Showing posts with label National Security Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label National Security Court. Show all posts

They're back

President Barack Obama has revived the military commissions at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
He issued this statement yesterday:

Military commissions have a long tradition in the United States. They are appropriate for trying enemies who violate the laws of war, provided that they are properly structured and administered. In the past, I have supported the use of military commissions as one avenue to try detainees, in addition to prosecution in Article III courts. In 2006, I voted in favor of the use of military commissions. But I objected strongly to the Military Commissions Act that was drafted by the Bush Administration and passed by Congress because it failed to establish a legitimate legal framework and undermined our capability to ensure swift and certain justice against those detainees that we were holding at the time. Indeed, the system of Military Commissions at Guantanamo Bay had only succeeded in prosecuting three suspected terrorists in more than seven years.
Today, the Department of Defense will be seeking additional continuances in several pending military commission proceedings. We will seek more time to allow us time to reform the military commission process. The Secretary of Defense will notify the Congress of several changes to the rules governing the commissions. The rule changes will ensure that: First, statements that have been obtained from detainees using cruel, inhuman and degrading interrogation methods will no longer be admitted as evidence at trial. Second, the use of hearsay will be limited, so that the burden will no longer be on the party who objects to hearsay to disprove its reliability. Third, the accused will have greater latitude in selecting their counsel. Fourth, basic protections will be provided for those who refuse to testify. And fifth, military commission judges may establish the jurisdiction of their own courts.
These reforms will begin to restore the Commissions as a legitimate forum for prosecution, while bringing them in line with the rule of law. In addition, we will work with the Congress on additional reforms that will permit commissions to prosecute terrorists effectively and be an avenue, along with federal prosecutions in Article III courts, for administering justice. This is the best way to protect our country, while upholding our deeply held values.
(image credit)
Sure to draw fire, the decision provokes these initial thoughts:
Military commissions are not per se illegal. The United States has resorted to them on occasion since the days of its Revolutionary War against England. Nor does international law contain any blanket prohibition on such tribunals.
Yet tribunals of exception give rise to concern, under the laws of the United States no less than under international law, for reasons like these:
► Such tribunals tend to be set up in times of crisis, when there exists a perceived need to deny certain rights to the accused.
► Frequently, denial of rights occurs at a time when some in the society maintain that the particular accused do not deserve all the rights required under ordinary law.
► Whereas the ordinary criminal justice system has been tested over time -- has learned to accommodate the rights of the accused and the demands of public safety -- the fact that the tribunal of exception is an untried system makes it inevitable that unanticipated difficulties will occur, thus requiring improvised responses that themselves may give rise to new difficulties.
This combination of factors enhances the risk of miscarriage of justice. The point was made, to cite one example, by those Justices who dissented from the Supreme Court's decision in In re Yamashita (1946), which upheld the capital conviction by military commission of a former Japanese general.
Many of these risk-of-miscarriage factors, moreover, have been evident at the GTMO commissions:
► President George W. Bush ordered them established fewer than 2 months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in a Presidential military order that asserted, without demonstrating, that due process corners had to be cut.
► Abandoning any presumption of innocence, administration officials and many others made clear their view that in any event these defendants deserved few rights. To quote an example at page 268 of my 2004 article, Guantánamo:
Vice President Dick Cheney elaborated, saying that the detainees "'don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process.'"
► A glaring example of the inherent deficiency of untried systems occurred at the pretrial hearing in Khalid Sheikh Mohammed et al. that I attended last December at Guantánamo. (Prior posts here, here, and here.) As I related in an op-ed published that week, defendants, charged with responsibility for 9/11, told the judge they wanted to "confess." But proceedings had to be continued when it became clear that no one -- not the judge, not the lawyers, and surely not the defendants -- knew whether someone charged with a capital crime may plead guilty before the military commission and still face the death penalty. The question remains open today, fully 8-1/2 years since President Bush ordered establishment of the commissions.
President Obama's statement promises to avoid risks of miscarriage of justice, primarily by increasing the rights conferred upon detainee-defendants. The 5 reforms listed in the statement are moves in the right direction, though the degree to which the new commissions meet prevailing due process standards cannot be assessed properly till the new rules are published.
Surely deserving particular praise is reform No. 1. It appears to conform evidentiary practice in the military commissions to prevailing legal standards; that is, to ban from trial statements obtained from detainees not only by torture per se, but also by interrogation methods that, though they fall may not qualify as torture, are nonetheless cruel, inhuman or degrading. Omission of such statements eliminates a category of proof that was both legally objectionable and objectively unreliable.
It seems far better to resolve the 20 or so cases reportedly destined for trial at Guantánamo by fair commissions, moreover, than to establish, just because of 20 hard cases, a permanent National Security Court.
Even so:
That this statement initiates yet another retooling of a demonstrably flawed system means that the risks of missteps, of unintended consequences, again has been increased. That fact, coupled with the decision to continue proceedings at a remote location inaccessible to all but a few, no doubt will compromise claims of fairness and legitimacy of these trials.

