . ?” Did pre-war experience create an indomitable fighting man in the Confederacy? (p. 45)

What advantages did Southerners bring into military service? For one motivation.
Viewed as a glorious, holy, sacred and patriotic endeavor performed by free men with honor, soldiers of the Confederacy insisted that they would win. This psychological and emotional edge was accompanied by pre-war militia training. At the very beginning of the war, Virginia Military Academy, Citadel, and a host of other military academies supplied leaders for the militia companies.

Yet, both in the North and South, the immensity of the war outstripped militia experienced. The army which Winfield Scott led into Mexico was numbered at 10,000, the size of a corps during the Civil War. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in 1862 was twice as large as Richmond, Virginia. in 1860.. Richmond the 26th largest city in the U.S.; the 25th largest city was Troy, New York. For many Southerners, the ANV was the largest community in which they had lived. Glatthaar, the author, understands that this new community was ‘a biological time bomb. (p. 50)

City dwellers had been inoculated by their survival of illnesses in their pre-war living conditions. Measles, mumps, typhoid, pneumonia, dysentery, and diarrhea took their tool in the ANV. Additionally, pre-war ‘rural living did little to develop concern over sanitation.. (p. 52) After 1st Manassas, Southern army encampments continued to suffer casualties from sanitation and hygiene issues related to the slaughtering of beef.

Despite a rural upbringing most Confederate soldiers had not slept and lived for extended periods out of doors. At home, food was prepared by mothers and daughters; in camp, cooking was done by males inexperienced with food preparation. Glatthaar cites examples of soldiers mistaking tallow for lard. Also, it is assumed that the Southern soldier had extensive experience with firearms. Casualties generated by negligence and accidents were a steady drain on company strength during 1861 and 1862.Glatthaar has found.

Many Confederate soldiers realized that military service was much like slavery. An extreme case of military disobedience at the company level were among Louisiana troops. Troops from other states acted in ways similar to the Louisiana men. “Removed fro traditional social controls and with too much time on their hands, young . . . responded with’ disruptive behavior. (p. 57) Wildly drunk, preferring prostitutes as female company, and gambling to the point of exhaustion, some Rebels were not good soldiers.

Virginia soldiers adjusted their military performance and discipline by 1862 when Lee took command of the Army of Virginia and made it into the Army of Northern Virginia. The proper sanWriting & Fighting From the Army of Northern Virginia: A Collection of Confederate Soldier Correspondence (Writing & Fighting the Civil War) by William B. Stypleitation, proper cooking, proper self-discipline, and proper obedience acquired by Virginia soldiers by June 1862 was what was their new commander, a very proper gentleman, R. E. Lee, demanded.

This essay is available from your local library, through inter-library loan, or from Civil War Librarian.

For Additional Reading:

Writing & Fighting From the Army of Northern Virginia: A Collection of Confederate Soldier Correspondence, William B. Styple, Belle Grove, Press, 2003

The Army of Northern Virginia: Lee's Army in the American Civil War, 1861-1865, Philip Katcher,Routledge Press, 2003

Lee's Tigers: The Louisiana Infantry in the Army of Northern Virginia, Terry L. Jones, Louisana State University Press, 2003