Closing Guantánamo: Legal and Policy Issues

It was a pleasure to see so many Int’l L Grrls (and their readers) at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting this weekend. A couple of us will be offering "reports" from the conference. Here, I’ll present a summary of one of the more eagerly awaited panels on “Closing Guantánamo: Legal and Policy Issues" chaired by Bobby Chesney (Wake Forest). The panelists were David Glazier (Loyola of L.A.), Deborah Pearlstein (Princeton), Joanne Mariner (Human Rights Watch), and Glenn Sulmasy (U.S. Coast Guard Academy). A discussion of the crux of the problem of detention in non-international armed conflicts going forward will appear in a subsequent post. (Apologies if I jhave mischaracterized anyone’s position; clarifications welcome).

Chesney introduced the panel by describing the two executive-order task forces currently at work on detainee issues.
  • One is reviewing detainee files case-by-case with an eye toward reaching individualized dispositions.
  • The other will take a longer perspective and attempt to devise a detainee policy for the future.
In the meantime, the administration has been forced to take positions (see post here) in habeas cases pending in federal courts (see post here).

Prof. Glazier (right) emphasized that the decision to close GTMO was the easy part; the “how” is where the challenge lies. Glazier identified three potential outcomes:
  1. release,
  2. prosecute (or transfer for prosecution), or
  3. continue to detain.
Of the 240 or so detainees, about 60 men have already been cleared for release. In his estimation, about 80 individuals might still qualify as “high value,” but it is likely that most are minor functionaries along the lines of Salim Hamdan. Federal courts represent the only place to credibly prosecute individuals for whom there is sufficient evidence. Anything short of an Article III process will be perceived as a shortcut. Glazier raised concerns about the transfer paradigm: if the United States can’t fairly prosecute them here (for lack of admissible evidence or viable substantive charges), then it is unlikely other states could either. To transfer detainees for prosecution would put the detainees at risk of further detention without trial or of sham proceedings that might violate international human rights protections.

He acknowledged that some subset of detainees cannot be tried (because any evidence against them was obtained by torture or mistreatment, any crime for which they might be tried was enacted after they acted, or because there is simply no or inadequate evidence available against them) but remain dangerous. For this group, the U.S. should establish a preventive detention regime that is based on the law of war (to which GTMO doesn’t come close to complying). This paradigm must reflect the model of a communal camp setting with access to the outside world, etc.

Deborah Pearlstein (right) emphasized that the problem of what to do with GTMO is to a certain degree sui generis, because our options are informed and limited by what we’ve already done (which includes the commission of acts of torture, incommunicado detention, removal from battlefield, the failure to hold GC III Art. 5 hearings, etc.). For these individuals, there may be no good options available, so we’re left to sort through the “less bad” options. In so doing, we should attempt to do as little violence to international law as possible. This process of resolving GTMO should be cabined off from the larger problem of defining a detention process going forward; we can’t let the hard case of GTMO make permanent bad law or policy for the future.
Taking off on Glazier’s three categories of detainee, Pearlstein noted that the individuals slated for release represent a diplomatic, rather than a legal, problem. Many of these individuals may not be able to be sent home because of widely-shared treaty obligations under the Refugee or Torture Conventions. For those individuals who might have been prosecutable, there were more options available upon capture (courts martial, legitimate and lawful military commissions). Now, we’re left with federal courts as the only legitimate option.

For those who present security risks and might need to be further detained, the law of war may not provide any affirmative authority to detain individuals (either combatants or civilians who directly participated in hostilities) who were captured either in the context of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) or outside of a conflict situation entirely (such as in Zambia). In addition, the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) may not constitute sufficient domestic authority to detain these individuals. Thus, we would need express domestic authority in the form of new legislation to continue to detain them.

One positive outcome of the recent Obama administration filing beyond the welcome demise of the "enemy combatant" nomenclature is the good faith statement that the Administration intends to be in compliance with IHL. IHL quite clear and detailed on what detention authority exists in IACs. This, however, brings into sharp focus the need to look closely at the nature of the authority to continue to detain GTMO and other detainees given that the law governing NIAC provides no treaty-based authority to detain, on the presumption that domestic claw would provide the necessary authority outside of a state-to-state conflict where international law would be necessary.

Anticipating arguments by Commander Sulmasy, Pearlstein opposed the establishment of any separate national security court on the grounds that such a system won’t solve the GTMO problem and could never be established in time, given the legal challenges that would inevitably follow. She referenced a Human Rights First study demonstrating that the federal courts are sufficiently flexible to handle terrorism cases.

Commander Sulmasy (left) emphasized that even when we resolve the GTMO cases, there are hundreds of detainees at Bagram Air Base whose lawyers are also attempting to get into the U.S. court system. We still have not yet fully resolved the question of whether the situation with Al Qaeda is an armed conflict or a law enforcement problem or some hybrid of the two. The typical Al Qaeda member is part-international criminal, part-warrior.

Although he was thin on details, Commander Sulmasy advocated a hybrid national security court that would combine aspects of the military commission scheme as it was originally conceived (to dispense rapid justice) and Article III courts. (Sulmasy conceded that the military commissions, which should have begun trials in 2003, never achieved their intended purposes and that his support for the existing system eroded over time). This might involve proceedings that would be closed to the public (but not the detainee). This would not constitute preventative detention, as the process would be an adjudicative one rather than an adaptation of the Combatant Status Review tribunal system. Sulmasy questioned the ability of Article III courts to deal with terrorists and unprivileged combatants, noting that many of the terrorism cases reported on to date preceded 9-11.

Joanne Mariner (left) agreed that the immediate decision to close GTMO represented a meaningful break with the most reviled of the many unsavory Bush Administration policies. She was concerned, however, that some of the solutions being put forward are—and will be perceived to be—mere tinkering with the existing machinery. (She specifically noted the Obama Administration’s deliberate use of the term “refining” in its pronouncements). This, she emphasized, will not fool our European allies or the Muslim world for that matter, which may actually be the most important audience to convince that we’re genuinely changing our approach to fighting terrorism. In her estimation, we need the Muslim world’s support to fight terrorism effectively. In this regard, Mariner was disappointed in the most recent filing in the detainee litigation which, while it rejected the rhetoric of the Bush administration and laid to rest the controversial and unsupported term “enemy combatant”, resulted in only a slight modification to the Bush approach to preventative detention in practical effect.

With respect to the detainee categories, those who have been implicated in crimes should be prosecuted. The federal courts have already demonstrated that they are capable of this and may, indeed, have been overly harsh in certain terror cases (e.g., Padilla). The indictment of al Marri was an encouraging sign that President Obama has put some faith in the federal court system to deal with these cases.
Of the persons who cannot be tried and should be released, there is the concern that many of the GTMO conditions will be replicated overseas. Human Rights Watch researchers, for example, interviewed high government officials in Yemen, who implied that the Bush Administration had sought to create a proxy detention regime there with only a thin veneer of rehabilitation. In order to convince our allies in Europe to help us resettle these individuals, we’re going to have to set good faith example and accept some of these individuals into the United States. Immediately resettling the Uighurs, for example, would have jump started resettlement negotiations with Europe.

In terms of the problem of characterizing the current situation, Mariner noted that the Bush Administration capitalized on ambiguity between the formal war in Afghanistan and the so-called “global war on terror.” She noted that although NATO passed a resolution endorsing a military response to 9/11 (one that was focused on Afghanistan just as the AUMF), the UN Resolutions subsequent to the attacks all have Al Qaeda in mind and call for traditional law enforcement responses with no reference to war rhetoric. Indeed, Mariner noted that many of our closest allies have argued that applying a war paradigm to the global terrorism challenge is counter-productive and feeds into perception of the Muslim world that this is a war on Islam.

The rest of the panelists opposed Commander Sulmasy’s proposal for any sort of a national security court. Glazier acknowledged that terrorists have dual characteristics (criminal/warrior), but queried whether we need new law and institutions to bridge this gap. Depending on the circumstances, we can freely choose between existing bodies of law to respond to dangerous individuals, as long as we faithfully adhere to domestic and international legal standards. He is concerned that national security courts will inevitably involve departures from core due process protections that we hold dear out of mere expediency. Otherwise, why would we need them? He is also concerned that if we make arguments about why we need such courts based on the difficulty of invoking standard criminal law processes, it will be too easy to expand this “special” process to other “tough cases,” such as drug smugglers and organized crime members.

On the question of whether we need a more formal preventative detention regime, Pearlstein noted that many human rights organizations do not categorically oppose security detention. (Indeed, it is affirmatively authorized in the 4th Geneva Convention for non-combatants who post security risks). The question remains: is such a system sensible as a matter of US policy and counter-terrorism strategy? This requires a consideration of whom we are talking about preventively detaining. Where people are apprehended engaging in violent acts, they can be prosecuted for such crimes as providing material support for terrorism, even if the acts in question were committed extraterritorially. So, any preventative detention regime would likely be used for mere members of dangerous groups for whom there is insufficient evidence that they actually did anything. Detaining and thus incapacitating a marginally low-level and expendable Al Qaeda member will serve some minor specific deterrent effect. If we detain too many of his brethren, however, it might also risk radicalizing his inevitable replacements. The long-term strategic rationale for such a system is questionable.

Take care not to court insecurity

"George Bush Goes for Consensus in Naming Michael Mukasey for Justice," reads the minutes-old headline at Le Monde. It spins with the Associate Press story that surmises, "Mukasey appears unlikely to face a bruising confirmation battle in the Democratic-controlled Senate."
No quibbling about the credentials of Mukasey (left), who presided over high-profile terrorism trials while a Chief Judge at the U.S. District Court in Manhattan, to serve as Attorney General of the United States. Still, there's good reason for Senators to take a hard look at the nomination.
Fresh in mind is the U.S. citizen whom the U.S. executive kept in "enemy combatant" detention for years before permitting him to stand trial in federal court in Miami. Prosecutors set out the case against José Padilla in an open and public proceeding, without resort to classified evidence -- and jurors promptly returned the verdict of guilty that likely will permit his incarceration for life. Putting to one side the difficulties presented to the defense by the taint of prior detention, many saw the result as proof positive that persons suspected of terrorist acts can and should be handled through the justice system in place before attacks on Washington and New York set the stage for efforts to establish a newfangled system. (See here, for example; I'd written as much here before the verdict.)
The administration's called this new mechanism "military commissions," though, as the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in many respects -- respects particularly menacing to the U.S. tradition of fundamental fairness in the substance and procedure of criminal law -- the system deviates from past commissions. Despite Congress' near-rubberstamp of the system in the post-Hamdan Military Commissions Act, the newfangled system continues to falter: the latest halt occurred because military judges concluded that the government was asking them to act illegally.
Against this backdrop, consider now the op-ed that Mukasey published in the Wall Street Journal a week after the close of the Padilla case. In stark contrast with many other commentators, Mukasey saw the result not as an affirmation of existing practice, but rather as evidence that "current institutions and statutes are not well suited to even the limited task of supplementing what became, after Sept. 11, 2001, principally a military effort to combat Islamic terrorism."
To solve the problem that he maintains is at hand, Mukasey commends his readers, and Congress, to give "careful scrutiny" to proposals for "a new adjudicatory framework" -- the so-called Homeland Security Court or, more often, National Security Court, idea that's been percolating in certain thinktanks for a year or more now. It remained out of the larger public discourse until a recent bipartisan publication in support.
Have yet to read anything in support that demonstrates genuine need for this legal contraption. Proponents tend to ignore statistical analyses -- like this chart in the ABA Journal -- indicating that the Justice Department's scarcely a failure in playing its part in the U.S. antiterrorism campaign. And just as the "new paradigm" proponents of a few years back (some of the same folks now calling for this "new court") acted as if history offered no cautionary lessons, proponents today do not mention difficulty and criticism (some from the pre-9/11 United States) visited upon other countries that've pursued this path. Think of the nonjury Diplock courts in Northern Ireland, or the special terrorism tribunals in places like Egypt, Turkey, and Peru. These examples show that such courts, though established in the name of enhancing security, not infrequently make guarantees of due process, public assumptions of the fairness and legitimacy of judicial decisions, and, in extreme cases, public safety, less secure.
With benefit of hindsight, Mukasey's August op-ed looks much like an audition for the position of next Attorney General. And with more than a year remaining for implementation, the Senate ought to use the confirmation hearings to test whether the nomination's intended to pave the way for a final Bush legacy: for the 1st time in the history of a centuries-old country that's faced many a threat to peace, even to its very existence, establishment of a permanent, due-process-lite National Security Court.
 
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